Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-cv-01447
07-13-2023
WILLIAM ALBERT CACCIA II, QM5483, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN WAPINSKI, et al., Defendants.
MANNION, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a federal civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The pro se complaint alleges that the named defendants imprisoned the plaintiff, William Albert Caccia II, and prosecuted state criminal charges against him in violation of his federal constitutional rights. At the time of filing, Caccia was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at Schuylkill County Prison. Following his conviction and sentencing, he was transferred to the custody of the state department of corrections, and he is currently incarcerated at SCI Waymart, a state prison located in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. In a contemporaneously entered order, we have granted Caccia leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action.
The pro se complaint names three defendants: (1) David Wapinsky, the warden of Schuylkill County Prison, where Caccia was confined in pretrial custody following his arrest; (2) Michael A. O'Pake, the county district attorney responsible for prosecution of the criminal charges against Caccia; and (3) Hon. William Baldwin, a now-retired state court judge who presided over the criminal case. Without alleging any actual facts in support, the pro se complaint asserts that Caccia's federal constitutional rights were violated when he was jailed and prosecuted in two separate criminal proceedings, Commonwealth v. Caccia, Docket No. CP-54-CR-0001176-2021 (Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) C.C.P.), and Commonwealth v. Caccia, Docket No. CP-54-CR-0001189-2021 (Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) C.C.P.).The plaintiff, however, has attached a copy of the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause filed in each of the two state criminal cases.
The pro se complaint references the former case by its offense tracking number (OTN U 727223-0) and the latter case by the docket number assigned for preliminary proceedings before a state magisterial district judge (“CR 247-21”).
Liberally construed, the pro se complaint appears to assert § 1983 false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims, alleging that Caccia's imprisonment and prosecution by the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. See generally Mala v Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a court's obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings and other submissions, particularly when dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants).
The plaintiff has referenced his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in his pro se complaint, but based on the sparse facts alleged therein, the appropriate framework for adjudication of his claims is the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.
The plaintiff's § 1983 malicious prosecution claims are barred by the favorable termination rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, where judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first demonstrate “that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule and broadened it to encompass equitable remedies as well, holding that “a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter what the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81-82.
Any malicious prosecution claims concerning Caccia's convictions are clearly barred by the Heck rule, as his felony burglary and misdemeanor drug possession convictions have not been invalidated. See Olick v. Pennsylvania, 739 Fed. App'x 722, 725-26 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam). In Commonwealth v. Caccia, Docket No. CP-54-CR-0001189-2021 (Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) C.C.P.), the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the felony offense of burglary and was sentenced to serve a term of 9 to 24 months imprisonment. In Commonwealth v. Caccia, Docket No. CP-54-CR-0001176-2021 (Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) C.C.P.), the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to serve a term of 12 months on probation, consecutive to the sentence of confinement imposed in his burglary case. Caccia did not appeal or seek post-conviction relief in either case.
With respect to the plaintiff's § 1983 false imprisonment claims, the allegations of the pro se complaint, the exhibits attached in support of the pro se complaint, and the plaintiff's guilty pleas in both state criminal cases foreclose any colorable false imprisonment claims. First, the pro se complaint does not allege that there was a lack of probable cause to arrest and detain him on burglary and drug possession charges at all, but only that Caccia experienced unspecified delays in his prosecution. Second, it is plainly evident from the exhibits attached to his pro se complaint that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Caccia and file the charges that resulted in his pretrial confinement: Caccia was charged with burglary based on the recovery of stolen items he had sold, multiple witness statements implicating him in the offense, surveillance video corroborating his entry into the apartment building at issue and his possession of various stolen items, and his own admissions when interviewed by police; Caccia was charged with drug possession because police found a bag containing field-tested methamphetamine on his person when he was arrested and taken into custody. Finally, under the circumstances presented, Caccia's subsequent guilty pleas to the burglary and drug possession charges for which he was being held conclusively establish that probable cause existed at the time of his arrest and detention. See Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F.Supp.2d 581, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2008); see also Walker v. Clearfield Cnty. District Attorney, 413 Fed. App'x 481, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] guilty plea-even one for a lesser offense-does not permit a later assertion of no probable cause.”).
We note that Caccia pleaded guilty and was sentenced in October 2021, only four months after he was arrested and charged in both cases. So it is entirely unclear what delays he describes.
Moreover, we note that the complaint fails to allege any personal involvement by Warden Wapinsky with respect to Caccia's § 1983 false imprisonment or malicious prosecution claims, see Kis v. Cnty. of Schuylkill, 866 F.Supp. 1462, 1476 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding warden could not be held liable on a § 1983 claims grounded in supervisory liability), and the other two defendants-Judge Baldwin and District Attorney O'Pake-are clearly entitled to absolute immunity from suit, see Mirales v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-13 (1991) (per curiam) (absolute judicial immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (absolute prosecutorial immunity).
Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Moreover, we recommend that the action be dismissed without leave to amend because, under the facts alleged, it is clear that any amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated July 13, 2023. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.