Opinion
A167444
12-19-2023
C.A., et al., Defendants and Appellants, v. R.R., Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Filed Order Date 1/10/24
(Alameda County Super Ct. Nos. HF21-112354 & HF21-114783)
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the written opinion filed on December 19, 2023, is modified as follows:
1. On page 24 of the Opinion, the first sentence of footnote 8 is amended to include the language, "in advance" between the words "submit" and "witness" so that the sentence now reads as: "Although omitted from the record, the trial court issued pretrial orders which required the parties to exchange and submit in advance witness and exhibits lists, but D.H. submitted neither."
2. On page 24 of the Opinion, the third sentence of footnote 8 is amended to include the language, "or settled statement" so that the sentence now reads as: "Further, no reporter's transcript or settled statement was provided for the hearing on the joinder motion."
3. On page 25 of the Opinion, the second sentence of the first full paragraph is amended by deleting "without following proper procedures".
4. On page 8, a new footnote 3 is added (and subsequent footnotes are all renumbered accordingly) after "own" on the third line of page 5 to read: "Both the trial court and opposing counsel stated on the record (with D.H. present) that D.H. had indicated he would not be calling any witnesses of his own, and D.H. did not challenge those statements. Since there was an unrecorded sidebar at the end of the previous hearing date for scheduling purposes and the court emerged afterwards stating it would continue the matter for one more day for R.R. to complete her case, it is reasonable to infer that D.H. stated he was calling no witnesses during the sidebar and that the trial court relied on his representation for scheduling purposes."
This modification does not change the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c)(2).) The petition for rehearing is denied.
GETTY, J. [*]
This case involves the legal parentage of nine-year-old E.A. C.A. and her longtime male friend, D.H., are the undisputed biological parents of E.A. In June 2022, however, the trial court found R.R.-C.A.'s close female friend (but never her same-sex partner)-to be the boy's other presumed parent pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). C.A. and D.H. appealed, arguing variously that R.R. did not have standing to raise her parenting claim; that there was insufficient evidence proving D.H. was a mere statutory sperm donor within the meaning of section 7613, subdivision (b)(1)(B), thereby invalidating the voluntary declaration of parentage (VDOP) he and C.A. executed during trial; and that the trial court violated D.H.'s due process rights by limiting D.H.'s time to present evidence supporting his competing parentage claim. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
I. BACKGROUND
A. E.A.'s Conception and Life Circumstances
C.A. is the mother of E.A. (born March 2014) and the only parent listed on his birth certificate. According to C.A. and D.H., E.A.'s conception did not occur through a sperm bank or with physician assistance, and the two had no written agreement regarding the conception. D.H., his wife, his mother, and his three daughters all lived with C.A. on a property she owned for the first year of E.A.'s life. C.A. and E.A. lived in a separate studio, while D.H.'s family rented the main house. During her pregnancy, D.H. took C.A. to several medical appointments, made some repairs to the house, and took C.A. to the emergency room once when she fell in the shower. He was at the hospital shortly before and shortly after E.A.'s birth. C.A. and R.R. bought a house together in 2015 and lived there with E.A. from June 2015 until July 2021, when R.R. moved into the separate in-law unit on the property.
C.A. initially told R.R. that the sperm for E.A. came from a sperm bank. However, in February 2016, after C.A. consulted with a lawyer about R.R. adopting E.A., C.A. told R.R. that D.H. was the "donor." D.H. did not tell his family that he provided the sperm used to conceive E.A. until the boy was two years old. E.A. was informed that D.H. was his biological father when he was four and one-half years old through a picture book C.A. and R.R. prepared and read to him, which referred to D.H. as someone who "gave his sperm to Mami [C.]" and referred to R.R. as "Mami [R.]"
B. The Parentage Petitions & Related Proceedings
In September 2021, R.R. filed a petition to establish her parentage of E.A., along with a request for an order with respect to custody and visitation. C.A. filed a response to R.R.'s petition on September 28, 2021, declaring, among other things, that E.C. "was conceived with my friend [D.H.], who agreed to be the donor and participate in [E.A.'s] life as a part of his extended family" and that she "had decided many years before meeting [R.R.] to have a child with a donor." C.A. reported having a "large community of close friends" whom she considered to be her "chosen family" in Oakland and the Bay Area.
At an initial hearing on September 30, 2021, the court found, based on the evidence set forth in the pleadings, that R.R. had made a preliminary showing that she was a presumed parent of E.A. pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d). Noting that this was "not a close case" given the evidence of "continual and extensive contact between the child and [R.R.]," the court ordered visitation pending trial for alternate weekends and Wednesday overnights on the weeks without weekend visits. The court set the matter for a long cause trial on October 25, November 2, and November 16, 2021, after both counsel indicated the trial would require close to three days.
On October 5, 2021, D.H. filed a pro per petition to determine parental relationship in a separate action, stating that he was E.A.'s biological father, asserting that legal and physical custody of E.A. should be granted to C.A., and requesting that he receive visitation at C.A.'s discretion. On October 7, 2021, C.A. filed a response to D.H.'s petition, agreeing with everything the petition requested. That same day, she also filed a request that D.H. be joined as a party to R.R.'s parentage petition and that the two pending parenting petitions involving E.A. be consolidated. On October 18, 2021, the trial court granted the unopposed joinder motion and consolidated the two matters. Trial commenced on October 25, 2021.
At the second day of trial on November 2, 2021, C.A.'s attorney asked that D.H. be allowed to attend family court mediation with C.A. and R.R. the next day. The trial court denied the request because D.H. had not sought custody of E.A. in his parentage petition and had requested that C.A. be awarded sole legal and physical custody with visitation to him only in C.A.'s discretion. The mediation session was ultimately rescheduled because a Spanish interpreter was not available for C.A. During custody proceedings on November 30, 2021, the court re-referred the parties to family court mediation, again excluding D.H. because he was not requesting custody or court-ordered visitation. It also made orders splitting E.A.'s Christmas break between R.R. and C.A.
Following three days of court trial, D.H. filed an amended parentage petition on December 6, 2021, now asking for joint legal and physical custody of E.A. on a 50/50 basis and requesting equal time at trial to present his case. C.A. filed a response on December 9 consenting to his custody request. That same day, she and D.H. signed a VDOP before a notary and submitted it for filing. A certified copy of the VDOP verifying its filing on December 15, 2021, was later admitted at trial.
It is unclear from the record how D.H. was permitted to file an amended petition which changed his demand for custody and visitation midtrial without a prior court order or stipulation of the parties. Absent permission, D.H. was not entitled to unilaterally file an amended petition mid-trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 472 &473; Fam. Code, § 210.) On this limited record, we cannot discern that such authority was granted.
Between the third and fourth day of trial, new counsel for D.H. substituted into the case. On December 13, 2021, the court reviewed with D.H.'s new counsel the history of the case, including the facts that: D.H.'s initial petition did not seek custody or a specific visitation order; D.H. was offered the chance to cross-examine each witness and only did so on one or two occasions for about five minutes; and he had indicated to the court that he did not intend to present any witnesses of his own. D.H. had failed to file either an exhibit list or a witness list pursuant to the court's pretrial order and was precluded from identifying new exhibits or witnesses mid trial. He was thus limited to presenting his own testimony. The court denied D.H.'s request for emergency custody and visitation orders pending the outcome of the trial but agreed to allow D.H. some time to present his case.
C. Trial Proceedings
Trial in this matter was held over five days from October 25, 2021, to January 31, 2022. M.H.-who had been E.A.'s cooperative daycare provider for three years-testified that R.R. was the one who initially brought E.A. to a co-op event, and he was subsequently enrolled. During his time at the coop, M.H. understood E.A.'s parents to be C.A. and R.R., who he called "Momma" and "Papi." In the daycare emergency forms-which were completed and signed by C.A.-C.A. and R.R. were listed as E.A.'s parents, and additional contacts included R.M. (R.R.'s mother, listed as grandmother) and D.H. (listed as uncle). M.H. further testified that during E.A.'s first year at the co-op D.H. was introduced to her as "Uncle David," but the second year she was told D.H. "had been the sperm donor." E.A. always addressed D.H. as "Uncle David," and M.H. considered him a person who supported events connected with the co-op. When E.A. talked about his family at school he talked about having two moms. M.H. also remembered C.A. telling her that she and R.R. were preparing to have R.R. adopt E.A.
S.S.-an elementary school teacher who was teaching E.A. in his second grade class and had taught the child for six months in first grade as a gifted student-testified that when he first began to teach E.A., he was told the boy had two mothers, C.A. and R.R. According to S.S., E.A. had "definitely internalized" that he has two moms, regularly commenting on it in class, such as when he interrupted another student discussing a traditional family to say: "[W]ell I have two moms and every family is the same." Both C.A. and R.R., as well as the grandparents on both sides were described as "very active" in the school setting. R.R.'s mother would often come and pick up E.A. from school. Before this litigation was filed, S.S. had never been introduced to anyone else as one of E.A.'s parents, although the boy did have a lot of community support. He met D.H. for the first time at school about a week before his testimony. He was not aware which of E.A.'s two mothers was his biological parent until two weeks before the trial.
R.R.'s father, P.R., testified that E.A. calls him "Papito," which is what he used to call his own grandfather. R.R.'s father speaks Spanish with E.A. and has tried to share his culture and history with the boy. E.A. has been to Mexico several times to visit P.R.'s family, once for the Christmas holiday. P.R. would see E.A. on Fridays after school. They would go to parks and museums and walk the dog together. E.A. especially likes the Natural History Museum in San Francisco, and they have gone together more than six times.
R.R.'s mother R.M. testified she was E.A.'s "Abue," his grandmother, being the mother of one of his moms. E.A. and R.R. stayed at her house for about 10 days when he was 15-months old, while C.A. and R.R. were in the process of buying their house together. From the time E.A. started preschool at two and a half, R.M. has typically seen E.A. twice a week, often babysitting while his moms were working. They would go to parks, playgrounds, and museums; practice soccer or a little basketball; go to the library and read books; visit R.M.'s mother; and have sleepovers.
J.C.-a colleague of R.R.'s who has known her for over four years- testified that she and her daughter regularly spent time with R.R. and E.A., including vacationing together several times. She described R.R. as a "really fantastic parent," who creates "structures, routines and loving boundaries for her child." E.A. calls R.R. "Momma."
R.R. testified that she lived in the same house with E.A. from the time he was 15 months old until July 2020. Since July 2020, she has lived in the back house on the property. R.R. explained that she was part of conversations with C.A. regarding her getting pregnant with different potential donors and the logistics involved, but C.A. never mentioned D.H. R.R. was initially a "very present person" in E.A.'s life. She was present at his birth, cutting the umbilical cord, and she bought the house with C.A. "to be able to be with him every single day for multiple parts of the day." In the first six months they were living together, she "came into the role of being his mom, being one of his moms." After they had lived together for a few months, C.A. approached R.R. about being a co-parent of E.A. and potentially legally adopting him. Shortly before E.A. turned two, R.R. realized that she would always be his mom. During the same period, E.A. started calling her "Papi," viewing her as a parent.
R.R. regularly cared for E.A. when sick and participated in almost all of his yearly checkups. One time, he swallowed a dime at school, and the teacher called her to take him to the emergency room. R.R. had also taken E.A. to all of his dental appointments until the start of these proceedings. She and C.A. split E.A.'s parenting, "like any parent splits things," until November 2020 when C.A. began limiting her time and connection with E.A. Eventually, C.A. stated she wanted to be a single mother and limited R.R. to putting E.A. to sleep twice a week. Thereafter, R.R. did her best to leave E.A. a daily note with vitamins and a snack at home or school so that he would know "that no matter where each of [them were], [she was] out here in the world loving him, caring about him, thinking about him so that he [could] go through the day feeling confident and held and loved and stable." Once C.A. was served with the parentage petition, she cut off all of R.R.'s contact with E.A. R.R. testified that E.A. was the center of her life and the first person she considers when making decisions.
C.A. had recently told the school R.R. could no longer leave these packages for E.A.
R.R. acknowledged at trial that she and C.A. were never in a dating relationship, married to each other, or domestic partners. She had been partnered with another woman for four years before the filing of the parentage action and remained partnered with her. After this testimony, C.A.'s attorney made an oral motion to dismiss R.R.'s parentage action for lack of standing, which the trial court denied. R.R. submitted a number of items into evidence reflecting C.A.'s view of their relationship, including a message from C.A.to R.R. stating: "On this 31st birthday of yours, I want to celebrate with joy and a lot of excitement the honor of sharing with a human being that has so much integrity. It's so real and unique. The family that we have created sometimes seems like a dream. Having you as my partner in raising our child is a real privilege. I adore you. Happy birthday, my girl. Your wife."
D.H. testified that, at the time E.A. was conceived, there was no written agreement that he would have parental rights. He told C.A. at the time that he would help her, but they did not agree to anything beyond conception. According to D.H., he considers E.A. to be his son and introduces him to others as such. E.A. has also introduced D.H. as his father. E.A. considers D.H.'s wife (A.C.) to be "a mom." D.H. filed to be named as E.A.'s father recently because he considered the situation difficult. E.A.'s life, "the way he is going to be raised is in dispute, if he's in the middle of a conflict between two people and that's something that could hurt him or cause him harm, then I wanted to be part of his life. I mean, legally be part of his life."
D.H. testified on the last day of trial during his case in chief that he had signed the VDOP the previous month because it was the "most appropriate way" to hold himself out as E.A.'s father "in a way that would be in accordance with the wishes of [C.A.]" He did not file for parentage before October 2021 because he did not think it was necessary, as he had always been able to have access to the child. He filed the court documents in October because he was worried about E.A.'s "emotional stability," stating: "I think that the way he has been raised without any conflicts, I was worried about him in this situation." He did not initially ask for custody or visitation because he did not want to be asking "too much" of C.A., given that he was able to see E.A. when possible. He felt minimized by the court proceedings, upset by being referred to as "just the sperm donor," and afraid that R.R. would exclude him from E.A.'s life. He was not asking the court to find that R.R. was not E.A.'s mother, he just wanted some rights himself. At oral argument in this matter, counsel for D.H. acknowledged that nothing in the record showed that D.H. had provided financial support for E.A.
C.A. testified that she is the executive director of a nonprofit organization that assists Latina women to launch businesses. C.A. married D.M. in 2004. In 2009, when she started to plan for a baby, C.A. knew she "did not want a binary family. [She] wanted a community family." So she gathered several of [her] friends and began to discuss it." D.H. was the third member of her community she asked to assist her in becoming a mother. She had no written or oral agreement with D.H. at the time of conception that he would not be a parent to E.A. She described him as a "great friend" who supported her during her pregnancy along with other members of her community.
Her intention in creating a nontraditional family was "to give a space to the people in [her] community" but "[n]ever give up [her] rights." According to C.A., E.A. was very connected to D.H. and his whole family, calling D.H.'s wife mommy and referring to D.H. as dad. She and E.A. would visit the family two or three times a week. C.A. thought about having R.R. adopt E.A. at one point but decided against it. She acknowledged a Facebook post from March 2019 in which she posted: "Thank you, daddy, mommy, [R.R.], for being the best dad in the world." The post went on to refer to R.M. as E.A.'s "grandma" and to R.R. as "his mommy."
D. Trial Court Decision
The trial court issued its final amended statement of decision on June 3, 2022. The court concluded that E.A. "has two parents, [C.A.] and [R.R.], and that [D.H.] is a statutory sperm donor (as well as a member of a loving community that acts as extended family to the child)." Specifically, the court held that C.A. is E.A.'s "biological mother and is indisputably one of his parents." The court then found it could not be "credibly disputed" that R.R. qualified as a presumed parent pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d) because she had established by a preponderance of the evidence that she received E.A. into her home and openly held out the child as her own. C.A. and D.H. had failed to rebut this presumption.
The trial court additionally concluded by clear and convincing evidence that prior to conception, C.A. and D.H. "had an oral agreement that [D.H.] would be a sperm donor, rather than a father, and continued this agreement until they apparently determined that declaring D.H. to be a legal father would assist [C.A.] in this litigation." D.H. was thus excluded as E.A.'s natural father pursuant to section 7613, subdivision (b)(2)(B). In reaching this conclusion, the trial court opined that E.A. had been "raised to view [D.H.] first as an uncle/close family friend and later (starting after he was 4 years old) as [] his sperm donor and biological father, but never as one of his parents." Finally, having found D.H. to be E.A.'s sperm donor, the court determined that the VDOP filed by C.A. and D.H. during the pendency of the case was void pursuant to section 7573.5, subd. (a)(5).
Under the circumstances, R.R. was granted joint legal and physical custody of E.A., with the parents sharing physical custody of E.A. on a 5-2-2-5 day schedule. Given "the high level of conflict" between the parties, the court rejected the suggestion of daily video calls with the non-custodial parent, opting for a single call on the third evening when E.A. is away from the noncustodial parent for more than three consecutive days. C.A. and D.H. timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. R.R. has Standing in this Matter
As a preliminary matter, C.A. and D.H. contend that, because R.R. was never a same-sex partner to C.A. (who is a heterosexual woman), she has no standing as an "interested person" under section 7630, subdivision (b) to seek second mother status with respect to E.A. R.R. disagrees, asserting that section 7630 has been liberally construed to grant standing to a wide range of people based on their relationship with the child rather than their biological connection, gender, or sexual orientation. "[S]tanding is a question of law, particularly where, as here, it depends on statutory provisions conferring standing." (Neil S. v. Mary L. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 240, 249 .) Reviewing the issue de novo, we easily conclude that R.R. is correct.
The Uniform Parentage Act, section 7600 et seq. (UPA), provides the statutory framework for judicial determinations of parentage in California. It governs private adoptions, paternity and custody disputes, and dependency proceedings. (In re M.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 197, 210 (M.C.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 378 (Martinez).) Pursuant to the UPA, "[a] person is presumed to be the natural parent of a child" if the person meets any one of a number of different conditions, including if that person "receives the child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child." (§ 7611, subd. (d).) And, according to section 7630 subdivision (b), "[a]ny interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d) or (e) of Section 7611."
In In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 (Nicholas H.), our Supreme Court applied section 7612, which provides that a presumption under section 7611 "may [with several specifically articulated exceptions] be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence." (§ 7612, subd. (a).) The Court concluded that the statutory language "indicates that the Legislature did not envision an automatic preference for biological fathers, even if the biological father has come forward to assert his rights." (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 604, explaining holding in Nicholas H.) Thus, it found that a presumed father's claim under subdivision (d) of section 7611 was not necessarily rebutted by evidence that he was not the biological father. (Nicholas H., at pp. 58-59; Miller v. Miller (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 111, 116-117 (Miller) [§ 7630, subd. (b) gave standing to seek paternity to a man who claimed parentage based on § 7611, subd. (d), notwithstanding the existence of a conclusively presumed father under § 7540].)
The next year, the Fifth District cited Nicholas H. for the proposition that "[t]he paternity presumptions are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state's interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family." (In re Salvador M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1357-1358 (Salvador M.).) In Salvador M., the appellate court concluded that an adult half-sister was the presumed mother of a child she had cared for from birth and continued to raise along with her own children after the death of their mother. (Id. at pp. 1355-1356.) In doing so, the court opined: "The familial relationship between a nonbiological father and an older child (over two years of age), resulting from years of living together in a purported parent/child relationship, is 'considerably more palpable than the biological relationship of actual paternity' and 'should not be lightly dissolved.'" (Salvador M., at p. 1358, quoting Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 117-118.)
Thereafter, in Librers v. Black (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 114 (Librers), the trial court found that a man had no standing to establish his status as a presumed parent pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d), even though he had signed a VDOP and had lived with and helped care for the child for the first two years of her life. The court reasoned that the child had a loving mother who had been her primary care provider for her entire life; the man was not the biological father; the couple never believed he was the biological father; granting standing would have the effect of not allowing the mother to move to a community where she had extended family and the promise of a job; and the man assisted the mother in raising the minor much like a friend or relative might in a shared housing situation. (Id. at p. 121.) The Sixth District reversed, holding that the existence of one fit parent did not preclude establishing paternity in a second individual; biology was not required; and where the child would live and with whom would be decided after the paternity question was resolved. (Id. at pp. 123, 127.) As for the trial court's "shared housing" rationale, the appellate court opined: "As we see it, the import of Nicholas H. is that a boyfriend, uncle or housemate who receives a child into his home and holds the child out as his own is not disqualified from asserting parental rights and responsibilities to the child by virtue of his lack of a biological attachment." (Librers, at p. 123, italics added.)
The Librers court next turned to the issue of standing, noting that standing is a party's right to make a legal claim and is a threshold issue to be resolved before reaching the merits. (Librers, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 124.) Moreover,"' "[s]tanding requirements will vary from statute to statute based upon the intent of the Legislature and the purpose for which the particular statute was enacted." '" (Ibid.) The court then considered the standing requirement at issue here, reasoning: "Section 7630, subdivision (b) provides that '[a] ny interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d) . . . of Section 7611.' . . . . Notably, this section does not condition standing on biology or depth of bond, the two criteria used by the trial court to deny . . . standing. The relevant inquiry under the statute is whether the prospective plaintiff claiming presumed father status under section 7611, subdivision (d) can allege facts that bring him within the statutory language of that subdivision." (Librers, at pp. 124-125, second italics added.)" 'Thus, a broad class of men, including" 'alleged'" fathers, can bring an action to establish paternity when such claim is based on the presumed father status which is obtained by receiving the child and openly acknowledging paternity.'" (Id. at p. 125, quoting Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 117, italics added by Librers.)
Among the examples of this" 'broad class of men'" entitled to standing as interested parties, the appellate court listed "the putative father of the child of the man's former lover, when the man had lived with the child and her mother (who was married to someone else) during the first year and a half of the child's life, and continued to visit with the child after the mother and putative father separated, until the mother cut off all contact between the putative father and the child when she reconciled with her husband." (Librers, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 125, citing Brian C. v. Ginger K. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1198.) And "[r]ead in a gender-neutral fashion, the class of interested persons has even been held to include a 12-year-old girl who sued for recognition of a mother-child relationship with the non-biologically-related woman who raised her." (Librers, at p. 125, citing In re Karen C. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 932 (Karen C.).)
More recently, in E.C. v. J.V. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1076 (E.C.) J.V. became pregnant shortly before ending her relationship with the biological father. Around the same time, she became good friends with E.C., who took her to her prenatal appointments, became her Lamaze partner, was present at the child's birth, and cut the umbilical cord. A few months after the child was born, J.V. and the child moved in with E.C. Sometime later, J.V. and E.C. became sexually involved and were a couple for five years. After they broke up, the two women continued to share custody for a year, until J.V. cut off contact. (Id. at pp. 1080-1082.) The trial court denied E.C.'s parentage petition because the women failed to register as domestic partners, they were only "good friends" when the child was born, and they did not conceive the child together with the intention to become parents. (Id. at pp. 1083-1084.)
The Third District reversed, reasoning that "[t]he relationship between a child's alleged parent and biological parent is legally irrelevant in determining whether the alleged parent held out that child as his or her natural child. The relevant relationship is that between the child and the alleged parent. [Citation.] Thus, by focusing its attention on the sexual relationship between appellant and respondent, the court failed to analyze the relationship between appellant and the minor. This was error." (E.C., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088; see id. at p. 1085 ["a presumed parent is not just a casual friend of the other parent, or even a long-term boyfriend or girlfriend, but someone who has entered into a familial relationship with the child: someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child's well-being, regardless of his or her relationship with the child's other parent"].)
We could stop here, finding that R.R. had standing based on this precedent as she alleged facts bringing her within the language of section 7611, subdivision (d). But subsequent actions by the Legislature make our conclusion even more clear. Specifically, in 2013, the Legislature enacted section 7612, subdivision (c) to abrogate the holding in M.C., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 197, that a child may only have two parents under the UPA. (Stats. 2013, ch. 564, § 1(b).) Pursuant to that statute: "In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage." (§ 7612, subd. (c), italics added.)
The public policy underlying this statute is stated in explicit legislative findings, including the following: "Most children have two parents, but in rare cases, children have more than two people who are that child's parent in every way. Separating a child from a parent has a devastating psychological and emotional impact on the child, and courts must have the power to protect children from this harm." (Stats. 2013, ch. 564, § 1(a).) The legislation was thus meant to clarify "that where more than two people have claims to parentage, the court may, if it would otherwise be detrimental to the child, recognize that the child has more than two parents." (Id., § 1(c).)
The Third District applied section 7612, subd. (c) in C.A. v. C.P. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 27 (C.A.).) There, the wife in a married couple conceived the child with a coworker. The marriage remained intact, with the wife and husband parenting the child. However, for the first three years of the child's life, the couple allowed the coworker to act in an alternate parenting role, and the child bonded with him and his close relatives. The coworker "was involved with the child's early medical evaluations and treatment, openly held her out as his daughter, received her into his home, paid child support, and had regular visitation" until the couple cut him off after he filed a petition to establish parentage. (C.A., at pp. 30-31.) In upholding the trial court's conclusions that the coworker was a third parent to the child, the appellate court rejected the argument that a third parent should not be recognized when the child is being raised in a stable marriage and the husband is conclusively presumed to be at least one father. (Id. at pp. 34, 3637.) In doing so, the court noted that "the Legislature has responded to new scientific advances and new ways people now choose to form relationships. But the legal changes express a consistent desire to preserve stability for the innocent children who have no control over what their various parents have chosen to do with their lives." (Id. at p. 34, some italics added.) While not involving a claim to be considered a second mother under the UPA, we find C.A. both analogous and instructive, as it highlights the Legislative intent that the touchstone for determining presumed parentage is the wellbeing of the child and the established relationship between that child and the individual seeking to establish parentage, not biology, gender, marital status, or sexual orientation. (See also Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 382389 [reversing where claimant uncle had relationship with the child but trial court took too narrow a view of detriment and denied his petition; the fact the child had two parents and a stable placement did not mean child would not suffer detriment from severance of relationship with uncle].)
In sum, we reject the theory posited by C.A. and D.H. that a woman who alleges that she meets the statutory requirements of section 7611, subdivision (d) does not have standing to pursue a parentage determination unless she has been in a sexual relationship with the biological mother. C.A. and D.H. have argued here only that R.R. is categorically exempt from being E.A.'s presumed mother. They do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence showing that R.R. has satisfied the requirements of section 7611, subdivision (d). Nor could they, given the strength of the showing made by R.R. in her petition and at trial of her role as a second mother to E.A. Thus-having determined that R.R. had standing in this action-she is necessarily established as a presumed mother to E.A. under the UPA.
We find the cases cited by C.A. and D.H. distinguishable both because they were resolved prior to the Legislature's recognition that a child may have more than two natural parents and because they involved women attempting to take the place of the biological mother. (In re D.S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1088 [vacating finding of dependency court that step-mother was presumed mother where biological mother made competing claim]; Scott v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 540 [where there can only be two natural parents and biological mother's rights have not been terminated, long-time partner of father had no standing to establish parentage]; Amy G. v. M.W. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1 [after biological mother filed a parentage petition, step-mother is not an interested person with standing to pursue her own parentage action], abrogated by statute as stated in In re D.S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095-1096.) Nor do we agree with C.A. and D.H. that the holdings in Nicholas H., Salvador M., and Karen C. are relevant only to cases where there are no competing paternity interests. Rather, they show the requirement that the court consider all relevant circumstances, including the relationship between the alleged natural parent and the child.
Finding that R.R. meets the qualifications of a presumed parent under the facts of this case does not mean that anyone who cohabits with a biological parent and his or her child will establish parental status. The facts of this case in particular demonstrate that R.R. was considered a mother by E.A. R.R. met the physical and psychological needs of E.A., as a parent would. C.A. and R.R. held R.R. out to be E.A.'s mother to family, friends, and the public. We agree with the trial court that this case is not a close one.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports D.H.'s Status as a Sperm Donor
Section 7613 governs parentage in cases involving artificial insemination. Pursuant to section 7613, subdivision (b)(2)(B): "If the semen is not provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or a licensed sperm bank as specified in paragraph (1), the donor of semen for use in assisted reproduction by a woman other than the donor's spouse is treated in law as if the donor is not the natural parent of a child thereby conceived if either of the following are met: [¶]. . . [¶] A court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived through assisted reproduction and that, prior to the conception of the child, the woman and the donor had an oral agreement that the donor would not be a parent." (Italics added.) Here, the trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence that, prior to E.A.'s conception through assisted reproduction, C.A. and D.H. had an oral agreement that D.H. would not be a parent.
On appeal, C.A. and D.H. contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the existence of such an oral agreement under the heightened clear and convincing standard of proof. Specifically, C.A. and D.H. argue that they both denied having such an oral agreement at trial and that R.R. was not present at their pre-conception discussions and thus could not testify to the contrary. They characterize the trial court's decision as improperly based on speculative inferences drawn from improper criteria. We disagree, finding the trial court's conclusion to be amply supported by the evidence presented at trial-along with reasonable inferences therefrom-under the requisite standard of proof.
"[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence." (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996, italics added.)
It is true that C.A. testified at trial that she had no written or oral agreement with D.H. at the time of conception that he would be a sperm donor rather than a parent to E.A. However, the trial court apparently discounted this statement, and we must give due deference to that credibility determination. Notably, C.A.'s responsive pleading filed September 28, 2021, expressly identified D.H. as a donor and characterized his role as a member of an extended family. When D.H, was asked about such a verbal agreement, his testimony was more equivocal. He testified: "[W]hat I remember, it was that I said I would help her. I offered to help her, but I don't remember that we had agreed to anything more beyond the conception." Certainly, a reasonable inference from this testimony is that D.H. agreed to help C.A. conceive a child but that was it. Indeed, in line with this interpretation, C.A. herself testified that her intention in creating a nontraditional family was "to give a space to the people in [her] community" but "[n]ever give up [her] rights." C.A. testified that D.H. was a "great friend" who supported her during her pregnancy, along with other members of her community. C.A. further emphasized that her "vision" was to be "a single mother within my community." That C.A. initially intended to be a single mother does not negate the rights subsequently created under section 7611, subdivision (d) by her conduct in willingly allowing R.R. to co-parent E.A. over the course of years.
The fact that C.A. and D.H. kept his status as the sperm donor a secret from everyone, including his wife and grown daughters, for two years is additional circumstantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that C.A. and D.H. agreed that he would be a member of her supportive community rather than an actual parent to E.A. While they were not required to disclose this information to anyone or to get the consent of D.H.'s wife, that they did not strongly suggests that D.H.'s involvement in E.A.'s life was intended to be limited. Moreover, E.A. was not told about his biological connection to D.H. until he was 4.5 years old, and, even then, C.A. and R.R. disclosed the information to the child through a handmade book which stated that D.H. "gave his sperm to Mami [C.]" so she could grow a baby and that after his birth "Mami [R.R.]" cut his umbilical cord, went with him to his first bath, and "since then . . . has not stopped following (and loving) the baby." The book concludes that E.A. "has his two moms, Mami [C.A.] and [R.R.] [a]nd has a large family too," including D.H.'s family and others. In other words, even at that point, a distinction was made between E.A.'s two mommies and the other members of his extended community, which included D.H. and his family.
Estate of Berger (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1293, relied upon by C.A. and D.H. in this context is completely inapposite, as it involves discerning the intent of a testator.
We add to this evidence the facts that D.H. was not identified on E.A.'s birth certificate, despite knowledge by C.A. of his parentage, and that he did not sign a VDOP until December 9, 2021, well after trial commenced. In addition, E.A.'s current teacher testified that he did not know D.H. as a parent until recently and that E.A. strongly identified as being a child of two moms; C.A. stated in her initial pleading herein that D.H. was someone who "agreed to be the donor and participate in E.A.'s life as part of his extended family"; E.A.'s three-year preschool provider testified that she understood E.A.'s parents to be C.A. and R.R., who he called "Momma" and "Papi"; and the preschool form completed and signed by C.A. listed C.A. and R.R. as E.A.'s parents and D.H. as an uncle. Under all of these circumstances-and applying the well-settled principles governing our review for sufficiency of the evidence-we have no trouble concluding that it is highly probable that C.A. and D.H. had an agreement at the time of E.A.'s conception that D.H. would be a sperm donor and member of C.A.'s extended community but not E.A.'s father. Indeed, substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that this understanding continued until C.A. and D.H. "apparently determined that declaring [D.H.] to be a legal father would assist [C.A.] in this litigation."
Given the conclusion that D.H.-while certainly an important member of E.A.'s supportive community-is not his natural parent pursuant to section 7613, subd. (b)(2)(B), the trial court correctly determined that the VDOP executed by C.A. and D.H. in this case was void. Section 7573, subdivision (d) provides: "Except as provided in Sections 7573.5, 7575, 7576, 7577, and 7580, a completed voluntary declaration of parentage that complies with this chapter and that has been filed with the Department of Child Support Services is equivalent to a judgment of parentage of the child and confers on the declarant all rights and duties of a parent." However, pursuant to one of the exceptions set forth in the statute, a VDOP is void if, at the time of signing, "[t]he person seeking to establish parentage is a sperm or ova donor under subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 7613." (§ 7573.5, subd. (a)(5); see also § 7551, subd. (b)(1)(C) ["Genetic testing shall not be used . . . [¶] . . . [¶]. . . [¶] [t]o establish the parentage of a person who is a donor pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 7613, except to resolve a dispute whether the child was conceived through assisted reproduction."].)
The trial court additionally held that-even if the VDOP was not void-R.R. would have standing to challenge it under section 7577, subdivision (a) as a presumed parent, and it "would have been compelled" to grant her set-aside motion based on the best interests of E.A. and the weighing of the factors set forth in section 7577, subdivision (h). As we uphold the trial court's decision to void the VDOP, we do not consider this alternate analysis.
C. D.H. Was Not Denied Due Process
Finally, we address C.A. and D.H.'s contention that the trial court in this case deprived D.H. of his due process right to a fair trial, essentially by prejudging the matter and viewing him as a bystander rather than a full participant in the proceedings. Indeed, C.A. and D.H. assert that "the judicial bias was of such a degree that it was the basis upon which their VDOP was erroneously invalidated by the court." We disagree.
The parentage trial was held on October 25, November 2, November 16, and December 13, 2021, with a final date on January 31, 2022. D.H. was present and self-represented on the first three dates and represented by counsel during the last two. Until midway through trial, D.H. did not seek legal or physical custody or a specific visitation schedule. Nevertheless, during the first three court dates, D.H. was given the opportunity to crossexamine each witness, asking less than ten questions. He also stipulated to the admission of some exhibits and stated he had no objection to the admission of others. After D.H. filed an amended petition and his new attorney made a general appearance, D.H.'s new attorney cross-examined C.A. And D.H. testified for a second time, this time on his own behalf. Because he failed to comply with pretrial orders, he was not permitted to present additional witnesses or exhibits. Clearly, D.H. was not denied the opportunity to participate in the trial or present evidence on his own behalf. (See In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 493 [requirements of due process of law are met in child custody proceedings when a parent is given notice and an opportunity to be heard]; see also Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210 [party appearing in propria persona "is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys"].)
Although omitted from the record, the trial court issued pretrial orders which required the parties to submit witness and exhibits lists, but D.H. submitted neither. Appellant's appendix appears to be missing several critical documents, including the trial court's pretrial orders and minutes from each day of trial. Further, no reporter's transcript was provided for the hearing on the joinder motion. By failing to provide an adequate record in this context, C.A. and D.H. cannot prevail on these constitutional claims. (Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 644 ["Where the appellant fails to provide an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must presume that the appealed judgment or order is correct, and on that basis, affirm."].)
C.A. and D.H., however, complain on appeal that D.H. was not granted equal time to present his parentage claim. This argument ignores the fact that D.H. did not comply with pretrial orders, made representations to the trial court that it relied upon for trial scheduling, and filed an amended petition changing his legal demands midway through trial without following proper procedures. It also disregards the fact that the trial court allowed D.H. additional time on due process grounds and that much of the relevant evidence (including D.H.'s testimony) had already been presented by the other parties. A trial court has the inherent authority and responsibility to fairly and efficiently administer the judicial proceedings before it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128; see Schimmel v. Levin (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 81, 87 [citing Code Civ. Proc, § 128 and opining that "[e]very court has the inherent power, in furtherance of justice, to regulate the proceedings of a trial before it" and "to effect an orderly disposition of the issues presented"].) Thus, due process does not prohibit the trial court from imposing reasonable limitations on the presentation of evidence. (See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 836 [due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court]; California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 12, 19-20 [affirming trial court's imposition of time limits on trial counsel pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 352 and 765].) That this resulted in less time for D.H. than was allotted to the other two parties does not show bias or constitute a violation of due process.
Moreover, C.A. and D.H.'s claim that they were prejudiced by the trial court's allocation of time because it kept D.H. from calling his wife and adult daughter to testify about the closeness of the family to E.A. is unavailing. Given the offer of proof, it is likely this testimony would have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. The existing record is clear that E.A. is very close to D.H. and his entire family, as members of his extended family community. In addition, the only two people with direct knowledge regarding E.A.,'s conception, C.A. and D.H., had already testified. And it is unlikely that D.H.'s wife and family could have spoken to any agreement between the two during that timeframe as they were unaware of D.H.'s biological connection to E.A. until the child was two years old. Thus, C.A. and D.H. are unable to show that D.H. was prejudiced by the trial court's trial management decisions. (See Gold Reserve, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (D.D.C. 2015) 146 F.Supp.3d 112, 128 [while parties were not afforded equal time, "establishing a denial of a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard' requires more"; rejecting due process claim where party failed to provide an explanation about how the unequal timing affected its ability to present its case].)
As additional evidence of bias at trial, C.A. and D.H. assert that D.H. was not treated equally to R.R. because he was not allowed to attend custody mediation sessions and was not granted temporary visitation. But D.H. and R.R. were never similarly situated during these proceedings. Prior to the parentage trial-at the initial hearing in this matter on September 30, 2021-the trial court made a preliminary finding that R.R. was a presumed mother of E.A. and granted temporary visitation based on the pleadings and declarations that had been filed up to that point, which the court concluded evinced "continual and extensive contact" between E.A. and R.R. for purposes of section 7611, subdivision (d). In contrast, until early December 2021, D.H. did not request custody and only wanted visitation at C.A.'s discretion (which he was presumably getting). Under such circumstances, it was reasonable to exclude D.H. from mediation. Nor, on this record, can we fault the trial court for preserving the status quo with respect to visitation until the issue of D.H.'s parentage was decided.
In the end, it is clear that C.A. and D.H. disagree with many of the decisions made by the trial court in this case. That C.A. and D.H. may be unhappy with the trial court's rulings, however, does not establish bias, as "a trial court's numerous rulings against a party-even when erroneous-do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review." (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 732.) Rather, "only the most 'extreme facts' would justify judicial disqualification based on the due process clause." (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 996.) Specifically, to support a due process violation there must exist, "based on an objective assessment of the circumstances in the particular case, . . .' "the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."' [Citation.] Where only the appearance of bias is at issue, a litigant's recourse is to seek disqualification under state disqualification statutes." (Ibid.) The allegations made by C.A. and D.H. in this case fall far short of the showing required for their constitutional claim.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of R.R. is affirmed. R.R. is thus entitled to recover her costs on appeal. Having considered all of the circumstances of this case, we decline to award sanctions to R.R. pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g).
WE CONCUR: HUMES, P. J., BANKE, J.
[*] Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.