Dunn v. State, 292 Ga. App. 667, 671 (1) ( 665 SE2d 377) (2008). See Watkins, 285 Ga. at 358 (2); Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 483, 484 ( 583 SE2d 170) (2003). "[A]n expert's lack of personal knowledge does not mandate the exclusion of the opinion but, rather, presents a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned the opinion."
Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 358 (2) ( 676 SE2d 196) (2009). See also Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 483, 484 ( 583 SE2d 170) (2003) ("where an expert personally observes data collected by another, his opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based in part on the other's findings"). Compare Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U. S. ___ ( 129 SC 2527, 174 LE2d 314) (2009) (admission into evidence of testimonial affidavits of state laboratory analysts to prove material seized by police was cocaine violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him where analysts did not testify in person); Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850 (7) ( 472 SE2d 74) (1996) (where forensic chemist did not testify, admission into evidence of mere affidavit that reported the results of a drug analysis violated defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him).
An expert may base her opinions on data gathered by others. See Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 483 ( 583 SE2d 170) (2003). As a result, Champion's testimony was properly admitted into evidence, id., and Watkins' trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to this admissible evidence.
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 483 ( 583 SE2d 170) (2003). The record shows that during the bench trial in this case, the state called Lori Reeves to testify as the crime lab expert.
Harkness v. State, 225 Ga. App. 864, 869 (7) ( 485 SE2d 810) (1997); Caldwell v. State, 230 Ga. App. 46 ( 495 SE2d 308) (1997). In Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 483 ( 583 SE2d 170) (2003), we held that the trial court did not err in allowing a GBI chemist's supervisor to testify that a tested substance was cocaine, based on his review of the lab technician's file and the output generated by two different tests. The supervisor compared the results to published data to determine whether the substance tested was cocaine.
Her analysis had been peer-reviewed, meaning that it was double-checked by another analyst at the lab to confirm that conclusions in Bailey's report were correct and contained no errors. Roberson described the techniques that Bailey used in her analysis and testified that after examining the raw data from these tests, he came to the independent conclusion that the material was cocaine. We addressed a nearly identical situation in Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 483 ( 583 SE2d 170) (2003), and held that the trial court did not err by allowing an expert to testify based upon his observations of data collected by another forensic analyst. We noted that "where an expert personally observes data collected by another, his opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based in part on the other's findings."
With regard to the testimony of Kyle Felix, appellant asserts that if trial counsel had prepared for trial more thoroughly, she would have been able to have excluded the firearms examiner's testimony because she would have discovered that Felix was merely a conduit for the opinion of the previous examiner, Chris Robinson. See generally Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 390, 658 S.E.2d 750 (2008) (expert's opinion must be his own; he cannot serve as a mere conduit for the opinions of other experts); Byrd v. State, 261 Ga.App. 483, 484, 583 S.E.2d 170 (2003) (same). We reject this assertion.