If there had been no dispute between them as to the terms of the future occupancy, the holding over by the tenant and the acquiescence therein by the landlord would have raised such a contract by implication. Williams v. Apothecaries Hall Co., supra; Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 610, 51 A. 535. Indeed, if the landlord had specified terms for the future occupancy of the property, the continuance in possession by the tenant without objection by him to those terms might have been construed as an acceptance of those terms and thus a contract would have been implied from the conduct of the parties. Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Realty Co., 114 Conn. 283, 288, 158 A. 548; Margolis v. Wise, 91 Conn. 152, 156, 99 A. 511. But if there had actually been no meeting of the minds either because of ambiguity or uncertainty in negotiations or because the negotiations had not been completed, then, of course, there could have been no contract. Shulman v. Hartford Public Library, 119 Conn. 428, 432, 177 A. 269; Margolis v. Wise, supra.

The landlord left him in charge as his sole representative, and plaintiff is justified in relying on his acts as to matters that would naturally devolve on the principal in such a business. Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 57 L.R.A. 222; Gratton v. Redelshenner, 28 Wn. 370, 68 P. 879; Van Santwood v. Smith, 79 Minn. 316, 82 N.W. 642. One who is put in the place of a general manager is thereby clothed with his powers. Citizens Trust Co. v. Zane, 113 F. 596; Cotton Co. v. Supply Co., 3 Ga. App. 212, 59 S.E. 713. (2) There was sufficient evidence that the screen was defective and that such defect was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

The defendant having made the secretary, Drews, its general agent and sole representative in Bridgeport for the handling of this property and left its management entirely in his hands, the plaintiff, in dealing with Drews, was justified in assuming that Drews was doing what the owner could have done in making terms with the plaintiff for the sale of the lots. State v. Marley, 78 Conn. 330, 333, 62 A. 85; Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 613, 51 A. 535; Kearns v. Nickse, 80 Conn. 23, 25, 66 A. 779; Van Santvoord v. Smith, 79 Minn. 316, 82 N.W. 642; Russo v. McAviney, 96 Conn. 21, 27, 112 A. 657; Citizens Trust Surety Co. v. Zane, 113 F. 596; Mahoney v. Hartford Investment Corporation, 82 Conn. 280, 286, 73 A. 766; Falletti v. Carrano, 92 Conn. 636, 638, 103 A. 753. The contention of the appellant, however, seems to be that this contract with the plaintiff could not bind the defendant owner of the property, because it was made in the name of Drews himself. "There is a broad line of distinction between instruments under seal and stipulations in writing not under seal, or by parol. . . .

Where, however, there is an express lease for a month and a continuance in possession by the lessee after its termination, which is acquiesced in by the lessor, as evidenced by his verbal consent or conduct, a tenancy is thereby created which the law will regard as one from month to month. Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 610, 51 A. 535. Such a tenancy is not regarded as a continuous tenancy, but as one for recurring monthly periods recommencing each month. Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49 N.W. 327; Gandy v. Jubber, 5 B. S. 78; 1 Taylor on Landlord Tenant (9th Ed.), § 59. The instructions that the tenancy set out in the special defense was originally one from year to year, were also correct.

A lease will not be presumed unless there is acquiescence on the part of the landlord. Id., 607; Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 610, 51 A. 535 (1902). If a tenant remains in possession without the consent of the landlord, there is no contract for an extended term to be implied from the holding over.

Although the refusal of the court to correct the finding to allow the plaintiff to recover a greater amount of damages for waste on the second count has been assigned as error, that assignment has not been pursued in the plaintiff's brief and we, accordingly, treat it as abandoned. Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 327. The issue before us is whether the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant continued to hold possession of the leased premises beyond the end of September, 1972. It is well established that a tenant occupying premises under a month-to-month lease would become liable for an additional month's rent by holding over beyond the end of any month. Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 610; Bacon v. Brown, 9 Conn. 334, 338; 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, 1116; 51C C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, 74. The trial court found that the plaintiff rented certain premises on Golden Hill Street in Bridgeport to the defendant on a month-to-month basis for a period of at least eight months before October, 1972. The defendant paid the monthly rental of $1250 as agreed for each month, including September, 1972. On August 4, 1972, the defendant gave the plaintiff written notice of its intention to vacate the premises effective October 1, 1972.

The defendant wrongfully withheld possession beyond the expiration of the lease until September 17, 1959, when the key was received in the mail by the plaintiff. As a result of this holdover, the defendant is responsible for reasonable rental for use and occupancy. Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 608, 611. While it is true that the plaintiff and the defendant had agreed to a surrender which was to take place before September 12, 1959, and a surrender was anticipated by the parties, no surrender took place either in fact or by operation of the law. 32 Am. Jur. 765, § 905.

"Where, however, there is an express lease for a month and a continuance in possession by the lessee after its termination, which is acquiesced in by the lessor, as evidenced by his verbal consent or conduct, a tenancy is thereby created which the law will regard as one from month to month. Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 610, 51 A. 535. Such a tenancy is not regarded as a continuous tenancy, but as one for recurring monthly periods recommencing each month." Williams v. Apothecaries Hall Co., 80 Conn. 503, 505-506, 69 A. 12 (1908).

A new lease is created only if the tenant holds over with the landlord's acquiescence. Berlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc., 5 Conn. App. 302, 308 (1985), Byxbee v. Blake, 74 Conn. 607, 610 (1902). In any event for a new lease to be crested there must be a meeting of minds on all the essentials of the lease.