As to any request by McKnight for the $85,000 back and the return of the car, McKnight seems to be seeking a rescission of the contract. Such a remedy "will not be allowed even for a substantial breach unless the former status of the parties can be restored." C.C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 236 S.W.2d 961, 962 (Ky. 1951) (citing Beattie v. Friddle, 17 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1929) (stating rescission of contract even for substantial breach is not permitted where "the position of the parties has been changed so that former status may not be restored"). "An absolute and literal restoration of the parties to their former condition is not required; it is sufficient if such restoration be made as is reasonably possible and such as the merits of the case demand."
Rescission of a contract "will not be allowed even for a substantial breach unless the former status of the parties can be restored." C.C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 236 S.W.2d 961, 962 (Ky. 1951). To state a cause of action for rescission of contract, a plaintiff must establish that the parties can be placed in status quo ante and has the burden of proving that the status quo may be restored and that he or she has restored, or offered to restore, the other party to the status quo ante.
Moreover, McKeever has not articulated why rescission would be an appropriate remedy for any alleged breach. See C. C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 314 Ky. 703, 705 (Ky. 1951) (noting that rescission will not be allowed for a slight or casual breach of the contract, or even for a substantial breach, unless the former status of the parties can be restored). Thus, because McKeever's claim fails to create a "reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged," her claim for breach of contract and rescission fails.
However, recision of a contract "will not be allowed even for a substantial breach unless the former status of the parties can be restored." C.C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 236 S.W.2d 961, 962 (Ky. 1951) (citing Beattie v. Friddle, 17 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1929) (rescission of contract even for substantial breach not permitted where "the position of the parties has been changed so that former status may not be restored"). "An absolute and literal restoration of the parties to their former condition is not required; it is sufficient if such restoration be made as is reasonably possible and such as the merits of the case demand."
This provision, most frequently applied in cases where property is transferred for a nominal consideration, was not intended, however, to repeal the parol evidence rule. C.C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 1951, 314 Ky. 703, 236 S.W.2d 961. Regardless of whether the provision would be applicable to contracts with or conveyances to the United States, Federal and Kentucky law agree that the estate or interest passing to a grantee, where the instruments of transfer are free of uncertainty, cannot be contradicted by extrinsic evidence. Kynerd v. Hulen, 5 Cir., 1925, 5 F.2d 160; Hart v. Knox County, D.C. 1948, 79 F. Supp. 654, appeal dismissed 6 Cir., 171 F.2d 45; Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op Ass'n v. Ray, 1926, 215 Ky. 373, 285 S.W. 198; Ford v. Coles, 1939, 278 Ky. 131, 128 S.W.2d 609.
In sum, "[w]e think the court under the facts properly admitted the parol evidence . . . as a proper method of ascertaining the true consideration for the deed of conveyance." C.C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 314 Ky. 703, 236 S.W.2d 961, 964 (1951). B. Unclean Hands
Where the intention of the parties is clear from the plain language of the contract, it needs no interpretation, and "extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced to vary its terms." C.C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed, 314 Ky. 703, 706, 236 S.W.2d 961, 962 (1951). Dana's entreaties that we rely upon the parties' testimony that they intended maintenance to end once retirement payments began will go unanswered because the contested portion of the settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous.