Opinion
03-24-00104-CV
05-31-2024
C. H. and A. C., Appellants v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-22-004931, THE HONORABLE CATHERINE MAUZY, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS J. BAKER, JUSTICE
C.H. (Mother) appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her three children, C.E.H., A.R.C., and B.F.C. Father, A.C., appeals from the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his two children, A.R.C. and B.F.C. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment finding by clear and convincing evidence that two statutory grounds existed for terminating Mother's parental rights, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O); that one statutory ground existed for terminating Father's parental rights, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O); and that termination was in the children's best interest, see id. § 161.001(b)(2).
Mother's court-appointed counsel and Father's court-appointed counsel have each filed a brief concluding that Mother's and Father's appeals are frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 &n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeals from termination of parental rights because it "strikes an important balance between the defendant's constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel's obligation not to prosecute frivolous appeals" (citations omitted)). The briefs meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep't of Protective &Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 64647 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in parental-termination case). Each appellant's respective counsel has certified to this Court that they have provided appellants with a copy of the Anders brief and a copy of the entire appellate record and informed appellants of their right to file a pro se brief. The Department of Family and Protective Services has not filed a response to the Anders briefs. To date, neither appellant has filed a pro se brief.
We have conducted a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine whether the appeals are wholly frivolous, as we must when presented with an Anders brief. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have specifically reviewed the jury's findings as to Mother under part (E) of Family Code § 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to that finding. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (holding that "due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code"). After reviewing the record and the Anders briefs, we find nothing in the record that would arguably support either Mother's or Father's appeal. We agree with both appellants' counsels that the appeals are frivolous and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of C.H. and A.C. We deny C.H.'s counsel's motion to withdraw.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking termination of parental rights extends to "all proceedings [in the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition for review." In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27-28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). Accordingly, counsel's obligations to C.H. have not yet been discharged. See id. If after consulting with counsel appellant desires to file a petition for review, her counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court "a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief." See id.