Opinion
Case No. 2:03CV-0185 DB
March 26, 2004
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Cross-Plaintiff Holli Lundahl's and Plaintiff Carlee Caffree's Rule 59 Motion to Vacate January 12, 2004 Order Dismissing Action With Prejudice. (Docket No. 46, 48.) Having considered the parties briefs, the record and relevant law, the Court issues the following Order.
Although Lundahl and Caffree entitle their motion a "Motion to Vacate" it is "more appropriately titled a motion to alter or amend judgment" Achey v. Linn County Bank, 174 F.R.D. 489, 489 (D. Kan. 1997) (citing Hatfield v. Board of County Comm'rs, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff Carlee Caffree filed a notice of joiner to Lundahl's Rule 59 motion. (Docket No. ??.) Indeed, Caffree joined in Lundahl's motion to the extent that Lundahl argued that the Court's dismissal order (1) violated of the continued stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, (2) violated the removal statute of the Bankruptcy Code, and (3) violated her England reservation. (Notice of Joinder, p. 1-2.)
BACKGROUND
Caffree sued numerous individuals in federal court alleging a variety of causes of action surrounding the validity of a state court's order. (First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 18, 24-34.) Lundahl, a defendant in Caffree's action, cross-claimed against each defendant named in Caffree's action and two additional individuals, making the same basic allegations as Caffree, (Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 22, 31-47.) Numerous motions were brought by many defendants and, on October 23, 2004, the Court issued an order to Plaintiff Caffree and Cross-Plaintiff Lundahl to supplement their briefs regarding this Court's jurisdiction, in relation to a Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendants Leslie Lewis and Alexandria Doctorman. (Docket No. 40.) Neither responded. Finally, on January 12, 2004, the Court issued an order dismissing this case for want of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Docket No. 45.) Lundahl and Caffree argue that the Court should vacate its January 12, 2004 dismissal order.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal StandardA Rule 59(e) motion "does not permit the losing litigant to rehash arguments previously addressed and rejected or to present new legal theories or facts that could have been raised earlier." Achey v. Linn County Sank, 174 F.R.D. 489, 490 (D, Kan. 1997). However, such a motion permits courts to rectify manifest errors of law or fact and to present newly discovered evidence. Id. (citing White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1982); Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir 1996)). Whether a court grants a Rule 59(e) motion is within its discretion. Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Serv., 101 F.3d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1996)),
II. Analysis
Lundahl's and Caffree's argument is, at its core, two-fold, (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case in light of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code and (2) the basis for the order was erroneous.
A. Automatic Stay
Lundahl and Caffree argue that the Court's October 22, 2003 order for Plaintiff Caffree and Cross-Plaintiff Lundahl supplement their briefing violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. However, Lundahl and Caffree misunderstand to whom the protection provided by the automatic stay provision applies. The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code halts "the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1992) (emphasis added). "[A]s the plain language of the statute suggests, . . . the Code's automatic stay does not apply to judicial proceedings that were initiated by the debtor." Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Merchants Farmer's Bank v. Hale, 122 B.R. 539, 541 (E.D. Ark. 1990)). The Court's order for supplemental briefing was issued to Lundal and Caffree as Cross-Plaintiff and Plaintiff respectively. The fact that Lundahl was also a Defendant in the action does not render the Court's order violative of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision since the Court's order applied only to Defendants Leslie Lewis's and Alexandria Doctorman's motion to dismiss, not to anything filed by Lundahl in her capacity as a Defendant
In addition, Lundahl and Caffree allege the Court's January 12, 2004 dismissal order should be vacated because it was issued three days after Lundahl's bankruptcy case was dismissed because, as Lundahl and Caffree assert, the automatic stay continues for ten (10) days after a Rule 58 dismissal is entered. (Motion, p. 6.) Lundahl and Caffree cite to Bankruptcy Rule 9063 to support this proposition. However, there is no Bankruptcy Rule 9063 in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In addition, Lundahl's and Caffree's position ignores the clear language of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that the automatic stay terminates when the bankruptcy case is dismissed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) (1992). The automatic stay in Lundahl's bankruptcy case ended on January 9, 2004 because that is when her bankruptcy case was dismissed. Accordingly, the Court's January 12, 2004 order, issued three days after the dismissal, did not violate the bankruptcy court's automatic stay on Lundahl's case in her capacity as a Defendant.
B. Erroneous Order
Lundahl and Caffree propose that the Court's January 15, 2004 dismissal order regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine lacked merit (Motion, p. 6.) Lundahl and Caffree make three arguments attacking the merits of the Court's dismissal order, namely (1) an England reservation made by Lundahl trumps the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) the state court judgment was not final because the state case was removed to the Bankruptcy Court prior to the state court's July 15, 2002 order, and (3) Rooker-Feldman does not apply to Caffree because she was not a party to the state court action. (Motion, 6-10.)
As a preliminary matter, Lundahl's and Caffree's arguments attacking the merits of the Court's January 15, 2004 order could have been raised earlier. In fact, the Court sought these arguments from Lundahl and Caffree when it issued its order for supplemental briefing regarding jurisdiction. However, neither responded to the Court's order for supplemental briefing. Because Lundahl and Caffree failed to respond to the Court's previous order and only now raise arguments regarding the merits of the Court's January 15, 2004, which could have been raised earlier, the Court will not entertain them now. See Achey, 174 F.R.D. at 490.
As discussed earlier in this Order, neither Lundahl nor Caffree had a legally justifiable basis for not responding to the Court's order for supplemental briefing.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court DENIES Lundahl's and Caffree's motion to vacate.IT IS SO ORDERED.