Id. at 899 (citations omitted). See also Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596 (D.C. 1992). In Bond we observed, for example, that in Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625 (D.C.), amended on other grounds, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1982), we had upheld the admission of the defendant's voluntary statements although his confession "took place more than twelve hours after his arrest but after he had validly waived his Miranda rights several times."

The waiver is valid even if obtained during the period of unnecessary delay. Everetts, supra note 3, 627 A.2d at 986 (confession admissible in spite of unreasonable 11-hour pre-presentment delay prior to confession, where 16-year-old-defendant validly waived Miranda rights); Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598-99 (D.C. 1992) (confession taken at least nine hours after arrest admissible despite pre-presentment delay of more than a day where defendant validly waived Miranda rights); Bond, supra, 614 A.2d at 901 (confession taken thirty-six hours after arrest and during sixty-two-hour pre-presentment delay); Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 633 (holding admissible confession taken approximately twelve hours after arrest and during thirty-six-hour pre-presentment delay), modified on other grounds, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983). The rationale underlying this waiver rule is that the fundamental concerns that led to the Mallory and McNabb decisions are adequately addressed by compliance with the requirements of Miranda, which was decided after Mallory and McNabb:

In the first place, Muhammad waived his rights at the outset. See United States v. Bell, 740 A.2d 958, 964-966 (D.C. 1999); Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598-599 (D.C. 1992). There was no evidence that the police threatened Muhammad or used physical force on him; in fact, Muhammad confirmed that no such abuse occurred.

We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusion that appellant's response to Officer Reisinger's question is admissible under the public safety exception. See Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 599 (D.C.1992). The public safety exception is a “ ‘function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of the circumstances in a given case.’ ”

From our own review of the record, we note other factors that arguably would weigh in favor of a finding of voluntariness. See Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 599 (D.C. 1992) (in considering the voluntariness of a confession, appellate court conducts an independent review of the record to evaluate the totality of the circumstances). First, although this was the first time Brisbon had been charged and prosecuted, he had a previous arrest, a fact indicating that he had some familiarity with the criminal justice system.

Whether a suspect voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is an issue of fact to which this court defers to the trial court's finding unless it is without substantial support in the evidence or plainly wrong. See Everetts v. United States, 627 A.2d 981, 986 (D.C. 1993); Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598 (D.C. 1992); D.C. Code § 17-305(a) (factual findings of a judge are accepted by this court unless they are "plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them]."). The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

See supra Part III, A. Finally, while newly surfaced evidence may give rise to the need for reconsideration of a pretrial suppression decision, see Scales v. United States, 687 A.2d 927, 937 (D.C. 1996), and evidence of drug use is relevant to the determination of voluntariness, see (Cullen) Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598 (D.C. 1992), the "new evidence" here was far from significant. Edwards claims that during trial the officer suggested that the confession may have been affected by Edwards' illegal drug use, even though at the suppression hearing the officer testified that Edwards was not under the influence of drugs.

Beasley v. United States, 512 A.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 907 (1987) (citations omitted). On appeal, deference must be given to the trial court's findings of fact, however, review of the trial court's legal conclusions is de novo. Hicks v. United States, 705 A.2d 636, 639 (D.C. 1997) (citations omitted); Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 599 (D.C. 1992) (whether appellant's confession was voluntary is a question of law that requires independent appellate review) (citing Miller v. Fenton, supra, 474 U.S. at 106). In this case, the trial court considered all of these factors and made factual findings, based on evidence in the record, which support its conclusion that the initial inculpatory statement was uncoerced and voluntary. Davis, an eighteen year old with an education to the tenth grade, had been arrested on three prior occasions; he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and in no pain or unusual discomfort under the circumstances.

We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusion that appellant's response to Detective Trugman's question is admissible under the public safety exception. See Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 599 (D.C. 1992).III.

Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (plurality opinion) (approved in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2046-47, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The ultimate issue of whether the statements were voluntary is a legal question, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Ruffin v. United States, 524 A.2d 685, 691 (D.C. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 2827, 100 L.Ed.2d 927 (1988), but considerable deference must be given to the factual findings of the trial court in this area, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); see also Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 599 (D.C. 1992); Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580, 586 (D.C.), cert. denied sub nom. Myrick v. United States, 479 U.S. 992, 107 S.Ct. 593, 93 L.Ed.2d 594 (1986). Applying these standards, we find that the statements made by appellant were all made voluntarily.