Cf. Bohorquez v. Strother, 287 Ga. App. 98, 99 (650 SE2d 765) (2007) (recognizing that "'a return of service may be impeached by sworn statements made on personal knowledge'" and citing cases in which sworn affidavits provided sufficient evidence to contradict return of service). SeeC.C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall County, 143 Ga. App. 520, 520 (239 SE2d 204) (1977) (affirming motion to dismiss when judgment was right for any reason). For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
Because such cases are inapposite, however, the BTA's reliance upon them is misplaced. 143 Ga. App. 520 ( 239 SE2d 204) (1977). 157 Ga. App. 289 ( 277 SE2d 285) (1981).
Similarly, in the instant case the Board of Tax Assessors did not "effect" its appeal because it failed to give notice to the taxpayer within 30 days of the decision of the Board of Equalization. Because the superior court thus lacked jurisdiction in this case, dismissal of the appeals was proper. See also C. C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall County, 143 Ga. App. 520 ( 239 S.E.2d 204) (1977) (upholding dismissal of a taxpayer's appeal because the taxpayer filed his notice of appeal with the superior court instead of with the county board of tax assessors). The fact that the Board of Tax Assessors filed the certification of record with the superior court within the statutory period does not require a different result.
Moreover, even if the trial court had considered some inadmissible evidence we would not find it to be reversible error in the case sub judice because the uncontroverted admissible evidence demanded the judgment. See Glynn County v. Palmatary, 247 Ga. 570, 574 (3) ( 277 S.E.2d 665); White Repair c. Co. v. Ga. Roofing c. Co., 152 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 262 S.E.2d 164); C. C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall County, 143 Ga. App. 520, 521 ( 239 S.E.2d 204). Judgment affirmed. Shulman, C. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.
Ellis v. Major Gas c. Co., 154 Ga. App. 34 ( 267 S.E.2d 485). The record in this case indicates that these requirements have been satisfied. Appellee cites Buoy v. Kiley, 238 Ga. 47, 48 ( 230 S.E.2d 861), and C. C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall County, 143 Ga. App. 520 ( 239 S.E.2d 204), in support of its argument that a taxpayer cannot initiate an action in the superior court to raise questions of taxability except on appeal from a decision of the Board of Equalization pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311 (e) (Code Ann. § 91A-1449), and that the superior court does not have jurisdiction to consider taxability except on such appeal. However, neither Buoy nor C. C. Leasing was brought pursuant to the refund statute and neither is apposite to the present case.
In this case no notice of appeal was filed with the State Board of Education but, instead, appellant filed her appeal directly in the superior court. "The proper appellate procedure in this instance was not followed in accordance with law, and indeed [there was] no proper appeal for consideration inasmuch as counsel filed the action in the superior court rather than as required by the statute." C. C. Leasing Corp. v.Bd. of Tax Assessors, 143 Ga. App. 520 ( 239 S.E.2d 204) (1977); Wood v. Atkinson, 229 Ga. 179 ( 190 S.E.2d 46) (1972). Therefore, the superior court did not have "jurisdiction to review the [decision] sought to be appealed because of the failure to confer jurisdiction upon [that] court pursuant to the [statute]."
Although the trial court did not expressly address this argument, we address it under the right-for-any-reason rationale. See, e.g., Bobick v. Community & Southern Bank , 321 Ga. App. 855, 869-70 (4) (b), 743 S.E.2d 518 (2013) (affirming dismissal under "right for any reason" doctrine); C. C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall County , 143 Ga. App. 520, 521, 239 S.E.2d 204 (1977) (same).Contrary to Rosser’s argument, the evidence demonstrates that Rosser is a public figure for purposes of this controversy.
Indeed, even under this forgiving analytical framework, the appellants' action must be dismissed.See, e.g., Bobick v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 321 Ga.App. 855, 869-70 (4) (b), 743 S.E.2d 518 (2013) (affirming dismissal under "right for any reason" doctrine); C.C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall Cnty., 143 Ga.App. 520, 521, 239 S.E.2d 204 (1977) (same).Webb v. Bank of Am., N.A., 328 Ga.App. 62, 63, 761 S.E.2d 485 (2014) (punctuation omitted); accord Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796 (2014).
The former code did not expressly define what constituted “the filing of the appeal” as that term was used in that section. The board, relying on C.C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall County, 143 Ga.App. 520, 239 S.E.2d 204 (1977), claims that “the filing of the appeal” under former OCGA § 48–5–311(g)(4)(A) meant the taxpayer's filing of the appeal with the board of tax assessors, not the board's subsequent filing of the appeal with the superior court. But contrary to the board's claim, C.C. Leasing held no such thing and provides no support for such a proposition.
Cf. Bohorquez v. Strother, 287 Ga.App. 98, 99, 650 S.E.2d 765 (2007) (recognizing that “ ‘a return of service may be impeached by sworn statements made on personal knowledge’ ” and citing cases in which sworn affidavits provided sufficient evidence to contradict return of service). See C.C. Leasing Corp. v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Hall County, 143 Ga.App. 520, 520, 239 S.E.2d 204 (1977) (affirming motion to dismiss when judgment was right for any reason). For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment.