Cabana v. Forcier

39 Citing cases

  1. Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-3068 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2011)   Cited 15 times
    Concluding plaintiff need not pay defendants' expert for the five hours he spent with defense counsel, as there was a “risk” that it was merely trial preparation

    These factors provide guidance to the court to determine reasonableness and to ensure that the deposing party "will not be unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms which produce windfalls" for the retaining party or its experts. Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 16 (D. Mass. 2001).

  2. Transwitch Corporation v. Galazar Networks, Inc.

    377 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D. Mass. 2005)   Cited 24 times
    Discussing magistrate judge authority under Rule 15 to dismiss some but not all claims against a defendant, without addressing dismissal of all claims against a particular defendant

    Futility constitutes an adequate basis to deny leave to amend the counterclaim and is judged by the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.See Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 13 (D.Mass. 2001) (recognizing that futility constitutes an adequate basis to deny amendment in the context of addressing a motion for leave to amend an answer to include a counterclaim); accord FilmTec Corporation v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of leave to amend to include counterclaim of sham litigation given futility of claim); 3 James Wm. Moore Moore's Federal Practice § 13.43[1] (2004) ("court may deny a motion to amend if the counterclaim is meritless and the amendment would prove futile").

  3. Adams v. Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr.

    No. 00 Civ. 9377 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 27, 2002)   Cited 17 times
    Determining reasonable fees based on the only example provided: that of the opposing parties' expert

    In evaluating whether a proposed expert fee is "reasonable," courts have considered the following factors: "(1) the witness's area of expertise, (2) the education and training that is required to provide the expert insight that is sought, (3) the prevailing rates for other comparably respected available experts, (4) the nature, quality and complexity of the discovery responses provided, (5) the cost of living in the particular geographic area, (6) the fee being charged by the expert to the party who retained him, (7) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters, and (8) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rule 26." Coleman v. Dydula, 190 F.R.D. 320, 324 (W.D.N.Y. 1999 See also Grdinich v. Bradlees, 187 F.R.D. 77, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Mathis v. NYNEX, 165 F.R.D. 23, 24-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2001). These factors merely serve as a guide; the "ultimate goal" is to balance the parties' interests so that the party retaining the expert witness is not "unduly hampered in [its] efforts to attract competent experts" while the opposing party is not "unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms which provide windfalls for the [opposing side's] experts."

  4. King v. Deming

    Civil Case No. 3:19-cv-30018-MGM (D. Mass. Jul. 30, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    "The pleadings alone are sufficient to satisfy that burden when a plaintiff in a negligence action asserts mental or physical injury." Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 119; Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421, 422 (D. Mass. 1984)). "'Good cause for a mental examination requires a showing that the examination could adduce specific facts relevant to the cause of action and necessary to the defendant's case.'"

  5. Morales-Melecio v. Martinez-Ortiz

    Civil No. 13-1311 (SEC) (D.P.R. Aug. 5, 2015)

    (1) the witness's area of expertise; (2) the education and training that is required to provide the expert insight which is sought; (3) the prevailing rates of other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality and complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee actually being charged to the party who retained the expert; (6) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters; and (7) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rule 26.Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2001); see also Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 493, 495-96 (S.D. Iowa 1992); and Bandy v. Kimsey, No. 09-82, 2010 WL 4630828, at 1 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 4, 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate goal is "to calibrate the balance so that a plaintiff will not be unduly hampered in his/her efforts to attract competent experts, while at the same time, an inquiring defendant will not be unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms which produce windfalls for the plaintiff's experts."

  6. Dmo Norwood LLC v. Kia Am.

    Civil Action 22-cv-10470-ADB (D. Mass. Feb. 15, 2023)

    Despite the substantial expansion that would result from adding the other proposed counterclaims against DMO Norwood and the Proposed Counterclaim Defendants, Kia asserts that the Court should nonetheless grant it leave to amend because its counterclaims are “arguably compulsory,” which can weigh in favor of granting an amendment. [ECF No. 53 at 7 (citing Madico, Inc. v. GMX Performance Films, PTE, No. 06-cv-10953, 2009 WL 10692740, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 11, 2009) (citation omitted) and Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 13 (D. Mass. 2001))]. It is not clear to the Court that Kia's proposed counterclaims would be compulsory, particularly where they pertain to separate Dealer Agreements between Kia and the New Hampshire Entities, which are not at issue in DMO Norwood's claims, and a much broader set of allegations of fraudulent conduct, but the Court need not reach that issue.

  7. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Citizens Bank

    C. A. 19-362WES (D.R.I. Jul. 15, 2022)

    See Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 2001) (“any concerns with distortions or inaccuracies by the examining psychiatrist can be addressed through traditional methods of impeachment and cross-examination”) (quoting Baba-Ali v. City of New York, No. 92CIV.7957(DAB)(THK), 1995 WL 753904, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1995)).

  8. Gunning v. N.Y. State Justice Ctr. for the Prot. of People With Special Needs

    1:19-CV-1446 (GLS/CFH) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2022)

    . . . . Information showing that a person having knowledge of discoverable facts may not be worthy of belief is always relevant to the subject matter of the action.'” Knapik v. Mary Hitchcock Mem'l Hosp., No. 5:12-CV-175, 2014 WL 12717392, at *9 (D. Vt. May 27, 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2015 (3d ed. 2013)) (citing Duggan v. Vill. of New Albany, No. 2:08-CV-814, 2009 WL 650461, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2009) (holding that “the credibility of witnesses is an issue in every case[, ]” and, therefore, “a party might be entitled to discover evidence of prior workplace discipline if, as part of the disciplinary incident, a witness acted in a dishonest manner or made an untruthful statement”); and Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 17 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Inquiries concerning a witness['s] credibility are relevant and thus reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, even if the information sought is not directly related to the subject of the underlying litigation.”)).

  9. Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt.

    Civil Action 20-cv-11358-ADB (D. Mass. Jan. 12, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules is broad, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), and Defendant's inquiry into Plaintiff Kinzer's credibility is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 17 (D. Mass. 2001). Plaintiffs' mere assertion that messages that provide case “updates” somehow equate to “concerted activity efforts, ” without further evidence, is insufficient to warrant any protection given Defendant's reasonable interest.

  10. Stone v. Trump

    356 F. Supp. 3d 505 (D. Md. 2018)   Cited 24 times

    In denying a motion to compel discovery, a court may consider whether compelling discovery is necessary. Freeman, 288 F.R.D. at 98 (first citing Cabana v. Forcier, 200 F.R.D. 9, 17 (D. Mass. 2001) ; then citing Tillman v. Lincoln Warehouse Corp., No. 83 CIV. 5381 (CSH), 1987 WL 7933, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1987) ; then citing In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 132, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ; then citing Oliver v. Comm. for the Re-Election of the President, 66 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D.D.C. 1975) ; and then citing 8B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2286 (3d ed. 2012) ). "Federal district courts often stay discovery pending the outcome of dispositive motions that will terminate the case."