Opinion
Index No. 159570/2018 Motion Seq. No. 001
04-29-2022
HAKAN CAGATAY, MIHRICAN CAGATAY, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, LOUIS SALCEDO Defendants.
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DATE 01/20/2022
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
JUDY H. KIM, JUDGE
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 47, 48, 49 were read on this motion for PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Upon the foregoing documents, plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is granted for the reasons set forth below.
Plaintiffs commenced this negligence action on October 16, 2018 for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle collision on October 14, 2017 on New Jersey Routes 1 & 9 South. It is undisputed that a vehicle driven by plaintiff Hakan Cagatay, in which plaintiff Mihrican Cagatay was a passenger, was struck in the rear by a sanitation truck owned by defendant New York City Department of Sanitation and operated by defendant Louis Salcedo.
Defendants interposed an Answer asserting a counterclaim against plaintiffs for contributory negligence (NYSCEF Doc. No. 27 [Answer at ¶12])
Plaintiff Hakan Cagatay testified at an examination before trial ("EBT") that at the time of the collision he was driving a Nissan Murano in the right lane of traffic and was stopped for approximately fifteen seconds at a red light when he heard and felt an impact at the back of his car (NYSCEF Doc. No. 29 [Hakan Cagatay EBT Tr. at pp. 25: 18-19, 33:2-10]). The impact of the sanitation track pushed plaintiffs' car into the car in front of them (Li at p. 35:20). Plaintiff Mihrican Cagatay also testified at an EBT that she and her husband were hit from behind (NYSCEF Doc. No. 31 [Mihrican Cagatay EBT Tr. at p. 20:8-19]).
Defendant Salcedo testified at an EBT that from his vantage point, on top of the sanitation track, he saw plaintiffs' car stop suddenly as a result of the car in front of it stopping suddenly (NYSCEF Doc. No. 32 [Salcedo EBT Tr. at pp. 46-48]). Salcedo further testified that (contrary to plaintiffs' EBT testimony) at the time plaintiffs' car stopped short the upcoming traffic light was green and remained green at the time of the collision (Id. at p. 48).
Plaintiffs now move for partial summary judgment as to liability on their complaint and dismissing defendants' affirmative defense.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, to be granted only where the moving party has tendered sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact and then only if, upon the moving party's meeting of this burden, the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" (Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499, 503 [2012] [internal citations and quotations omitted]). Here, plaintiffs have tendered sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact.
Defendants concede that the sanitation track driven by Salcedo rear-ended plaintiffs' vehicle and "[i]t is well settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle, and imposes a duty on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle to come forward with an adequate nonnegligent explanation for the accident" (Morgan v Browner, 138 A.D.3d 560, 560 [1st Dept 2016]).
In opposition, defendants argue that a material issue of fact exists because plaintiffs and Salcedo disagree as to whether the traffic light at the upcoming intersection was red or green at the time of the accident (NYSCEF Doc. No. 47 [Terrero-Black Affirm, in Opp. at ¶¶6, 10]). They further argue that plaintiffs' abrupt stop in front of a green light (as alleged by Salcedo) creates a question of fact as to whether plaintiffs were negligent. However, "[a] claim that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the rear driver" (Morgan v Browner, 138 A.D.3d 560, 560 [1st Dept 2016] [internal citations and quotations omitted]). "[Defendants [have] failed to rebut the inference of negligence created by the rear-end collision by showing that [Salcedo] maintained a safe distance from [plaintiffs'] vehicle before the accident" (Scioli v Joseph, 203 A.D.3d 680 [1st Dept 2022] [internal citations omitted]). Moreover, whether or not the traffic light was red or green at the time of the accident does not present a material question of fact for trial (See Chowdhury v Matos, 118 A.D.3d 488 ). Neither does defendants' allegation that plaintiffs' vehicle abruptly stopped raise an issue of comparative negligence supporting defendants' affirmative defense (Id.).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion is granted, and plaintiffs are granted summary judgment as to liability in their favor against defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that upon completion of discovery on the issue of damages, filing a Note of Issue, and compliance with all the rules of the Court, this action shall be placed on the trial calendar for a trial on the issue of plaintiffs' damages; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs shall serve a copy of this decision and order with notice of entry upon the Clerk of the Court (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119), who are directed to enter judgment accordingly; and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "EFiling" page on this court's website at the address www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh).
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.