¶6 Here, it is undisputed that Landmark did not file the requisite written statement until more than three years after the official survey of the election returns was filed. Moreover, pursuant to our decision in Cacioppo v. Eagle County School District Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453 (Colo. 2004), Landmark's challenge was subject to section 1-11-213(4)'s time bar, and because section 1-11-213(4) is a non-claim statute, the equitable estoppel doctrine does not apply. ¶7 Accordingly, we conclude that Landmark's challenge to the bond and tax election at issue was time barred, and thus, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand for further proceedings.
¶37 The question before us is thus whether petitioners' challenges concern the form or content of the titles of SB 303 or Proposition HH. ¶38 In Cacioppo v. Eagle County School District Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 457 (Colo. 2004), we drew a distinction between challenges to the form and content of a title, on the one hand, and challenges to the substance of a measure, on the other. We observed that the form or content of a title "refers only to the heading of the ballot issue and the question presented to the voters."
Likewise, a declaratory judgment "calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present rights upon established facts." Cacioppo v. Eagle County Sch. Dist. Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 467 (Colo. 2004) (citation omitted). A court should exercise jurisdiction in such actions "only if the case contains a currently justiciable issue or an existing legal controversy, rather than the mere possibility of a future claim."
In addition, "`we afford the language of . . . statutes their ordinary and common meaning [and] construe statutory . . . provisions as a whole, giving effect to every word and term contained therein, whenever possible.'" Cacioppo v. Eagle County School Dist. Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 463 (Colo. 2004) (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs. v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Colo. 2001)) (alteration in original); see also § 2-4-201, C.R.S. (2004) ("In enacting a statute, it is presumed that: . . . [t]he entire statute is intended to be effective. . . .").
¶ 46 We conclude that the district court erred in applying section 1–11–213(4), for several reasons.a. Landmark's Challenges Are Substantive ¶ 47 In Cacioppo v. Eagle County School District Re–50J, 92 P.3d 453 (Colo.2004), the supreme court ruled that "[i]f the claim alleges that the ballot issue as passed cannot stand under the laws of this state, it is substantive in nature and thus not subject to the time requirements of ... section 1–11–213, which governs the time for appeal concerning challenges to election results." Id. at 465.
ECF No. 16 at 14, 15. I decline to address this concern because the date of disbursement does not change my conclusion. See Cacioppo v. Eagle Cnty. Sch. Dist. Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 467 (Colo. 2004) (declining to answer "a hypothetical question about possible future interpretations to the law"). Irrespective of when the settlement funds were disbursed, Westby could not have received payment any earlier than February 7, 2013 when she signed the Release and became legally entitled to the money.
("[E]xpert testimony that purports to explain the legal meaning of a term is forbidden . . ., but testimony defining a term of art as it is used within a given field may be allowed."); Cacioppo v. Eagle Cnty. Sch. Dist. Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 466 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) ("The trial court heard expert testimony concerning the nature and definition of a so-called 'phased-in' tax ...."); Wisner v. Vandelay Invs., L.L.C., 916 N.W.2d 698, 726 (Neb. 2018) ("The definition of a mental disorder provided by the experts appears to be broader than the standard required by the statute."); Hutchins v. Town of Colton, No. 116349, 2004 WL 3425347, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) ("It is important to note that while no statutory definition of ATV 'areas and trails' exists, Respondents' expert provides an expansive definition therefor ...."); Traxler v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. 2012) ("Traxler offered expert testimony regarding the meaning of transmission and distribution lines.")
As noted by the Supreme Court of Colorado, legislation implementing constitutional rights "is permissible as long as it does not directly or indirectly impair, limit, or destroy the rights that the executing ... provision provides." Cacioppo v. Eagle Cty. Sch. Dist. Re–50J , 92 P.3d 453, 463 (Colo. 2004) (en banc). On this issue, three members of the court conclude that the Iowa Civil Rights Act does not preempt the plaintiff's Bivens -type constitutional claims, while a majority conclude that the district court properly dismissed Godfrey's Iowa constitutional claims based upon Iowa equal protection principles because of the adequacy of remedies under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
Research reveals that courts in several states are guided bystatutes governing how and under what circumstances reimbursement of attorney fees in election contests may occur. See, e.g. Cacioppo v. Eagle County School Dist. Re-50J, 92 P. 3d 453 (Colo. 2004); Davis v. Dunn, 690 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 2010); Mansfield v. McShurley, 911 N.E. 2d 581 (Ind. App. 2009); Legislative Coordinating Council v. Stanley, 957 P.2d 379 (Kan. 1998); Big Spring v. Jore, 109 P. 3d 219 (Mont. 2005); State ex rel. Poddar v. Lee, 100 P. 3d 747 (Or. App. 2004).
Contrary to the canons of statutory construction, Yaekle's argument ignores this last phrase in the provision. See Cacioppo v. Eagle County Sch. Dist. Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 463 (Colo. 2004) ("[W]e afford the language of . . . statutes their ordinary and common meaning [and] construe statutory . . . provisions as a whole, giving effect to every word and term contained therein, whenever possible." (quotations omitted)); see also § 2-4-201(1)(b), C.R.S. (2008) ("The entire statute is intended to be effective").