Opinion
CASE NO. 8:96-cv-771-T-23TGW
10-21-2015
MILFORD WADE BYRD, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
(Death Case) ORDER
The respondent moves (Doc. 62) for reconsideration of the earlier order (Doc. 61) staying and administratively closing this case pending the disposition of Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (granting the writ of certiorari). The petitioner opposes the motion (Doc. 63).
Under Rule 60(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the respondent argues entitlement to relief from the earlier order. Permitting relief for "any other reason that justifies relief," Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535-36 (2005).
The respondent has not demonstrated an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. A district court has inherent authority to stay an action pending resolution of another action. See Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc'ns, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000). See also Rice v. Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94216, 2010 WL 3607474, *2 (D. S.C. Sept. 9, 2010) ("a federal court has the inherent power to stay, sua sponte, an action before it . . . pending resolution of independent proceedings [that] bear upon the case").
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Hurst to address "whether Florida's death sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of this Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)." The petitioner's amended petition raises a Ring claim. Although Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), finds that Ring's is not retroactive, Hurst's retroactivity is unknown because Ring was based on the Sixth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, although certiorari was granted specifically on the applicability of Ring, one of the issues briefed in Hurst challenges Florida's permitting the jury to find an aggravating circumstance without expressly and unanimously identifying a specific aggravating circumstance.
"In Ring, the Court held that an aggravating factor necessary for imposition of the death penalty has to be found by a jury; it cannot be determined by the sentencing judge." United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 609). --------
As stated in the earlier order (Doc. 61 at 2), "The wise preservation of both public and private resources commends a cessation in these proceedings until the Supreme Court's determination in Hurst."
Accordingly, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 62) is DENIED.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on October 21, 2015.
/s/_________
STEVEN D. MERRYDAY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE