Opinion
11-P-182
12-29-2011
LYELL J. CADET, JR. v. COMMISSIONER OF THE DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Claimant Lyell J. Cadet, Jr., appeals from a Boston Municipal Court judgment affirming a final decision of the division of unemployment assistance (DUA) decreasing his weekly benefit rate from $628.00 to $299.00 for a twenty-week period. We affirm.
Background. The facts are undisputed. On April 24, 2009, Cadet's primary employer, Trillium Asset Management Corporation (Trillium), laid him off. He continued part-time work and received compensation at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) in an as-needed position which he had maintained since 2000. On April 27, 2009, he applied for and then received regular unemployment benefits (based upon his Trillium salary) pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, §§ 24 and 29, at the rate of $628 per week for twenty-six weeks.
Meanwhile, residual compensation from Trillium during the quarter of April 1 through June 30, 2009, amounted to $12,096.76; and his payments from MGH for the year of April 1, 2009, through March 31, 2010, came to $5,053.41. His post-layoff income for that period therefore totaled $17,150.17. Also during the year following his layoff, Cadet enrolled in a retraining program at Salem State College approved by DUA pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 30(c), entitling him to an extended twenty-six weeks of benefits at the existing rate.
At the conclusion of his twenty-six weeks of regular Massachusetts benefits (the $628 per week), Cadet received payments for an extended twenty weeks at the same benefit rate under the Federal emergency unemployment compensation program of 2008 (Title IV of Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, 122 Stat. 2323, 2353).
At the conclusion of his first benefit year on March 31, 2010, Cadet submitted a claim for extended benefits in accordance with the requirements for continuing eligibility. See G. L. c. 151A, § 30A (describing the operation and complexities of extended benefits eligibility). That process required redetermination of his benefit rate. By reason of his post-layoff income of $17,150.17 during the eleven months up to March 31, 2010, he remained eligible for regular Massachusetts benefits under G. L. c. 151A, §§ 24 and 29, but at the reduced rate of $299 per week as the formulated result of his reduced income during the 'base year' interim.
On appeal from the affirmance of the administrative decision, Cadet argues that the reduction unfairly penalizes him for his continuing part-time employment effort and despite his retraining initiative as encouraged by G. L. c. 151A, § 30(c).
Analysis. 1. Statutory requirements. The eligibility for ongoing regular benefits disqualified Cadet from an extension of his eligibility at the higher earlier rate of $628 under either G. L. c. 151A, § 30(c), or the Federal emergency unemployment compensation legislation of 2008. Section 30(c), as amended through St. 1992, c. 118, § 9, provides extension of benefits at the higher rate 'only if [the applicant] has exhausted all rights to regular and extended benefits under this chapter and has no rights to benefits or compensation under this chapter or any other state unemployment compensation law or under any federal law.'
The 2008 Federal provision limited payments 'to individuals who (1) have exhausted all rights to regular compensation with respect to a benefit year that ended on or after May 1, 2007; and (2) have no rights to regular compensation or extended benefits.' United States Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Programs Letter 23-08, dated July 7, 2008; and id. at Attachment A, Operating Instructions, § 1a(1) & (2). Cadet does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement imposed by each statute.
The record shows that Congress subsequently amended the 2008 legislation prospectively so as to permit a period of extension of Federal benefits without the process of refiling and redetermination of State benefits, a change which assisted Cadet after an interim of twenty weeks at the reduced level.
Cadet points out that the letter of those provisions tends to defeat the purposes of unemployment assistance, at least in his case, because (a) he was pursuing retraining as encouraged by G. L. c. 151A, § 30(c), and (b) he continued to work part-time for MGH. Those circumstances are unfortunate. However, agencies and courts must respect and apply the plain and mandatory language of statutes and leave amendment to their legislative authors. See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 661 (2006); Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009).
2. Estoppel. Cadet suggests on appeal that he might not have pursued his retraining program if he had known of the resulting reduction of his benefits. However, no ground of equitable estoppel is available. No evidence indicates that any governmental officer induced his detrimental reliance by a false or mistaken representation. And estoppel does not function as a theory of liability against a governmental body engaged in the execution of a lawful public policy. See, e.g., Harrington v. Fall River Hous. Authy., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 308-309 (1989); Dagostino v. Commissioner of Correction, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 458-459 (2001).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Green, Sikora & Wolohojian, JJ.),
Entered: December 29, 2011. Clerk