Opinion
97 Civ. 5787 (TPG)
May 3, 2000
OPINION
Plaintiff is suing pro se and seeks to recover for alleged sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and 3(a). The action arises out of plaintiff's employment in the library of Teachers College at Columbia University. Plaintiff is suing the College, the University and various persons connected with the College.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Although plaintiff is pro se, he has a law degree and has filed extensive papers in opposition to the motion.
Defendants' motion is granted and the action is dismissed.
Facts
Plaintiff was hired by the College on April 1, 1993 to serve in its library. Conflict between plaintiff and other library personnel developed quickly. In November 1996 defendant Jennifer Govan became plaintiff's supervisor.
On February 6, 1997 Govan asked plaintiff about the work he was performing. Plaintiff has testified in his deposition that he said that he did not like the way she asked the question, and that he told Govan that she wasn't his mother and that he did not appreciate her talking to him as she did. Govan asked plaintiff to come into her office. Plaintiff has admitted in the deposition that he refused to comply, but explains that there was a "standing order" to cover a certain desk where he was located. His testimony is that he did not wish to participate in an unpleasant exchange with Govan "having nothing to do with my job."
Immediately thereafter plaintiff sent Govan and defendant Maureen Horgan, Planning Coordinator of the library, an e-mail expressing the sharpest kind of criticism of Govan. Among other things, the e-mail stated that a previous comment by Govan about plaintiff's initiative was "a poor quality communication, which I did not feel needed a response." There were remarks in the e-mail such as the statement that plaintiff was treating Govan like an adult and expected to be treated the same way.
After consultation, the library management suspended plaintiff for two days without pay.
Plaintiff came to the College during the morning of the first day of the suspension and submitted to defendant Don Dean, the College's Director of Personnel Services, a complaint charging that Govan had sexually harassed him. The complaint alleged that Govan had singled plaintiff out for hostile treatment based on his gender and based perhaps on some kind of latent sexual feeling toward plaintiff. The complaint contained many allegations about Govan's allegedly improper supervisory conduct, which plaintiff interpreted as having some sexual meaning. However, the complaint alleged nothing that could be remotely considered to be sexual language or activity or advances of any kind.
At the expiration of this two day suspension plaintiff was given another two day suspension with pay. At this time plaintiff delivered to Dean a memorandum, which again accused Govan of harassment, but suggested that whether this harassment was sexual, "or just plain harassment," was an issue which should be investigated.
Dean did investigate the matter, and made a thorough review of plaintiff's performance history. On February 13, 1997 the College delivered to plaintiff a letter terminating his employment immediately, with pay to continue until March 13, 1997. The letter stated that the termination was based on plaintiff's continuing hostile attitude toward his supervisors, which was so disruptive that a continuation of employment in the library was untenable. The letter was signed by defendants Govan and Horgan, and also by defendant June P. Frank, the Director of the library.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC, which was referred to the New York State Division of Human Rights. The complaint charged sexual harassment. It did not charge retaliation. The State Division issued a Right to Sue Notice without holding a hearing.
Although plaintiff makes claims of sexually hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment, plaintiff makes no assertion that Govan, the alleged perpetrator of the harassment, ever made any advances to plaintiff, asked plaintiff for a date or other social meeting, used any sexual or even affectionate language toward plaintiff, spoke in any sexual or off-color terms to him or in his presence, or engaged in anything whatever which could be interpreted as conduct with a sexual connotation directed to him or committed in his presence. Plaintiff alleges no statement or other indication by Govan that sexual favors were a condition of plaintiff's continued employment or of any term of his employment. Essentially what plaintiff claims is that Govan's conduct, which objectively was entirely of a non-sexual nature, gave him the "gut feeling" that she had some kind of sexual attraction to him, and was seeking to have sexual domination over him.
Discussion
The Sexual Harassment Claim
The standards regarding summary judgment and the standards under the substantive law of sexual harassment are well known. There is no need for a detailed discussion of these standards or a recital of the applicable decisions. The present case is clear beyond any question.
On the basis of the facts admitted by plaintiff, there is not even a claim of conduct which can form the basis of recovery for sexual harassment, either on a hostile work environment theory or a quid pro quo theory. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claim for sexual harassment.
Retaliation
The same is true with respect to the retaliation issue. In the first place, plaintiff presented no charge of retaliation to the EEOC or the State Division of Human Rights. Therefore the court lacks jurisdiction over the retaliation claim. Butts v. New York Dept. of Housing, 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993).
In any event, there is no basis in the record for any claim that the termination of plaintiff was carried out in retaliation for protected activity in which plaintiff was asserting his civil rights. It is true that plaintiff made a complaint to the College that Govan was committing sexual harassment and that this complaint was made shortly before his termination. However, this complaint was baseless on its face. It must be concluded that plaintiff did not have a good faith, reasonable belief that Govan was guilty of a violation of his rights. By making such a complaint, plaintiff was not engaging in protected activity, and plaintiff's subsequent termination cannot be said to be in retaliation for protected activity. See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996).
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claim of retaliation.
Individual Defendants
It is settled law in this Circuit that an individual defendant with supervisory control is not an employer within the meaning of Title VII. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995). For this additional reason, the action must be dismissed as to the individual defendants.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and the action is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York May 3, 2000