With respect to Garcia's argument that he had a right to change his mind and ask for a blood test, the trial court stated: "if a driver elects to take one of the three tests, he must complete the test or he will be deemed to have refused and failed to take it. ( Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182]; Quesada v. Orr (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 866 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 640])." The court also observed: "The fact that [Garcia] may have ultimately submitted to a blood test does not save him from the consequences of his earlier behavior.

California courts have stated that if a driver's refusal to take a test required by section 13353 is engendered by confusing or misleading statements by the arresting officer and not engendered by the driver's self-impaired ability to understand, then the driver's refusal is vitiated so that his driver's license may not be suspended. ( Goodman v. Orr (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 845, 853 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 226]; see also, Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 497 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182].) Therefore, the superior court in the instant case did not err in mandating the reinstatement of Joyce's driver's license.

The Agnew case goes on to discuss the so-called "confusion test" under Rust, supra. The Court thereafter, at 216 N.W.2d 297-298, quotes from Cahall v Department of Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal App 3d 491, 497; 94 Cal.Rptr. 182, 186 (1971), explaining Rust, thusly: "`Finally, appellant maintains that he was so confused concerning the taking of a chemical test that his refusal should be vitiated.

Because Bruno waived his right to request a statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632, we will assume the trial court found every fact essential to support its judgment. (Noguchi v. Civil Service Com. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1538; Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 495.) “On appeal, we ‘need only review the record to determine whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.

(2) Ordinarily, the question of whether plaintiff's conduct amounted to a refusal, as contemplated by Vehicle Code section 13353, or was the result of officer-induced confusion, is a question of fact. (See McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 653, 658 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 804]; Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 495 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182]; Goodman v. Orr (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 845, 848-849 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 226].) But, here, plaintiff argued that the admonitions required by the statute were misleading and confusing as a matter of law. He makes no claim that the officer's conduct or additional statements caused him to be confused.

However, here only 15 to 20 minutes was involved. (2b) As appellant failed to accompany the officer to Van Nuys to complete the breath test, he was required to select and complete another test. ( Smith v. Cozens (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 300 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 787]; Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182].) Appellant, himself, testified the officer requested five or six times that appellant submit to a further test, and that he insisted it was unfair to require him to do so. He refused to undergo any further testing.

"The determining factor is not the state of the suspect driver's mind, it is the fair meaning to be given his response to the demand that he submit to the chemical test." ( Maxsted v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, at p. 986; Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182]; Buchanan v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, at p. 299.) Under the circumstances, the only fair meaning that can be drawn from respondent's conduct is that he refused to submit to any chemical test.

Public policy dictates that the suspected drunken driver not be allowed to evade giving the best evidence of his offense by the pretext of partial compliance. ( Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182].) Since compliance consists of completing one of the tests, in the instant case it is necessary to determine what actions as a matter of law constitute completion of a urine test.

The question of officer-induced confusion is one of fact. ( Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 497 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182]; Rees v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 746, 749 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 456]; Lagomarsino v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 517, 519 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 193].) When a driver who has been given Miranda manifests confusion by asserting his alleged right to an attorney, it is incumbent upon the officer to explain that the right does not apply to these tests.

He responded, "I tried to urinate," and would not agree to either of the other tests. He accordingly submitted to none of the chemical tests required by section 13353 (1a) Smith's first contention, that the Vehicle Code at the time of his arrest did not require that he complete a test but only that he not refuse one, has been resolved adversely to him in Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 182], and Quesada v. Orr, 14 Cal.App.3d 866, 871 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 640]. In those cases it is expressly held that upon the suspected drunken driver's inability to produce a urine sample the statute requires him, upon request, to submit to, and complete, one of the other tests.