Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-943 Section "E" (3)
August 31, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Patricia A. Cade, filed this pro se action on April 9, 2001 against her employer, William Henderson, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (the "Agency"). She makes the following claims: (1) the Agency improperly dismissed her discrimination complaint in December 1996; (2) her appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board was processed improperly; (3) her representative before the Merit Systems Protection Board was improperly appointed by the Agency and negligently represented her; (4) the Agency discriminated against her, a black employee, by disciplining her more harshly than it disciplined white employees; and (5) the Agency retaliated against her for making discrimination complaints. Cade seeks a declaratory judgment that defendant violated her rights under Title VII; reinstatement to her former job with back pay, front pay and other types of lost compensation; compensatory damages; and a "judgment for criminal charges brought against all proven to have purger [sic], purposely defraud and intentionally sabotaged plaintiff's position and for degradation of character." Plaintiff attached to her complaint copies of (1) the Agency's letter dismissing her discrimination complaint in December 1996; (2) the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") decision dated February 6, 1998, affirming the Agency's dismissal; and (3) the EEOC's denial of her request for reconsideration, dated January 5, 2001.
Complaint, Record Doc. No. 1.
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. Defendant has attached to his motion copies of four documents: (1) Cade's prior complaint against the Postmaster General in this court in Civil Action No. 98-740 "F', Government Exh. A; (2) Judge Livaudais's Ruling on Motion, entered in C.A No. 98-740 on September 23, 1998, in which he granted the Postmaster General's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, Government Exh. B; (3) the judgment entered in C.A. No. 98-740 on September 23, 1998, dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice, Government Exh. C; and (4) the opinion of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming Judge Livaudais's dismissal of C.A No. 98-740, Government Exh. D.
Record Doc. No. 5.
Cade filed a timely opposition memorandum to defendant's motion to dismiss the instant action. She argues that she is entitled to bring her discrimination claim in this court because (1) the EEOC's denial of her request for reconsideration on January 5, 2001 included a notice of her right to file a civil action; (2) C.A. No. 98-740 was not adjudicated properly; (3) she has now exhausted her administrative remedies as to her Title VII and negligence claims; and (4) the court has jurisdiction. The remainder of plaintiff's arguments are not relevant to the pending motion.
Record Doc. No. 6.
Defendant filed a reply memorandum addressing Cade's claim of exhaustion of her administrative remedies. In turn, Cade filed a reply brief to defendant's reply memorandum and subsequently added Scialla Associates and National Association of Postal Supervisors (NAPS) as defendants in this action. Both new parties were defendants in Civil Action No. 98-0740.
Record Doc. No. 11.
Record Doc. No. 15.
Record Doc. No. 16.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must take the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true. However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. "To qualify for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must on its face show a bar to relief. [Citation omitted]. Although dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily determined by whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, give rise to a cause of action, a claim may also be dismissed if a successful affirmative defense appears clearly on the face of the pleadings. [Citation omitted]."
Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997) (Appendix A: Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., Inc., Civil Action No. 95-2835 (Vance, 1.)).
Id.; Shipp v. McMahon 199 F.3d 256, 260 (5th Cir. 2000).
Clark v. Amoco Production Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986) (in the context of an issue of claim preclusion).
B. Judicial Notice
The court "at any stage of the proceeding" may take "judicial notice of adjudicative facts." "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
Fed.R.Evid. 201(a), (f).
Id.R.201(b).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court ordinarily must limit its inquiry to the facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to or incorporated in plaintiff's complaint. However, the court may take judicial notice of facts contained in any documents in public records, including court orders. Such documents should be considered only for the purpose of determining what statements the documents contain, not to prove the truth of the documents' contents or to determine a fact in dispute.
Lovelace v. Software Spectrum,. Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id.; Jefferson, supra, 106 F.3d at 1250 n. 14.
Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1018 n. 1.
This court will consider the facts contained within the documents attached to plaintiff's complaint. The court will also take judicial notice of the facts contained within the documents attached to defendant's motion to dismiss, all of which are public records.
C. Collateral Estonnel
Defendant argues that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from contesting certain issues that were previously decided in another proceeding. Collateral estoppel is applicable when the facts and legal standard used to assess the facts are the same in both proceedings. In F.D.I.C. v. Lee, the court set forth four conditions required for the application of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion: I) the issue under consideration in a subsequent action must be identical to the issue litigated in the prior action; 2) the issue must have been fully and vigorously litigated in the prior action; 3) the issue must have been necessary to support the judgment in the prior action; and 4) there must be no special circumstances that would render preclusion inappropriate or unfair.
Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 832 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
942 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. La. 1996).
Id. at 257 (citing United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 311 (1994)).
Considering the first requirement, a review of Cade's prior complaint and of Judge Livaudais's opinion in C.A. No. 98-740 reveals that plaintiff brought the same claims in that action which she is asserting in the current action, against the same defendants, all arising out of the same operative facts. The two actions are distinguishable only because she has now received a denial of her request for reconsideration of the EEOC's dismissal of her discrimination complaint, which she did not have at the time of the previous action, and she now purports to bring a race discrimination claim when her prior action brought claims only of sexual discrimination and retaliation. This new claim will be considered separately.
As to the second and third requirements, Cade argues that the issues before the Court in this action have not been litigated at all for purposes of collateral estoppel because the matter was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Falcon v. Transportes Aeros de Coahuila, S.A., the Fifth Circuit addressed application of the second and third requirements for collateral estoppel when the prior action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, quoting from a decision by the Court of Appeals of Texas:
169 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1999).
As the Court of Appeals of Texas, First District noted in Shell Pipeline Corporation v. Coastal States Trading, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 837, 843 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1st Dist.) 1990), "[w]hen the federal court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction any finding beyond those necessary to make that decision are not "actually litigated' or "necessary to the outcome, ' and therefore do not have collateral estoppel or res judicata consequences. See Jack Faucett Assoc., Inc., v. American Tel Tel Co., 744 F.2d 118, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984)."
Id. 312-13.
In the prior action, this Court had jurisdiction to review the MSPB decision under 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (2)(b)(2) only if Cade's case before the MSPB was a "mixed case"; if not, jurisdiction was only with the Federal Circuit. This Court had jurisdiction over Cade's Title VII claims only if those claims had been presented to the appropriate federal agency for review of the merits. The Court's dismissal of Cade's prior action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was based on two findings: 1) her case before the MSPB appealing her demotion was not a "mixed case1'; and 2) she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her Title VII claims against the USPS regarding her claims of sexual harassment, retaliation and a hostile work environment. Cade's complaint to the EEOC was dismissed on procedural grounds. Because her EEOC complaint was dismissed without a review of the merits, Cade had not exhausted her administrative remedies. The final denial by the Office of Federal Operations of her request for reconsideration of that dismissal does not change that conclusion. These two determinative issues were actively litigated and were necessary to the outcome of the matter. The Court carefully reviewed the record, the law and the parties' memoranda prior to its decision. This Court's decision as to both issues was affirmed on appeal.
See Civil Action No. 98-0740, Record Doc. No. 11, Courts Order referring the matter to the Federal Circuit.
s v. Levitt F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1997)('[a] complainant must pursue and exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a judicial complaint. [Citation omitted].')
See Civil Action No. 98-0740, Record Doc. No. 8, Ruling on Motion.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302 (b)(1998) (whenever an employee files both an EEO complaint and a MSPB appeal on the same matter, "whichever is filed first shall be considered an election to proceed in that forum."
Barnes, 118 F.3d at 408 ("If the agency does not reach the merits of the complaint because the complainant fails to comply with administrative procedures the Court should not reach the merits either. [Citation omitted]."
While plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit pro Se, she was represented by counsel in her prior lawsuit.
See Civil Action No. 98-0740, Record Doc. No. 13.
Finally, Cade has presented no special circumstances that would render preclusion of this action inappropriate or unfair. All claims in the instant lawsuit, except Cade's race discrimination claim, are precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. D. Race Discrimination Claim.
In her Reply Brief to Defendant's Reply Memorandum, plaintiff simply reiterates the history of her complaints and disputes the decisions of the EEOC and MSPB throughout the administrative and judicial process.
Cade's new claim of race discrimination arises from the same set of operative facts that gave rise to her prior lawsuit. Again, this Court has jurisdiction over her race discrimination claim arising under Title VII only if she has exhausted her administrative remedies as to that claim. She has offered no evidence that she has done so.
Accordingly, upon reviewing the record, the law, the motion of defendant to dismiss and the memorandum and reply memorandum in support, and the plaintiff's opposition and reply brief thereto;
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of defendant William Henderson, to dismiss plaintiff Patricia Cade's claims against it, be and is hereby GRANTED;