Opinion
March 24, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County [Shirley Fingerhood, J.].
There is no merit to petitioner's argument that respondent's padlocking order was in excess of its jurisdiction and arbitrary and capricious. Administrative Code of the City of New York § 20-105 (b) (3) authorizes respondent, after notice and hearing, to seal premises on which an unlicensed activity is occurring, "provided that such premises are primarily used for such activity." Petitioner's argument that the record does not support a finding that the premises in question were being used primarily for dancing overlooks the definition of a "cabaret" in Administrative Code § 20-359 (3), which includes "[a]ny room, place or space in the city in which any musical entertainment, singing, dancing or other form of amusement is permitted in connection with the restaurant business", and which excludes eating establishments that provide certain types of incidental musical entertainment "without dancing". By definition, therefore, the statute brings within its reach the type of mixed use of premises that was found to exist in this case. That only a limited portion of the premises were used for dancing has no bearing on the question of whether the premises were being "primarily" used as a cabaret. The evidence supports the finding that the premises were being used primarily for several activities, none of which under the statute is required to predominate.
Nor is there merit to petitioner's argument that the statute, both on its face and as applied to the facts of this case, is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define "dancing". To meet constitutional muster, a statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what activities are prohibited (see, Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109; People v Illardo, 48 N.Y.2d 408, 413). It is not necessary that the statute be meticulously specific (Matter of Children of Bedford v Petromelis, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 730), nor is the Legislature precluded from "using ordinary terms to express ideas that find adequate interpretation in everyday usage and understanding" (People v Illardo, supra, at 414).
The Hearing Officer credited the testimony of the inspectors who were at the premises and had described the activities that they had observed, thus providing substantial evidence for the determinations under review (Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Wallach, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.