Under OCGA ยง 9-11-52 (a), that constitutes a waiver. Cage v. Chase Home Mortgage Corp., 212 Ga. App. 861 (1) ( 443 S.E.2d 504) (1994). Appellants assert that they were relieved of any obligation to make a request, because the trial court voluntarily acknowledged that it would make findings and conclusions.
Accordingly, that issue is waived. See Cage v. Chase Home Mtg. Corp., 212 Ga. App. 861 (1) ( 443 S.E.2d 504) (1994). 4. Finally, Garmon asserts that the amount the trial court awarded Daniel for attorney fees is unsupported by the evidence.
Absent a timely request prior to the entry of the order or judgment, the trial court does not err in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as a part of the judgment. See Middlebrooks v. Fleet Finance Inc., 217 Ga. App. 263(2) ( 456 S.E.2d 627) (1995); Cage v. Chase Home Mtg. Corp., 212 Ga. App. 861(1) ( 443 S.E.2d 504) (1994); Burks v. First Union Mtg. Corp., 209 Ga. App. 41(1) ( 432 S.E.2d 822) (1993). Since Greene County requested findings of fact and conclusions of law only after the entry of judgment, it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to grant or deny such request.
Unlike Aycock, we do not remand the case for written findings of fact and conclusions of law because OCGA ยง 9-11-52 (c) has since been amended. Their absence is ground for affirmance when they are necessary for resolution of the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Cage v. Chase Home Mtg. Corp., 212 Ga. App. 861 (1) ( 443 S.E.2d 504) (1994). Even if we consider the oral findings, given to the parties by the court in explanation of its decision at the end of the trial, the judgment must be affirmed.
In this instance there was a sufficient request, as a matter of law, as is evident from the discussions of the court and the parties and their actions thereafter. In this regard, the case differs from Burks v. First Union Mtg. Corp., 209 Ga. App. 41(1) ( 432 S.E.2d 822) (1993), and Cage v. Chase Home Mtg. Corp., 212 Ga. App. 861(1) ( 443 S.E.2d 504) (1994), where no request was made. Here the court erred in finding, as it did in its order denying defendant Gold Kist's motion for reconsideration of the order denying Gold Kist's post-judgment motion, that "[t]he record does not reflect a request by either party for the Court to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prior to the entry of the Court's ruling."