A protestor seeking to overturn a finding of fact by the Board, including the Board's determination that a proposal meets a particular Solicitation provision, bears the burden of demonstrating that finding is "fraudulent, or arbitrary, or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or . . . not supported by substantial evidence." 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1994); CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Grumman states that "[a]t the hearing, Grumman conclusively demonstrated Intergraph's inability to perform even one million `input evaluations' per second."

This is not a pre-award case where the alleged violation is "immaterial" and will not have an impact on Weeks's economic situation. See CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing prejudice in the pre-award context). Rather, Weeks has a definite economic stake in the solicitation being carried out in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. If the MATOC solicitation is allowed to go forward, it will dictate Weeks's bidding and government work in the South Atlantic Division for the next five years.

The government violates no law by seeking relevant information from persons within the agency, especially when it first sought that information from plaintiff itself. See, e.g., CACI Field Services, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 718, 729 (1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Moreover, even if defendant had failed to afford plaintiff an adequate opportunity to rebut inferences about plaintiff's ability to perform the contract, that failure would not be reason to set the contract award aside.

The bid protest plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a significant error marred the procurement in question. Id. (citing CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). In addition, the court may not substitute its judgment for the agency's expertise in procuring services to meet the needs of the government.

The bid protest plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a significant error marred the procurement in question. Id. (citing CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). In addition, the court may not substitute its judgment for the agency's expertise in procuring services to meet the needs of the government.

The bid protest plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a significant error marred the procurement in question. Id. (citing CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). The court gives great deference to an agency's technical evaluation of an offeror's proposal.

In Allied Technology Group, Inc. v. United States, 649 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2011), we said: The plaintiff-appellant must show that the Contracting Officer's award “lacked a rational basis,” Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009), or “violates to prejudicial effect an applicable procurement regulation,” CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed.Cir.1988). The test under the first ground is “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.”

This court reviews the Claims Court's grant of a judgment on the administrative record de novo, applying the same standard over the GAO's decision as did the Claims Court. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (Fed.Cir.2005). The plaintiff-appellant must show that the Contracting Officer's award “lacked a rational basis,” Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009), or “violates to prejudicial effect an applicable procurement regulation,” CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed.Cir.1988). The test under the first ground is “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.”

Most of the cases concern the deliberative process exemption to a Freedom of Information Act request, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). That exemption is "coextensive with the common law deliberative process privilege," CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 680, 686 n. 7 (1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Court of Federal Claims recognized that factual information asserted to be deliberative "should be disclosed . . . but only it if `does not reveal the deliberative process and [is] not intertwined with the policy-making process.'"

[16] Additionally, the City must show that any unreasonable or arbitrary scoring by NPS resulted in competitive prejudice against the City. See CACI Field Servs., Inc. v. United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding, in accordance with GAO decisions, that "prejudice is a separate element which must be proven"); In re IGIT, Inc., B-275299.2, 1997 WL 369348, at *6 (C.G. Jun. 23, 1997) ("[O]ur Office will not sustain a protest unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable possibility that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions, that is, unless the protester demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award."). 1) Solvency and longevity.