Opinion
2015 CA 0597
06-03-2016
JOHN M. BYRD, EUGENE MOORE, CHRIS NAVARRO, AND JOSEPH MICHAEL WILLIAMS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT
James L. Carroll James E. Mixon Brian E. Frazier Columbia, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Defendant-in Reconvention-Appellee Hilton Eugene Moore James D. "Buddy" Caldwell Attorney General Darrell J. Saltamachia Special Assistant Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendants/Plaintiffs-in- Reconvention-Appellants State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development and Sandy Pittman, in her capacity as director of the Office of Risk Management
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER C613437, SECTION 26, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE BOB DOWNING, JUDGE PRO TEMPORE James L. Carroll
James E. Mixon
Brian E. Frazier
Columbia, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Defendant-in
Reconvention-Appellee
Hilton Eugene Moore James D. "Buddy" Caldwell
Attorney General
Darrell J. Saltamachia
Special Assistant Attorney General
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendants/Plaintiffs-in-
Reconvention-Appellants
State of Louisiana through the
Department of Transportation and
Development and Sandy Pittman, in
her capacity as director of the Office of
Risk Management BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, HOLDRIDGE, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
Disposition: VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CHUTZ, J.
Appellants/plaintiffs-in-reconvention, the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development and Sandy Pittman in her capacity as Director of the Office of Risk Management (the State), appeal the trial court's judgment dismissing with prejudice their reconventional demand asserting entitlement to declaratory relief against appellee/defendant-in-reconvention, Eugene Moore. We vacate the trial court's dismissal of the State's reconventional demand and remand with instructions to transfer to the 37th Judicial District Court.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As a result of an automobile accident, Moore sustained injuries and sued the State, among others. After a jury trial, on April 26, 2010, the 37th Judicial District Court rendered a judgment from which both the State and Moore appealed. The second circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. See Starr v. State ex rel Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 46,226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/17/11), 70 So.3d 128, writs denied, 2011-1835 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 386, 2011-1952 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 387, & 2011-1625 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 388.
Although a judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict was signed on February 17, 2010, the trial court subsequently granted, in part, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and issued an amended judgment on April 26, 2010, which was the subject of the Second Circuit's review. See Starr , 70 So.3d at 133.
In an effort to execute the judgment rendered in his favor, Moore sought a mandamus against the State. The 37th Judicial District Court sustained an objection of improper venue asserted by the State and ordered the matter transferred to the 19th Judicial District Court.
See and compare Starr v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 47,848 (La. App. 2d Cir. 9/28/12) (an unpublished writ action), writ denied, 2012-2146 (La. 10/12/12), 98 So.3d 877.
It is undisputed that before the mandamus action was heard in the 19th Judicial District Court, the parties executed a partial settlement whereby all issues were resolved by the State's payment of the amounts awarded in the judgment to Moore except interest on the award of future medical expenses. Moore filed an amended request for mandamus relief seeking an order directing the State to pay that interest in conformity with the judgment.
The State subsequently filed a reconventional demand in the 19th Judicial District Court, averring entitlement to declaratory relief. A hearing was held on both Moore's entitlement to mandamus relief and the State's entitlement to a declaratory judgment. Although the trial court verbally apprised the parties that it would grant Moore's request for a writ of mandamus and dismiss the State's reconventional demand, it rendered a judgment dismissing both the mandamus and the declaratory relief with prejudice. The State appeals the dismissal of its reconventional demand.
In his appellee brief, Moore challenges the dismissal of the request for mandamus relief, urging that he has "join[ed] in the [State's] appeal." But a party who has not appealed or answered the appeal may not seek to have the trial court's judgment modified in its favor. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2082 and 2133; Garcia v. Banfield Pet Hosp., Inc., 2009-0466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/21/10), 35 So.3d 261, 265-66, writ denied, 2010-0393 (La. 4/30/10), 34 So.3d 299. Accordingly, the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of Moore's request for mandamus relief is not before us.
DISCUSSION
At the heart of this appeal is interpretation of that portion of the April 26, 2010 judgment rendered in the 37th Judicial District Court and affirmed by the second circuit. The judgment states in relevant part:
Judgment is rendered in favor of [Moore] and against [the State] for future medical expenses in the amount of [$1,392,000.00], which [is] to be paid pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5106B(3)(c) and 39:1533.2, together with legal interest at the rate of [6%] from date of judicial demand until date of judgment and judicial interest applied thereafter until paid in full.In Moore's attempt to collect "legal interest at the rate of [6%] from date of judicial demand until date of judgment and judicial interest applied thereafter until paid in full," the State refused to tender any amount. The State reasoned that "pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5106B(3)(c) and 39:1533.2," Moore was not entitled to any interest as a matter of law.
We initially note that according to La. R.S. 13:5106B(3)(c):
In any suit for personal injury against the [S]tate or a state agency wherein the court pursuant to judgment determines that the claimant is entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment, the court shall order that all medical care and related benefits incurred subsequent to judgment be paid from the Future Medical Care Fund as provided in [La.] R.S. 39:1533.2. Medical care and related benefits shall be paid directly to the provider as they are incurred. Nothing in this Subparagraph shall be construed to prevent the parties from entering into a settlement or compromise at any time whereby medical care and related benefits shall be provided but with the requirement that they shall be paid in accordance with this Subparagraph.And according to salient provisions of La. R.S. 39:1533.2:
A. There is hereby established in the state treasury the "Future Medical Care Fund[,]" ... hereinafter referred to as the "fund[.]" ... The fund shall consist of such monies transferred or appropriated to the fund for the purposes of funding medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment rendered against the [S]tate or a state agency as provided by [La.] R.S. 13:5106 and as more specifically provided in [La.] R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c). All costs or expenses of administration of the fund shall be paid from the fund.See also Fecke v. Bd. of Sup'rs of La. State Univ. and Agr. and Mech. Coll., 2015-0017 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/7/15), 180 So.3d 326, writs granted, 2015-1807 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So.3d 1175 & 2015-1806 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So.3d 1177 (trial court's order of interest on a future medical care award established pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5106B(3)(c) and 39:1533.2 was legal error and, therefore, vacated by this court).
B. The fund shall be administered by the treasurer on behalf of the office of risk management for the benefit of claimants suing for personal injury who are entitled to medical care and related benefits that may be incurred subsequent to judgment. Except for costs or expenses of administration, this fund shall be used only for payment of losses associated with such claims.
In light of each party's construction of the language of the April 26, 2010 judgment, it is understandable that neither Moore nor the State had an interest in raising the issue in the appeal before the second circuit and, therefore, the ambiguity was not addressed in the appellate court's review.
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for; and the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. La. C.C.P. art. 1871. A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. La. C.C.P. art. 1872. The enumeration in Articles 1872 through 1874 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in Article 1871 in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. La. C.C.P. art. 1875.
While declaratory relief to interpret a prior judgment may not appear within the scope of the plain language of La. C.C.P. art. 1872, La. C.C.P. art. 1875 ostensibly permits consideration of declaratory relief in the context of execution of a judgment where the terms of the award are ambiguous. Thus, we can see that declaratory relief may be an avenue for clarity to assist in the execution of the judgment.
Indeed, in Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Younger , 158 So.2d 341 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), the court examined the liability of a tortfeasor's insurer for interest to the injured party in "proceedings, which are in the nature of an action for declaratory judgment." A controversy arose after finality of the judgment when the plaintiff, claiming he was due a greater amount, refused to accept the tender made by the insurer. After examining the language of the judgment, the Younger court noted that two or more constructions with regard to insurer's liability for interest could reasonably be placed on the earlier decree. It then resorted to the pleadings in order to clarify the ambiguities and uncertainties. Younger , 158 So.2d at 343.
Because the judgment which is the subject matter of the State's claim for declaratory relief was rendered in the 37th Judicial District Court, we are without a record from which to examine pleadings in order to clarify, if possible, the ambiguous and uncertain language contained in the April 26, 2010 judgment in a manner similar to that undertaken by the. Younger court. To obtain the clarity the parties seek in interpreting the April 26, 2010 judgment, the matter must be transferred to the 37th Judicial District Court.
A court possesses inherently all of the power necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law. La. C.C.P. art. 191. We believe the "court of record" required to determine the State's entitlement to declaratory judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1871 or any other proper relief, see e.g., La. C.C.P. art. 2001 et seq., necessary to resolve the ambiguity arising from the April 26, 2010 judgment lies with the 37th Judicial District Court. See Sondes v. Sears , Roebuck & Co., 501 So.2d 829, 833-34 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (district court has inherent power to transfer claims subject to declinatory exception that plaintiff's claims had been brought in improper court and, thus, an action relating to wrongful issuance of writ of sequestration was correctly transferred to court that issued writ). Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the State's reconventional demand.
DECREE
For these reasons, the trial court's dismissal of the State's petition for declaratory judgment/reconventional demand is vacated. We remand to the trial court for the sole purpose of transferring the matter to the 37th Judicial District Court. Appeal costs in the amount of $2,534.00 are assessed against appellants/plaintiffs-in-reconvention, the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development and Sandy Pittman, in her capacity as Director of the Office of Risk Management.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. HOLDRIDGE, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority's decision. I agree with the trial court's decision to dismiss the "Petition for Mandamus." I am concerned that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in its reconventional demand for declaratory judgment and that the trial court was correct in dismissing that claim also. However, both parties agreed that the final judgment in the 37th Judicial District Court was ambiguous and uncertain. For that reason, I concur in remanding this matter back to the trial court for the limited purpose of transferring the declaratory judgment action to the 37th Judicial District Court for it to interpret its judgment. Whipple, C.J., dissenting.
This matter is before us on appeal from a judgment rendered by the 19th Judicial District Court (after transfer from the 37th Judicial District Court) ordering the dismissal of a mandamus action filed by plaintiff, Eugene Moore, to execute on a final judgment rendered in his favor and against the State of Louisiana, DOTD, in the 37th Judicial District Court (which was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal). Specifically, Moore sought a writ of mandamus compelling the State to pay interest purportedly owed, and as specifically ordered in the judgment, on the future medical care award made in plaintiff's favor. The State responded with a reconventional demand in the 19th Judicial District Court challenging plaintiff's right to enforce the judgment and collect on this award.
As pertinent to this appeal, although the trial court in the 19th Judicial District Court verbally informed the parties that it would grant Moore's request for a writ of mandamus and would dismiss the State's reconventional demand, the court instead rendered a judgment dismissing both the mandamus claim and the declaratory relief demand, with prejudice. To further complicate this matter, the State alone filed the instant appeal. Thus, the propriety of the 19th Judicial District Court's denial of plaintiff's writ of mandamus is not before us. Instead, in its present posture, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in dismissing, with prejudice, the State's reconventional demand for declaratory relief, filed in a mandamus action, wherein the State sought to have the interest provision in the final judgment declared ambiguous, when read with the statutory reference in the judgment or to have the order of interest set aside as an illegal order by the rendering court (i.e., the 37th Judicial District Court).
Citing Fecke v. Bd. of Sup'rs of La. State Univ. and Agr. and Mech. Coll., 2015-0017 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/7/15), 180 So. 3d 326, writs granted, 2015-1807 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So. 3d 1175 & 2015-1806 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So. 2d 1177, wherein a trial court's order of interest on a future medical care award established pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:5106B(3)(c) and 39:1533.2 was found to be legal error, the majority herein vacates the dismissal, apparently concluding that the judgment herein is ambiguous and requires the re-transfer of this matter back to the 37th Judicial District Court, to allow that court to apparently review, reconsider, or interpret the underlying judgment previously rendered. Pretermitting whether the State's reconventional demand was or could be properly asserted in response to a mandamus action, in my view, the disposition ordered by the majority based on a purported ambiguity cannot override the fact that the judgment of the 37th Judicial District Court is now a final judgment. See Batson v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 2006-1998 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/13/07), 965 So. 2d 890, 895-896, writ denied, 2007-1479 (La. 10/5/07), 964 So. 2d 945 ("[T]he State is precluded from now raising a substantive challenge to the ... judgment, which has been final and definitive for many years. ... The doctrine of res judicata is not discretionary and mandates the effect to be given final judgments.").
On review, I find there is no legal basis for this court to sua sponte transfer this case back to the 37th Judicial District Court with instructions to act in a matter that was earlier ordered to be transferred to (and was acted upon by) the 19th Judicial District Court. I see no basis for the relief ordered, as the soundness (or lack thereof) of the 37th Judicial District Court's ruling is no longer an issue in this case, and the State's failure to seek modification (which it calls "clarification") precludes the particular relief the State is seeking in its reconventional demand. Moreover, the "transfer back" to the 37th Judicial District Court directly by this court arguably serves no purpose, as the reassertion of any such claims would be subject to plaintiff's assertion of exceptions raising the objection of res judicata.
Our charge is to review judgments and to render decisions on such judgments based on the legal and procedural posture of the record as it exists at the time of our review. As to any argument that the judgment should be set aside as it contains a provision that renders it an absolute nullity, the record is devoid of any evidence presented by the State to so establish. Thus, I find no error regarding the issue that is before us, namely, the 19th Judicial District court's ruling dismissing the reconventional demand/request for declaratory judgment, which was essentially asserting a collateral attack against the prior final judgment on the merits. GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons. GUIDRY, J., dissenting.
I do not think the ruling at issue is ambiguous, and therefore, pursuant to the inherent powers of the judiciary, I believe it is proper and judicially efficient for this court to simply find that the provision at issue is an absolute nullity, which the proposed opinion does not address. The nullity of the provision was raised in the proceedings before the 19th Judicial District Court and has been re-urged on appeal.
"[T]he jurisprudence has held that, where the judgment attacked is an absolute nullity, it may be attacked collaterally and in any court." Succession of Moses v. Carr, 543 So. 2d 77, 79 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 547 So. 2d 362 (La. 1989).
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review this court's decision in Fecke v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 15-0017 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/7/15), 180 So. 3d 326, writs granted, 15-1807, 15-1806 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So. 3d 1175, 1177 (wherein another panel of this court found the trial court's award of interest on a future medical care awarded established pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3(c) and La. R.S. 39:1533.2 to be legal error and vacated the award), until that decision is reversed or otherwise overruled, I believe this court can rely on the reasoning from that opinion to find that interest is not payable on the award of future medical costs paid from the Future Medical Care Fund. Additionally, La. Const. art. 12, § 10(C) states, in pertinent part, that "the legislature by law may limit or provide for the extent of liability of the state, a state agency, ... in all cases, including the circumstances giving rise to liability and the kinds and amounts of recoverable damages." The legislature, in enacting La. R.S. 13:5106B(3)(c) and La. R.S. 39:1533.2, limited the recovery of future medical damages against the state to payment from the Future Medical Care Fund in accordance with the foregoing statutes. Due to the conflict with the public policy of this state as expressed in La. Const. art. 12, § 10(C), La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) and La. R.S. 39:1533.2, I believe the objectionable decree in the April 26, 2010 judgment should be declared null and without effect.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.