Cadle Co. v. Fletcher

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Filon

    21-20555 (JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2022)

    See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-361a(f). In Cadle Co. v. Fletcher, 324 Conn. 228 (2016), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that postjudgment execution statutes do not provide any specific exemption for residual, postgarnishment wages that have been disbursed to a judgment debtor or placed in the judgment debtor's bank account beyond the general exemption set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-352b(r) and the procedure set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-367b(c). Section 52-361a(f) provides in relevant part: "The maximum part of the aggregate weekly earnings of an individual which may be subject under this section to levy or other withholding for payment of a judgment is the lesser of (1) twenty-five per cent of his disposable earnings for that week, or (2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed forty times the higher of (A) the minimum hourly wage prescribed by Section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, USC Title 29, Section 206(a)(1), or (B) the full minimu

  2. Cadle Co. v. Fletcher

    848 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2017)   Cited 3 times

    The Connecticut Supreme Court has answered that question in the negative. See Cadle Co. v. Fletcher, 324 Conn. 228, 244–45 (Dec. 23, 2016). In light of the paucity of state precedent, we held that it was more appropriate for the Connecticut Supreme Court to interpret the relevant state statutes in light of Connecticut's overall statutory scheme.

  3. Anderson v. Hilburn

    Civ. No. 19-05 GBW/SMV (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2019)

    See Cadle Co. v. Fletcher, 804 F.3d at 202. The Connecticut Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, Cadle Co. v. Fletcher, 324 Conn. 228, 244-45 (2016), and the Second Circuit entered a judgment, see Cadle Co. v. Fletcher, 848 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2017). Nothing in this history invalidates the Second Circuit's reference to Connecticut exemption statutes to determine what was "generally exempt" under the UFTA.

  4. Synchrony Bank v. Daniels

    464 N.J. Super. 384 (Law Div. 2019)

    Frazer, Ryan, Goldberg, Keyt & Lawless v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 181, 907 P.2d 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ; Cadle Co. v. Fletcher, 324 Conn. 228, 151 A.3d 1262 (2016) ; Tressler v. Lunt, 158 A. 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1932), overruled in part by K-M Auto Supply Inc. v. Reno, 236 A.2d 706 (Del. 1967) ; Dillon Cos. v. Davis, 39 Kan.App.2d 444, 181 P.3d 570, 573 (2008) ; Shafizadeh v. Shafizadeh, 444 S.W.3d 437, 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Brown v. Kentucky, 40 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) ); Edwards v. Henry, 97 Mich.App. 173, 293 N.W.2d 756 (1980) ; John O. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 88 Wis.2d 252, 276 N.W.2d 274 (1979) ; In re Walsh, 96 P.3d 1 (Wyo. 2004).