Opinion
C.A. No. 00A-03-007-CG.
Date Submitted: October 3, 2000.
Date Decided: October 26, 2000.
On Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Affirmed.
Lori A. Cagle, pro Se, New Castle, Delaware, Appellant.
Shu-Ching Kuo, pro Se, New Castle, Delaware, Appellee.
ORDER
This 26th day of October, 2000, upon consideration of the record in this case and the papers filed by the parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Appellant, Lori Cagle, worked as a cashier at a 7-11 Market owned by Appellee, Shu-Ching Kuo, from June 3, 1999 until October 23, 1999. The parties dispute whether Kuo fired Cagle or whether Cagle voluntarily quit her job.
(2) On October 24, 1999, Cagle filed an application for unemployment insurance benefits with the Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Division. On November 4, 1999, a Claims Deputy determined that Cagle was disqualified from receipt of benefits because she was discharged from her work for just cause m connection with her work. Cagle appealed the Claims Deputy's findings and on November 30, 1999, an Appeals Referee dismissed the appeal because Cagle failed to appear for the hearing.
(3) For reasons not set forth in the record, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board remanded the case back to the Appeals Referee, who held a hearing on January 20, 2000. Only Cagle appeared at the hearing. On January 26, 2000, the Appeals Referee issued her decision reversing the decision of Claims Deputy. The Appeals Referee found that Cagle had been discharged from her job without just cause and was, therefore, eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
(4) Kuo appealed the decision of the Appeals Referee and on March 1, 2000, the Board held a hearing, which both Cagle and Kuo attended. On March 7, 2000, the Board issued its decision. The Board reversed the decision of the Appeals Referee, finding that Cagle voluntarily quit her job without good cause in connection with her work and was, therefore, disqualified from receipt of benefits. Cagle has now appealed the decision of the Board to this Court pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3323.
(5) This Court's role, in reviewing a decision of the Board, is to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Duncan, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 308 (1975). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892 899 (1994). Under this standard of review, the Board must resolve questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence while this Court may only determine whether there is satisfactory proof to support a factual finding. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (1965).
(6) Under 19 Del. C. § 3315 (2), an individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits where the individual has been discharged for just cause in connection with his or her work. "Just cause" is defined as a "wilful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interest, or the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct." Abex Corp. v. Todd, Del. Super., 235 A.2d 271, 272 (1967). Under section 3315(1), an individual is also disqualified from receiving benefits where the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work.
(7) Both Cagle and Kuo, in their submissions to the Court pursuant to this appeal, set forth narratives basically reiterating their version of the events which led to Cagle's departure from her job. Because she asserts no other grounds for appeal, the Court will interpret Cagle's opening brief as an argument that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's determination that Cagle voluntarily quit her job.
(8) At the Appeals Referee hearing, Cagle testified that she reported for work at the 7-11 on Friday, October 22, 1999. Kuo came into the store and began questioning Cagle about whether anyone had been in the back room. Eventually, another employee asked Cagle to stock the cooler and Cagle proceeded to do so. When Cagle came out of the cooler, she found Kuo going through her coat pockets. Cagle testified that she questioned Kuo about why she was going through her coat, but admitted that she had a pack of cigarettes and a newspaper in her coat which she had not paid for. Cagle stated the Kuo allowed her to place these items on her bill, but that Kuo did not explain to her why she searched Cagle's coat pockets.
(9) Cagle testified that she was not scheduled to work until the following Monday. On Saturday, October 23, 1999, Cagle returned to the 7-11 to get her paycheck. Kuo refused to give her the check, stating that she had a right to hold the check until the following Monday. Cagle stated that Kuo called her a thief and told her to stay in the store until the police got there. Later that evening, Cagle learned from her daughter that Kuo had accused Cagle of stealing money from the store. Cagle testified that she spoke to the police, but that she was never arrested or charged with stealing money from the 7-11.
(10) Cagle testified that, although she was scheduled to work at the 7-11 on Monday, she did not go to work, "because [Kuo] started accusing me on Saturday and wouldn't give me my paycheck" and because, "it made me mad." Upon further questioning by the Referee, Cagle added that Kuo had told her on Saturday that she was not allowed back on the premises. Cagle understood this to mean that she was fired.
(11) In her written decision, the Appeals Referee determined:
The claimant was terminated for alleged theft, however, was never arrested, arraigned or required to make a court appearance. Whereas the employer contended that the claimant did misappropriate the said monies, the employer did not appear at the hearing, and the contention is therefore dismissed as vague and indefinite. Moreover, a person is assumed innocent until proven guilty of such charge by a court of law.
On the basis of the undisputed testimony of the claimant and the employer's failure to appear at the appointed hour on the day in question, it is accordingly found that the claimant's conduct did not rise to the level of wilful or wanton misconduct or just cause under the above-cited section of law.
As a result, the Appeals Referee reversed the Claims Deputy's determination that Cagle had been discharged for just cause and determined that she was entitled to benefits.
(12) At the Board hearing, Kuo appeared and testified that, during her employment, Cagle stole an instant lottery ticket. As a result, Kuo switched her to the day shift and told her she could not work alone. Kuo testified that she kept money in a back room and that Cagle was aware of that fact. On October 15, 1999, Kuo discovered that money had been taken from the back room. On October 22, 1999, Kuo came into the store while Cagle was working and discovered that money was missing again. Kuo testified that she then called the police. Kuo also looked in Cagle's jacket pockets and found a package of cigarettes, two knives, and a $500 money wrapper. Kuo also found magazines wrapped inside a newspaper. Cagle left the store before the police arrived.
(13) Kuo stated that the following morning, Saturday, Cagle came into the store to get her paycheck and Kuo told her that the police were looking for her. Cagle then left and did not came back. Nor did Cagle come to work on Monday or Tuesday. When the Board asked Kuo why she fired Cagle, Kuo stated, "I didn't fire her. The record, she just didn't show up to work because I waiting for her to come to work. Police can't question her and that's fact." Kuo also stated that she did not tell Cagle she was not allowed back onto premises, only that the police were looking for her.
(14) Cagle testified before the Board that she came into the store on Saturday to ask for her paycheck and Kuo told her to wait because the police were coming. Cagle testified again that Kuo told her she was not allowed on the premises and this that was the reason Cagle did not return to work. Cagle testified, "She never told me I was fired. She just told me that I wasn't allowed on the premises."
(15) In its decision, the Board stated:
The Board heard testimony from the employer, and the Board accepts this testimony. The Board finds that the employer did not discharge the claimant, but rather, the claimant stopped coming to work after the employer reported a possible theft to the police. The claimant's conduct involving magazines, newspapers and cigarettes was questioned by the employer, and when the employer wished to have the police question the claimant concerning the missing money, the Board finds that the claimant stopped reporting for work. She voluntarily left her work without good cause.
The Board then reversed the determination of the Appeals Referee that Cagle had been discharged from her job without just cause and disqualified Cagle from receipt of unemployment benefits.
(16) As set forth above, this Court's function is to determine whether substantial evidence exists in the record below to support the Board's findings. It is the Board's function, not the Court's, to determine which version of conflicting testimony to believe. In this case, Kuo testified that she did not fire Cagle. Rather, she told Cagle that the police wanted to question her about missing money and Cagle then stopped reporting for work. Clearly, the Board accepted Kuo's version of events, rather than Cagle's testimony that she was told that she was not allowed on the premises any longer. It is the Board's sole entitlement to do so and the Court cannot disturb its decision.
In conclusion, the Court finds that substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Board's factual findings. Therefore, the Board's decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.