Opinion
Civil Action No. 01C-12-031.
Submitted April 1, 2004.
Decided July 16, 2004.
Upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Additur or in the Alternative New Trial on the Issue of Damages. DENIED
Beverly L. Bove, Esquire, Aaron R. Goldstein, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Donald M. Ransom, Esquire, Casarino, Christman Shalk, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs filed this action claiming damages for personal injuries and loss of consortium stemming from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on February 10, 2000. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict on March 10, 2004. The jury completed the Verdict Form as follows:
1. Do you find that Defendant Debbie Thomas was negligent in a manner proximately causing the February 10, 2000 accident and any of the injuries claimed?
X Yes ______ No
If you answered "Yes", proceed to Question 2.
2. What amount of damages to you award to the plaintiffs for injuries you find to have been proximately caused by the Feburary 10, 2000 accident in question:
Barbara Cahall $ 2,500 Ronald Cahall $ 0
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Additur or in the Alternative New Trial on the Issue of Damages on March 12, 2004.
The first issue raised by Plaintiff concerns a note from the jury. During deliberations, the jury gave the bailiff the following note:
If we find Debbie Thomas negligent and award Barbara damages, will Debbie incur any additional damages?
The Court immediately instructed the bailiff to call counsel to address the jury's question. Before counsel arrived, the jury informed the Court, through the bailiff, that the jury had re-read the instructions and answered the question themselves. The jury announced that they had reached a verdict before the Court had any communication with the jury concerning the note. Prior to the reading of the verdict, the Court read to counsel the contents of the jury note. No party made any application to the Court for a mistrial or other relief before the jury returned to the courtroom. Counsel was content to have the jury's verdict taken without any inquiry by the Court regarding the note.
Plaintiffs have argued: "Additionally, based on the content of the jury's note to the Court, it is clear that the jury was considering information which was not in evidence: namely the financial impact on the Defendant should they award damages." This Court previously has rejected a similar argument that there was an indication that the jury was improperly considering financial impact. In Bradshaw v. Trover, the jury sent the following note while it was deliberating: "Was any medical bills paid by insurance company?" Before the Court was able to respond to this question, the jury arrived at its verdict. The award for pain and suffering was $3,000. The jury declined to compensate the spouse of the injured party for loss of consortium. The Court denied plaintiffs' motion for additur and a new trial on the issue of damages. The Bradshaw Court found that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence. The medical evidence concerning the extent of injury was much in dispute. Medical evidence demonstrating that the injuries were resolved within a reasonable period of time justified the zero award for loss of consortium.
Del. Super., 1999 WL 1427770, Vaughn, J. (Order October 27, 1999).
In another case in which the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for additur, the jury had found the defendant negligent in a manner proximately causing the accident, but awarded zero damages. The Court found that the jury's verdict indicated that it had determined that the plaintiff's injuries were minor. The evidence, however, demonstrated some degree of compensable injury. Therefore the Court granted additur in the amount of $2500. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found:
Hall v. Dorsey, Del. Super., 1998 WL 960774, *1, Quillen, J. (Nov. 5, 1998).
The concept that some damage claims are so minimal that they are not worthy of compensation is very important. The concept is also well grounded in law. The Jury, as the conscience of the community, has a distinct role to play in sending a message to the exaggerating litigious claimant that the claim is so relatively worthless that it does not belong in Court. . . . Moreover, the law has always drawn a limit; the law does not compensate for every loss.
Id. at *6 ( citing, inter alia, Furek v. University of Delaware, 594 A.2d 506, 525 (Del. 1990) ( lex non curat de minimis — the law cares not about trifles).
The accident at issue in this litigation occurred on February 10, 2000. Mrs. Cahall returned to work on April 1, 2000. While at work in July of 2000, Mrs. Cahall was moving files into boxes when she began to experience left shoulder pain. Mrs. Cahall was treated for this pain by a surgical procedure in February 2001. The most contested issue in this case is whether the left shoulder pain resulted from the February 10, 2000 accident, for which Defendant could be liable, or was caused by a work-related injury.
Defendant's medical expert witness specializes in surgery of the upper extremity. His qualifications were not disputed. Defendant's expert personally examined Plaintiff Barbara Ann Cahall, took a medical history, and reviewed Mrs. Cahall's medical records, including x-rays and physical therapy records. Using anatomical models, Defendant's expert explained his conclusions in great detail. In sum, he found that prior to July 2000, Mrs. Cahall did not have any symptoms relating to left shoulder pain, or any treatment or physical therapy directed to left shoulder pain. Defendant's expert opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mrs. Cahall's problems with her left shoulder, necessitating surgery, were not proximately caused by the February 10, 2000 accident. Additionally, he stated that Mrs. Cahall did not have any permanent injury and would not require any future medical care as a result of the February 10, 2000 accident.
The jury is entitled to choose the weight to be given to the testimony of each expert. "And, a jury is free to accept or reject in whole or in part testimony offered before it, and to fix its verdict upon the testimony it accepts." The jury heard conflicting evidence concerning the cause of injury. Plaintiff Barbara Ann Cahall's doctors testified in support of her claim. Defendant, however, elicited testimony from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the injuries were not caused by the accident. It is apparent that the jury gave greater weight to the testimony of Defendant's medical expert than to that of Plaintiffs' physicians.
Jones v. Shisler, Del. Super., 2002 WL 1038822, Silverman, J. (May 16, 2002) (Court granted additur in the amount of $2500 to supplement jury verdict of zero damages where jury found that the accident proximately caused come injuries to plaintiff).
A jury verdict will be set aside when, in the judgment of the trial judge, the verdict "is at least against the great weight of the evidence. In other words, barring exceptional circumstances, a trial judge should not set aside a jury verdict on such ground unless, on a review of all the evidence, the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the result." The Court should be reluctant to draw a conclusion different from the jury on a disputed question of fact when the subject matter is within the normal comprehension of a jury and the evidence in the case is not particularly complex.
Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979).
See id. at 466-67.
The Court finds that the jury's verdict was consistent with the weight of the evidence. Additionally, the case was not especially complicated and was within the normal comprehension of a jury. The issues decided by the jury, as reflected on the Verdict Form, are questions of fact. The award of damages to Barbara Ann Cahall in the amount of $2,500, and the verdict that Ronald E. Cahall receive no compensation for loss of consortium, are not inconsistent with the evidence.
THEREFORE, Plaintiffs' Motion for Additur or in the Alternative New Trial on the issue of Damages is hereby DENIED.