As the Court of Appeals has noted, "The facts and circumstances of each case must be reviewed to determine whether a person participated in the commission of an offense as an accomplice, for, as Justice Hunter observed, there are no `hard and fast rules in this area of the law.'" Byrer v. State, 423 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (quoting Pace v. State, 248 Ind. 146, 149, 224 N.E.2d 312, 314 (1967)). First, Edgecomb's actions before the commission of the crime suggest guilt.
Davis contends there must be some agreement prior to the commission of an offense to sustain a conviction for conspiracy. He cites McBrady v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 1222 and Woods v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 624, 413 N.E.2d 572 to support his argument and claims there is no evidence in the instant case of a prior agreement between himself and anyone else. In determining whether a person aided another to commit an offense, the trier of fact may consider the former's affirmative conduct from which reasonable inference of a common design or purpose to effect the commission of the crime might be drawn. Byrer v. State (1981), Ind. App., 423 N.E.2d 704, 706. The unexplained possession of stolen property shortly after the time of theft is a circumstance from which a jury is entitled to draw inferences of guilt.
We further note that a person who aids another person in committing an offense, is guilty of the offense as if he were the principal. Ind. Code ยง 35-41-2-4; Dennis v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 1209; Byrer v. State (1981), Ind. App., 423 N.E.2d 704. We conclude that the evidence presented to the jury, along with reasonable inferences thereon, could properly enable a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that defendant was guilty of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ind. Code ยง 35-41-2-4. Byrer v. State (1981), Ind. App., 423 N.E.2d 704. In addressing the issue of sufficiency of evidence, we will affirm the conviction if, considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ind. Code ยง 35-41-2-4. Byrer v. State (1981), Ind. App., 423 N.E.2d 704. Applying our standard of review, it is clear that the jury could reasonably find each of the elements necessary for conviction.
See Byrer v. State, 423 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (finding sufficient evidence of robbery defendant's accomplice liability where defendant was present during robbery planning discussion, drove principal robbers to and from scene, waited in car during robbery, and shared in robbery proceeds).
The particular facts and circumstances of each case must be considered in determining whether a person participated in the commission of an offense as an accomplice. Byrer v. State, 423 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). An accused's mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to establish that he aided another person to commit an offense.
It was at that point that I saw him remove a car stereo from our display. Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in and of itself raise the inference Pennington was a participant, Byrer v. State, (1981) Ind. App., 423 N.E.2d 704, 706; Fox v. State, (1979) 179 Ind. App. 267, 384 N.E.2d 1159, 1165; Anderson v. State, (1973) 156 Ind. App. 265, 295 N.E.2d 832, 833-34; Bond v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 95, 272 N.E.2d 460, 463. No reasonable inference arises from this testimony Pennington was intentionally blocking the clerk's view of the store so that her brother could steal the 8-track car stereo set, and no other evidence in the record supports that proposition. Next, it is undisputed Pennington did not exert unauthorized control over the stolen stereo either while it was in the store or while her brother was carrying it to the van.