(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Byrd v. State, 216 Ga.App. 510, 512 (4) ( 455 SE2d 318) (1995). Because Oliver was named in the indictment as a co-defendant, Gassett had notice that she might be called as a state's witness.
Further, Doster was Mize's co-indictee and "a defendant is placed on due notice that all parties named as victims or co-indictees in an indictment may be called as witnesses." Byrd v. State, 216 Ga. App. 510 (4) ( 455 S.E.2d 318) (1995). In addition, the trial court allowed Mize's attorney to interview Doster before her trial testimony, and billing records introduced at the motion for new trial hearing show that Mize's counsel prepared for his impeachment of Doster a week before the trial.
Hendrix cannot validly claim that he was surprised when the State called his former girlfriend as a witness โ she was named as a victim in the accusation. See Byrd v. State , 216 Ga. App. 510, 512 (4), 455 S.E.2d 318 (1995) (when a witnessโ name is contained in the indictment, a defendant cannot validly contend that he was surprised because he lacked knowledge of such witness). In addition, "the testimony of a witness whose name was not supplied to the defendant does not have to be excluded if other means of protecting the defendant and effectuating the intent of the statute can be found."
Because our review is limited to those matters enumerated and argued by an appellant, we do not address whether the test results should have been excluded on the grounds that their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Nor do we consider whether the trial court, upon admitting the test results, should have charged the jury as to the permissible uses to which such results could be put, as that issue has not been raised on appeal. See Williams v. State, 178 Ga. App. 581, 587 (5) ( 344 S.E.2d 247) (1986) (appellate jurisdiction limited to legal points raised by enumerations of error); Byrd v. State, 216 Ga. App. 510, 513 (5) ( 455 S.E.2d 318) (1995) (issues raised in enumerations but not argued in brief deemed abandoned). Judgment affirmed.
And the purpose of statutes such as these is to avoid surprise. Byrd v. State, 216 Ga. App. 510, 512-513 (4) ( 455 S.E.2d 318) (1995). But here, in making the motion in limine defense counsel was not seeking to avoid surprise or prepare for trial. The timing of his motion, which was made after the jury was sworn, demonstrates it was made as part of a strategy to ambush or trap the State. At the time counsel made the motion in limine, he actually had received all the requested material.
But none of the factual predicate of this argument is apparent from the record on appeal and it is well settled that we may not take our facts from appellate briefs. Byrd v. State, 216 Ga. App. 510, 511 (3) ( 455 S.E.2d 318); Colevins v. Federal Department Stores, 213 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) ( 443 S.E.2d 871); Paul v. Joseph, 212 Ga. App. 122, 125 ( 441 S.E.2d 762). Furthermore, a conclusion that some issues in the case are moot would not be of any advantage to Harvey since such a conclusion would not authorize reversal of the trial court's judgment of contempt. Judgment affirmed. Andrews and Blackburn, JJ., concur.