Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2373-12T3
04-21-2014
ELODIA R. CAFFERTY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and CEVA FREIGHT, LLC, Respondent.
Carolyne S. Kalson, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Robert Lougy, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Ceva Freight, LLC, has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes, Fasciale and Haas.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 334,696.
Carolyne S. Kalson, attorney for appellant.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Robert Lougy, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Ceva Freight, LLC, has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Appellant Elodia R. Cafferty appeals from the January 8, 2013 final decision of the Board of Review (Board) affirming a decision of the Appeal Tribunal that she was disqualified for unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.
Appellant was employed full-time as an administrative manager by Ceva Freight, LLC (Ceva) from October 3, 1988 until she resigned effective April 8, 2011. In this position, appellant was "responsible for human resource functions, payroll, accounting and facility management."
In August 2010, appellant began receiving medical attention for depression stemming from the loss of her husband. She went on family medical leave and returned to work on August 15, 2010. At that time, she assumed additional accounting responsibilities due to the closing of Ceva's Rochester facility. Nevertheless, Ceva's managing director, Joe Macor, told appellant that she could reduce her hours to four days per week. When her workload required it, however, appellant would work extra hours or come in to work five days per week instead of four.
In January 2011, appellant took on some additional responsibilities, which required her to commute to a facility in Lawrence, New York. These duties were comparable to those Ceva assigned to other employees and no other employee was given the option of working four days per week. However, appellant felt "overwhelmed" by her work responsibilities and spoke to Macor. Macor testified that the New York assignment was "short term . . . very short term and it was never permanently assigned" to appellant. In addition, he permitted appellant to take another employee with her to New York to provide assistance. Macor also told appellant that Ceva intended to hire another employee to perform the New York assignment, which would reduce appellant's workload. Appellant acknowledged that her job was not in jeopardy and she was never disciplined for not keeping up with her work.
On March 25, 2011, appellant sent Macor a letter resigning from her job effective April 8, 2011. In the letter, appellant stated:
I feel it is in my best personal interest to resign. There have been many challenges of which I have struggled with and it is now affecting me to the extent that I feel it's best for me to leave. I have been a loyal employee for over 22 years so please know this decision is very difficult for me.Appellant did not discuss her decision to resign with Macor before sending the letter. She did not submit any medical documentation showing that her condition was aggravated by her assigned duties.
Appellant filed an application for unemployment benefits, asserting that she resigned from her position due to her medical condition and the stress of the job. This application was denied by the Deputy Claims Examiner, who found that appellant "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work." Following a hearing, the Appeal Tribunal reversed the Deputy's determination. However, the Board remanded the matter for additional testimony. On remand, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's decision that appellant was ineligible for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Again, however, the Board remanded for additional testimony.
On October 17, 2012, the Appeal Tribunal denied appellant's application. In rejecting appellant's contention that she resigned for "medical reasons[,]" the Tribunal stated:
There was no evidence presented to demonstrate [that appellant's] health condition was caused or aggravated by the work [appellant] performed at the time of the separation. The claimant provided medical documentation dated 03/09/2012 and 03/10/2012 [indicating that] the death of [appellant's] husband culminated in her nervous breakdown. The treating physicians for the depressive disorder never suggested [that appellant] abandon her job. [Appellant] failed to explore measures in order to preserve her employment. [Appellant] does not demonstrate sufficient justification for leaving the job. Therefore, [appellant] is disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) as of 04/03/2011, as [she] left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work.In a decision dated January 8, 2013, the Board upheld the decision of the Appeal Tribunal. This appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant argues that she had good cause to leave her employment because of her concern that the stress from her work was affecting her health. We disagree.
Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)).
A person is disqualified for benefits:
For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment[.]An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that he or she "did so with good cause attributable to work." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218; N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c). "While the statute does not define 'good cause,' our courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "good cause attributable to such work" as "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment."
[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(d) provides that "[w]hen an individual leaves work for health or medical reasons, medical certification shall be required to support a finding of good cause attributable to work." Here, appellant never presented Ceva with documentation of a medical condition at the time of her resignation. Indeed, she did not present any medical documentation until March 2012, almost one year after her resignation. As the Appeal Tribunal noted, the March 2012 doctor's notes do not state that appellant's medical condition required that she resign from her job. Absent such unequivocal medical evidence, an employee's decision to terminate employment is deemed to be without good cause attributable to the work. Wojcik v. Bd. of Review, 58 N.J. 341, 344 (1971).
Appellant also failed to take any steps to obtain a modification of her job responsibilities or work hours before submitting her resignation letter. "The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances . . . attributable to the work." Shuster v. Bd. of Review, 396 N.J. Super. 240, 244-45 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Fernandez v. Bd. of Review, 304 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288.
Ceva had been receptive in the past to appellant's needs and had reduced her work week from five days to four after her husband's death. Although Ceva assigned new duties to appellant, it allocated another employee to assist her in this short-term project. Ceva also told appellant that additional staff would be hired. However, rather than seeking a leave of absence or any further accommodations, appellant left her job.
Applying our deferential standard of review, we find no basis to interfere with the Board's decision that, under these circumstances, appellant was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. The Board's determination was supported by substantial, credible evidence, and we find reason to disturb it.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION