Opinion
D058466 Super. Ct. No. ECU03634
12-28-2011
C & G FARMS, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HORIZON MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Jeffrey B. Jones, Judge. Affirmed.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Respondent C & G Farms, Inc. (C & G Farms) filed a first amended complaint against appellants David DeShay, Horizon Management, Inc. (Horizon Management), Horizon Equities, Inc. (Horizon Equities), and American Trust Deed Services Corp. (American). In the first amended complaint, C & G Farms alleged that appellants had held a "secret" nonjudicial foreclosure sale of certain real property in which both C & G Farms and Horizon Management had liens. C & G Farms contended that its interest in the property was "wiped out" by the "secret" sale of the property and that it incurred more than $184,000 in damages. After appellants failed to respond to the first amended complaint, the clerk entered a default against each appellant. Appellants filed a motion to set aside the defaults (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b)), which the trial court denied. After a prove-up hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of C & G Farms against appellants in the amount of $225,862.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
On appeal, appellants claim that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the defaults. Appellants also contend that the defaults and the default judgment are void because C & G Farms failed to properly serve the first amended summons and first amended complaint. Finally, appellants contend that the judgment against Horizon Equities is defective because there are no substantive allegations against Horizon Equities in the first amended complaint. We affirm the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside the defaults, and affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 29, 2009, C & G Farms filed a first amended complaint against appellants, among other defendants. In the first amended complaint, C & G Farms alleged that DeShay was the principal officer of Horizon Equities and Horizon Management, and that each appellant was the agent of the others. C & G Farms further alleged that Horizon Management was the beneficiary of a deed of trust recorded on certain real property located in Calexico, California (the Calexico Property) and that American was the trustee of the deed of trust. C & G Farms alleged that Horizon Management was a senior lienholder and that C & G Farms was a junior lienholder in the Calexico Property.
C & G Farms alleged that DeShay, acting in his individual capacity and as an agent for Horizon Management and American, fraudulently assured C & G Farms that he would not reschedule a planned nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Calexico Property without providing notice to C & G Farms. C & G Farms alleged that despite such assurance, "defendants deliberately concealed the fact and date of the rescheduled public auction," causing C & G Farms to lose its secured interest in the property. In a fraud cause of action, C & G Farms alleged that it had suffered damages "in the principal amount of $184.042.52, plus accrued interest."
On October 26, 2009, C & G Farms requested entry of default as to each appellant. In support of its request, C & G Farms filed proofs of service stating that it had effected substitute service on Horizon Management, Horizon Equities, and American by giving the first amended summons and first amended complaint to "Dave K. 'Doe', Person in Charge" on August 31, 2009, and subsequently mailing the documents to each entity on September 3. C & G Farms also filed a proof of service stating that it effected substitute service on DeShay by giving the first amended summons and first amended complaint to a "Jane Doe" on September 2, 2009, and subsequently mailing the documents to DeShay on September 10.
The proof of service states, " 'Jane Doe,' served via intercom (refused access to server)."
DeShay's response to the first amended complaint was due no later than October 20, and the other appellants' responses were due no later than October 13. (See §§ 412.20, subd. (a)(2), 415.20.)
On October 27, pursuant to C & G Farms' request, the clerk entered appellants' defaults.
It appears that the clerk entered DeShay's default on October 27, 2009, and entered the other appellants' defaults at a later date, nunc pro tunc to October 27. The record suggests that the clerk entered the defaults of Horizon Management, Horizon Equities, and American sometime after November 5, when C & G Farms filed a declaration of diligence concerning service of the first amended summons and first amended complaint on these entities.
On November 16, attorney Jefferey Lurner attempted to file an answer on behalf of appellants. After initially filing the answer, the clerk cancelled the file-stamp, noting that appellants had been in default "as of 10/27/09."
On February 8, 2010, C & G Farms filed an application seeking entry of a default judgment against appellants.
On February 22, 2010, appellants filed a motion to set aside the defaults pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b). In their motion, appellants stated that "[i]n September of 2009" attorney Mitchell Feinstein was their attorney "on all matters." Appellants further contended, "In September of 2009, David DeShay instructed [Attorney] Feinstein to challenge the service of process in this case, and if necessary to respond to the [first amended] complaint on behalf of himself and his wholly owned entities." Appellants stated that "[i]n October of 2009," Attorney Feinstein requested a larger monthly retainer, DeShay refused to pay the retainer, and Attorney Feinstein "ceased working on the matters" for appellants.
Appellants argued, "It was due to mistake and inadvertence that David DeShay believed that [Attorney] Feinstein would or had filed a response to the [first amended] complaint in this matter. It was mistake and excusable neglect that caused [Attorney] Feinstein not to make it clear to his former client that he had not filed any responsive pleading to the [first amended] complaint and that a response was due soon." Appellants also contended that "[o]n October 29, 2009 David DeShay retained [Attorney] Lurner to take over the handling of this and other matters for him." Appellants noted that Attorney Lurner attempted to file an answer on behalf of appellants on November 16, but the clerk rejected the answer.
In a declaration offered in support of appellants' motion to set aside, Attorney Feinstein stated, "As of September of 2009[,] I was the attorney representing David DeShay and certain of his entities in certain cases involving American Trust Deed Services, Horizon Management Inc., Horizon Equities Inc. and David DeShay individually." Attorney Feinstein further stated, "At the end of September 2009, Mr. DeShay advised me that he no longer wanted me to represent American Trust Deed Services."
With respect to this matter, Attorney Feinstein stated, "I . . . supplied Mr. DeShay with the dates by which responses in the within action were due as well as the draft responses I had prepared. I believe through inadvertence and mistake that Mr. DeShay failed to file [a] responsive pleading on behalf of himself or to timely obtain counsel to represent [] the three entities." Attorney Feinstein also stated, "When I spoke to Mr. DeShay regarding service of process he told me that he was convinced that since the papers had been 'drop served' at his office, that service was not proper. I advised Mr. DeShay that was not the case, but I believe[d] Mr. DeShay was acting under his mistaken belief that service had not been properly effected." Finally, Attorney Feinstein stated, "In October of 2009, I mistakenly believed that David DeShay had already retained new counsel to file an opposition challenging service of process, which turned out to be incorrect, and therefore, upon my departure and shortly thereafter I failed to file any responsive pleading on behalf of Mr. DeShay or his corporate entities in this action."
Appellants also supported their motion to set aside with a declaration from David DeShay. In his declaration, DeShay stated, "This matter was . . . brought to my attention and I turned over the handling of this matter to [Attorney] Feinstein sometime in September of 2009." DeShay further stated, "[Attorney] Feinstein was retained by me with a regular monthly retainer for the purpose of defending and/or managing the case involving American Trust Deed Services, Horizon Management Inc., Horizon Equities Inc. and David DeShay individually." In addition, DeShay stated, "On October 6, 2009, [Attorney] Feinstein quit working for American Trust Deed Services, and began to withdraw from all cases he was handling for me. [¶] As of October 6, 2009[,] [Attorney] Feinstein no longer represented me."
DeShay stated further, "It was my mistaken belief in speaking with [Attorney] Feinstein that he already had or would file a response to the [first amended] complaint in this matter." DeShay also stated, "On October 29, 2009, I retaine[d] [Attorney] Lurner to take over the handling of this and other matters for me." DeShay stated that Attorney Lurner attempted to contact C & G Farms' counsel seeking to know when C & G Farms had served appellants, but C & G Farms' counsel did not respond to Attorney Lurner's requests. Finally, DeShay stated that Attorney Lurner attempted to file an answer on November 16 on behalf of appellants, but the clerk rejected the filing in light of the October 27 defaults.
C & G Farms filed an opposition to the motion to set aside. C & G Farms contended that the defaults were not the result of acts or omissions on the part of Attorney Feinstein, noting that it was unclear whether Attorney Feinstein had ever represented appellants in this matter. In the alternative, C & G Farms argued that any such representation ended, at the latest, on October 6, which was well before appellants' responsive pleadings were due, and also well before the entry of the defaults on October 27. C & G Farms contended that the defaults were not attributable to Attorney Feinstein, but rather, that they were caused by inexcusable neglect on DeShay's part. In support of this contention, C & G Farms stated that Attorney Feinstein's declaration established both that he had advised DeShay that DeShay's contention that service of process had not been properly effected was without merit, and that Attorney Feinstein had provided DeShay with draft responses to the first amended complaint and "the dates by which responses . . . were due." Further, C & G Farms noted that DeShay conceded that he did not retain Attorney Lurner until after entry of the defaults. C & G Farms also argued that DeShay had attempted to intimidate C & G Farms' counsel "from seeking entry of default."
In support of its opposition, C & G Farms offered several emails that DeShay sent to C & G Farms' counsel, Attorney Goodman, in September and October of 2009. In one of these emails, DeShay threatened to "draft a complaint to the State Bar tomorrow," if Attorney Goodman failed to contact him. In another, DeShay wrote that Attorney Goodman should "take your professional code of conduct and shove it where . . . ." In addition, in an October 12 email to Attorney Goodman, DeShay stated, "Tonight, I received a Proof of Service from [Attorney] Feinstein, who no longer works for me and I have been advised that answers we discussed were not filed . . . ." DeShay also stated that he would "refrain from notifying the court" that Attorney Goodman had failed to provide DeShay with proof of service if "you refrain from filing a default against any defendants."
C & G Farms also offered a letter dated September 30 from Attorney Feinstein to Attorney Goodman stating that Attorney Feinstein had not been retained as counsel in this matter. The letter also stated, "[I]f you could please kindly advise me of the service dates so that I can advise Mr. DeShay as president of [Horizon Management, Horizon Equities, and American] so that he m[a]y retain counsel to prepare an appropriate response, it would be greatly appreciated."
In addition, C & G Farms filed a declaration of Attorney Goodman in which he attested to the threatening and hostile nature of emails that DeShay sent to him in September and October of 2009.
After appellants filed a reply, the trial court held a hearing on March 16, 2010 to consider the motion to set aside. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court reasoned that Attorney Feinstein's conduct had not been a "but for" cause of any of the defaults, noting that Attorney Feinstein had been discharged prior to the entry of the defaults and that DeShay knew, no later than October 12, that Attorney Feinstein had not filed any responses to the first amended complaint. In addition, the trial court found that DeShay did not have "any credibility in his declaration." The court reasoned, "[DeShay] knew no answer had been filed[,] although he is now indicating that he thought that it was entered in the file, but clearly that's not true." The trial court found that DeShay had been attempting to "contest service," and that while "he was trying to get information from [Attorney] Goodman to figure out whether he could successfully do so, . . . the time ran and he was defaulted and his entities were defaulted." The court summarized its ruling by stating:
"I would have a hard time with a straight face saying, 'Oh no, it looks like a reasonable mistake.' It doesn't. It looks like a litigation tactic gone horribly wrong, but intentionally pursued . . . . Motion will be denied."
On July 28, 2010, appellants filed a motion to set aside the default pursuant to section 473.5.
On August 17, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of C & G Farms against appellants in the amount of $225,862, consisting of a judgment in the amount of $184,042, prejudgment interest in the amount of $41,820, and costs totaling $320.
On September 9, appellants withdrew their July 28 motion to set aside the default.
On October 25, appellants timely filed an appeal from the August 17 judgment.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion to set aside the defaults
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their February 22, 2010 motion to set aside their defaults (§ 473, subd. (b)).
We deny appellants' August 4, 2011 request that we take judicial notice of documents purportedly establishing that they had a "meritorious defense" to the underlying lawsuit. (Steven M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 824 [denying party's request for judicial notice of materials related to merits of lawsuit because party may not raise contentions pertaining to the merits in an appeal from a default judgment].)
We also deny appellants' October 27, 2011 request that we take judicial notice of documents that were not before the trial court at the time it denied appellants' February 22 motion to set aside. Absent "exceptional circumstances," reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court." (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) Appellants offer no compelling argument as to why the documents referred to in their October 27, 2011 request for judicial notice could not have been offered to the trial court at the time it ruled on their motion to set aside.
1. Standard of review
In In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 118 (King), the court defined the standard of review that an appellate court is to apply in reviewing an order denying a motion to set aside under section 473.
"The standard for appellate review of an order denying a motion to set aside under section 473 is quite limited. A ruling on such a motion rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the correct result for the decision of the trial court. [Citations.] ' " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' " [Citations.]' [Citation.]" The burden is on the complaining party to establish abuse of discretion, and the showing on appeal is insufficient if it presents a state of facts which simply affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion. [Citation.]" (King, supra, at p. 118, fn. omitted.)
2. Governing law
Section 473, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part:
"The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or
dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect."
"The statute contains a discretionary provision, which enables a court to ' "relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." [Citation.] . . . [¶] Section 473[, subdivision] (b) also contains a "mandatory" or "attorney affidavit" provision which relieves a party 'if a default judgment or dismissal is the result of its attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, without regard to whether the neglect is excusable. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Jackson v. Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 742, 755.)
"A party seeking relief under section 473 bears the burden of proof." (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205.) " ' " '[T]he provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed and sound policy favors the determination of actions on their merits.' [Citations.]" ' [Citation.] " ' "[B]ecause the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 712, 718.)
3. The trial court was not required to set aside the defaults based on Attorney Feinstein's declaration
Appellants claim that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default, in view of Attorney Feinstein's declaration.
In Cisneros v. Vueve (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 906 (Cisneros), the court considered whether a trial court had erred in refusing to set aside a default based on the affidavit of attorney who had not begun to represent the defendants at the time the default was entered. In affirming the denial of the motion to set aside, the Cisneros court stated:
"Because Attorney Perdue was not representing defendants at the time the default was entered, we find as a matter of law, that he was not the proximate cause of the entry of default as defined in the 'unless clause.'[] Hence, the trial court properly concluded that defendants were not entitled to relief under the attorney affidavit provisions of section 473." (Cisneros, supra, at p. 912.)
As noted above, a trial court is mandated to grant a motion to set aside a default upon the filing of a proper attorney affidavit of neglect, "unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect." (§ 473, subd. (b), italics added.)
In this case, the trial court reasonably found that Attorney Feinstein's representation of appellants concluded no later than October 6, 2010. In light of DeShay's October 12 email to Attorney Goodman requesting that Attorney Goodman refrain from seeking the defaults, the trial court also reasonably found that DeShay knew, no later than October 12, that Attorney Feinstein had not filed responsive pleadings to the first amended complaint on behalf of any of the appellants. The clerk entered appellants' defaults on October 27. Under these circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably found that appellants' defaults were not caused by Attorney Feinstein's "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect." (§ 473, subd. (b); see Cisneros, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.)
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the defaults on the basis of Attorney Feinstein's declaration of fault.
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the defaults on the ground that the defaults were caused by appellants' excusable neglect
We assume for purposes of this decision that appellants adequately raised this ground for relief in the trial court, notwithstanding that they did not list this ground as a basis for relief in their notice of motion to set aside.
Appellants claim that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside their defaults on the ground that the defaults were caused by their excusable neglect. Appellants raise numerous arguments in support of this contention. We consider each argument in turn.
First, appellants contend that they acted "entirely reasonably during the 16-day period between the time Mr. Feinstein resigned on October 6, 2009 and the time Mr. Lurner was retained on October 22." Similarly, appellants argue that they "were diligent in their efforts to retain new counsel, and had every reason to believe that their interests were being protected." These arguments fail because appellants did not establish in the trial court that they retained Attorney Lurner prior to the entry of the October 27 defaults. On the contrary, in his February 10, 2010 declaration, DeShay stated, "On October 29, 2009[,] I retaine[d] [Attorney] Lurner to take over the handling of this and other matters for me." (Italics added.) In addition, in opposing appellants' motion to set aside, C & G Farms offered an email that Attorney Lurner sent to Attorney Goodman in which Attorney Lurner stated that as of November 11 he had not been retained in this matter. Attorney Lurner did not attempt to file an answer on behalf of appellants until November 16. In light of this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably found that appellants did not retain counsel prior to entry of the October 27 defaults, and that they failed to act diligently in obtaining new counsel to file responses to the first amended complaint.
Second, appellants contend that "Mr. DeShay made numerous attempts to determine the date and manner of service, but was wholly ignored by [C & G Farms'] counsel." Appellants offer no authority in support of their suggestion that Attorney Goodman was required to respond to DeShay's abusive emails inquiring as to the date of service. Further, the trial court reasonably found that DeShay was attempting to determine the date of service of the first amended summons and the first amended complaint so that he could challenge the validity of service at "the last possible
moment." The trial court thus did not err in refusing to set aside the defaults based upon DeShay's attempts to determine the date and manner of the service of the first amended summons and the first amended complaint.
We reject appellants' contention that the trial court's finding in this regard is "belied" by the fact that DeShay stated in his email to Attorney Goodman that he would "accept proof of service" if Attorney Goodman would send him a copy of proof of service of the first amended summons and first amended complaint. The trial court could have reasonably found that DeShay was not being truthful in his offer not to contest service. In the same email, DeShay wrote, "I do not believe in rules of engagement and will do everything in my power to defend myself. If you think this is a joke or a walk in the park you are dearly mistaken. So take your professional code of conduct and shove it where . . . ." In the hearing on the motion to set aside, the trial court repeatedly stated that it did not believe that DeShay was credible, specifically stating, with respect to one of DeShay's email's to Attorney Goodman, "Mr. DeShay was lying to Mr. Goodman."
Third, appellants argue, "Mr. DeShay reasonably believed that his interests had been protected by Mr. Feinstein." As discussed in part III.A.3., ante, on October 12, DeShay sent Attorney Goodman an email requesting that Attorney Goodman "refrain from filing a default against any defendants." Based on this email, the trial court could have reasonably found that Mr. DeShay knew, no later than October 12, that Attorney Feinstein had not filed any responsive pleadings to C & G Farms' first amended complaint. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the defaults on the ground that DeShay reasonably believed that Attorney Feinstein had protected appellants' interests.
Finally, we reject appellants' contention that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the defaults on the ground that C & G Farms' counsel failed to notify appellants of his intention to seek the defaults. (See Carrasco v. Craft (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 796, 807 [stating that counsel's failure to give notice of intent to seek default does not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside a default].)
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the defaults on the ground that the defaults were caused by appellants' excusable neglect.
B. Appellants waived their objection that C & G Farms failed to properly serve the first amended summons and first amended complaint
Appellants contend that the default and default judgment are void because C & G Farms failed to properly serve them with the first amended summons and first amended complaint.
" 'A general appearance operates as a consent to jurisdiction of the person, dispensing with the requirement of service of process, and curing defects in service.' [Citation.]" (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145.) "[A] party who seeks relief on any basis other than a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction will be deemed to have made a general appearance and waived all objections to defects in service, process, or personal jurisdiction." (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 52; accord § 418.10, subd. (d) ["no motion under . . . Section 473 . . . when joined with a motion [to quash] under this section . . . shall be deemed a general appearance by the defendant" (italics added)].)
Appellants made a general appearance in this action by filing their February 22, 2010 motion to set aside the default (§ 473, subd. (b)), without joining such motion with a motion to quash service. They thereby "waived all objections to defects in service, process, or personal jurisdiction." (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) Accordingly, we conclude that the appellants waived their objection that C & G Farms failed to properly serve the first amended summons and first amended complaint.
C. The trial court did not err in entering a default judgment against Horizon Equities
Citing section 580, subdivision (a), appellants claim that the judgment against Horizon Equities is "defective," because the first amended complaint did not contain any allegations against Horizon Equities or demand any relief against Horizon Equities.
Appellants' claim pertains to the default judgment, rather than the default. We assume for purposes of this decision that appellants may raise this claim notwithstanding that they did not raise such a claim in their motion to set aside the default.
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Section 580, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part with respect to default judgments, "The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint . . . ." "The primary purpose of this section is to insure that defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them." (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 493 (Becker).)
The first amended complaint alleges that DeShay is the principal officer of Horizon Management and Horizon Equities. It further alleges that "each of the defendants was the agent and employee of each of the remaining defendants, and in doing the things alleged below, was acting within the scope of such agency." A cause of action for fraud incorporates both of these allegations and states, "As a proximate result of the conduct of defendants as herein alleged plaintiff's secured interests in the subject . . . real property was wiped out, resulting in damages to plaintiff in the principal amount of $184,042.54, plus accrued interest in an amount to be proven at trial." (Italics added.) The first amended complaint's prayer for relief states in relevant part:
"Plaintiff prays [for] judgment as follows:
"1. For plaintiff and against all defendants;
"2. General damages in the sum of $184.042.54;
"3. Interest on the sum of $184.042.54, at the legal rate, from and after April 13, 2007." (Italics added.)
We reject Horizon Equities' contention that it did not have notice of the possibility that a judgment might be entered against it because it is not named in the caption of the fraud cause of action. In light of the allegations in the first amended complaint described above, Horizon Equities had adequate notice that a judgment in an amount of $225,862 might be taken against it. No more was required. (See Becker, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 493.)
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in entering a default judgment against Horizon Equities.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying the motion to set aside the default are affirmed. C & G Farms is entitled to costs on appeal.
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AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
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NARES, Acting P. J.
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HALLER, J.