Byrd v. Brandeburg

26 Citing cases

  1. Wells v. Rhodes

    928 F. Supp. 2d 920 (S.D. Ohio 2013)   Cited 18 times
    Concluding "that § 1982 provides an adequate basis for a private conspiracy claim under § 1985"

    See, e.g., James v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 2012 WL 3017889, at *12 (N.D.Ill. July 19, 2012) (holding that “allegations of harassment of a homeowner with the intent to deprive him of the right to use his property because of race are sufficient to state a claim under § 1982”); Whisby–Myers v. Kiekenapp, 293 F.Supp.2d 845, 850 (N.D.Ill.2003) (allegations that neighbor detonated a Flash Simulator and yelled racial epithets at homeowner stated a claim under § 1982); Zhu v. Countrywide Realty Co., Inc., 160 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1232 n. 30 (D.Kan.2001) (indicating that § 1982 applies to “claims for relief from discrimination in holding or conveying property and such actions as cross-burning and fire-bombing”); Egan v. Schmock, 93 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1093 (N.D.Cal.2000) (“[A]llegations of violent or intimidating acts motivated by a discriminatory animus are sufficient to state a claim for deprivation of the right to ‘hold’ real property as guaranteed under § 1982.”); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F.Supp. 60, 64–65 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (granting summary judgment on a plaintiff's § 1982 claim where a defendant threw a Molotov cocktail at the plaintiff's house); Cotton v. Duncan, No. 93 C 3875, 1993 WL 473622, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 15, 1993) (“Attempting to erect and ignite a cross that reads ‘KKK Rules' on an African—American family's lawn is precisely the type of conduct section 1982 is designed to remedy.”). Finally, within the similar context of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Sixth Circuit has provided that a plaintiff must establish that “(1) he belongs to an identifiable class of persons who are subject to discrimination based on their race; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race; and (3) the defendant's discriminatory conduct abridged a right enumerated in section 1981(a).” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir.2006).

  2. Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time Fitness, Inc.

    Case No. 2:06-cv-99 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2010)

    The Sixth Circuit indicated that the primary concern in permitting late amendment is possible prejudice to the defendant. See id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b): " the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits") (emphasis in original); see also Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1996) ("The primary concern for most courts is possible prejudice to the defendant from a late amendment.") (citing UBS Securities, Inc. v. Tsoukanelis, 852 F.Supp. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). Here, Defendant fails to set forth any argument that it would be prejudiced by the inclusion of Seals's salary level test claim, nor does the Court find any. Indeed, the claim appears to be subsumed in the context of this case and would not require any new discovery.

  3. Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp

    293 F. Supp. 2d 845 (N.D. Ill. 2003)   Cited 32 times
    Stating that to state a § 1982 claim, plaintiffs must allege that the defendant "had a racial animus, intended to discriminate against the plaintiff, and deprived the plaintiff of protected rights because of the plaintiff's race"

    We agree with those courts that have concluded that section 1982's protection of the right "to hold" property includes the right to use one's property. See United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1162, 1167 (6th Cir. 1995) (Jewish synagogue members who were scared to come and go from the synagogue as a result of a driveby shooting were deprived of their right to use property); United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1091 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the phrase "to hold" under Section 1982 can mean "to use" property), aff'd en banc, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992); Bryant, 2000 WL 1670938, at *5-6 (harassing and intimidating conduct by neighbors prevents individuals from holding property); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 64 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (allegations of racially motivated firebombing were sufficient to state claim for inability to hold property under § 1982); United States v. Three Juveniles, 886 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1995) (slashing of tires and carving of an anti-Semitic slogan on a car is prohibited by § 1982, which protects the use of a motor vehicle); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 237-38 (N.D.Ill. 1992) (burning of cross on plaintiffs' lawn prevented plaintiffs from using property as protected by § 1982); Stirgus, 720 F. Supp. at 122 (firebombing of home prevented individuals from holding property in violation of § 1982). As the Supreme Court has stated, section 1982 is concerned with "the right of black persons to hold and acquire property on an equal basis with white persons and [to provide for] the right of blacks not to have property interests impaired because of their race."

  4. Baker v. John Morrell Co.

    266 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Iowa 2003)   Cited 40 times
    Comparing punitive damages to compensatory damages plus backpay

    A court's primary concern on Rule 15(b) motions is possible prejudice to the defendant. E.g., Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 65 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (citation omitted). In Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60 (N.D.Ohio 1996), the plaintiffs brought a civil rights action against a Caucasian minor who threw a Molotov cocktail onto the porch of their home.

  5. Bryant v. Polston, (S.D.Ind. 2000)

    Cause No. IP00-1064-C-T/G (S.D. Ind. Nov. 2, 2000)   Cited 6 times
    Finding threats of physical violence including with a gun and continuous racially derogatory remarks to state a cause of action under Section 3617

    5 or 3606. See Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 1090, 1092-93 (N.D.Cal. 2000) (holding a § 3617 claim may be based upon discriminatory conduct designed to drive an individual out of his or her home); Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 239-243 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding FHA protects individuals from interference by neighbors for discriminatory reasons in the peaceful enjoyment of their homes); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (N.D.Ill. 1992) (allegations that defendants participated in cross-burning on plaintiff's lawn stated claim under Section 3617); Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (holding allegation that plaintiff's home had been firebombed in order to intimidate and coerce her to move out of the neighborhood was sufficient to state a claim under § 3617); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (firebombing of family's car in effort to drive them from the neighborhood sufficient to state claim under § 3617); cf. Byrd v. Brandeberg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 64-65 (N.D.Ohio. 1996) (granting plaintiffs summary judgment on claims under Sections 1982, 3617 and 3604 against minor and his parents based on minor's throwing Molotov cocktail onto porch of plaintiffs' home); Michigan Prot. Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (interpreting "interfere with" in section 3617 as including "such overt acts as racially- motivated firebombings"). The Seventh Circuit left this question open in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978), and as previously explained, its holding in Looper likely would not be extended to the context of neighborhood coercion, harassment and intimidation.

  6. Okudinani v. Rose

    No. 17-2556 (2d Cir. Jul. 9, 2019)   Cited 9 times

    Most of those cases involved extreme acts of violence or egregious harassment: detonating a flash simulator near the plaintiff's vehicle while she was driving; throwing a Molotov cocktail onto the plaintiffs' porch; and burning a cross on the plaintiffs' lawn. See Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, 293 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849-50 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (flash simulator); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (Molotov cocktail); Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 236 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (burning cross). An individual subjected to a campaign of intimidation does not truly enjoy the freedom to hold property, a right protected by section 1982.

  7. Cox v. City of Dallas

    430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005)   Cited 245 times
    Holding that municipality’s alleged failure to prevent dumping near the plaintiffs’ homes was not actionable under § 3604(b) because the allegedly discriminatory enforcement of zoning laws was not "connected" to the sale or rental of the dwelling

    F.2d at 1209 (emphasis added), citing Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982) (discriminatory rental decisions); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (rejection of public and low-income housing and adoption of restrictive land use ordinances); Marable v. H. Walker Assocs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981), appeal after remand, 704 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1983) (unequal application of rental criteria by landlord); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978) (racial steering); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (adoption of restrictive zoning law); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1992). The non-controlling cases cited by amici do not contradict this: they either do not deal directly with § 3604(a), see Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 2003); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088-90 (10th Cir. 1993); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F.Supp. 60, 62-66 (N.D.Ohio 1996), do not address the "availability" issue head-on, see United States v. LH Land Corp., Inc., 407 F.Supp. 576, 579-80 (S.D.Fla. 1976); Lane v. Cole, 88 F.Supp.2d 402, 405-06 (E.D.Pa. 2000), or deal with situations where current owners are suing because houses have been made unavailable to others, see supra note 11; Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110-11, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of Nat. Ass'n of Realtors, 442 F.Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D.Ill. 1977). It is true that insurance redlining (although generally not mortgage redlining) may injure current owners in their capacity as current owners, in the unusual circumstance that they apply for insurance after purchasing a house, but the evil there is still access to homes for new owners/tenants — that is, the practice of insurance redlining serves to reduce access to houses to future owners, as it "indirectly relate[s][to] actions arising from efforts to secure h

  8. Jackson v. DeJoy

    Civil Action 5:22-CV-00143-CHB-EBA (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2024)

    Therefore, even if the Court did find that Jackson had properly prosecuted this case, on these grounds alone the Court may alternatively grant summary judgment in the Defendant's favor. See Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F.Supp. 60, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (“In this case, the defendants have failed make any response to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

  9. Varela v. Hill

    4:23-cv-01016-SEP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Several district courts have addressed § 1982's application to harassment by neighbors and have found that “§ 1982 is violated when neighbors harass the occupants because of their race and thereby interfere with the occupants' use of their property.” House of Providence v. Meyers, 458 F.Supp.3d 621, 633-34 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (residents of plaintiffs' township interfered with plaintiffs' peaceful property use by using racial epithets, falsely reporting the plaintiffs to authorities, trespassing, and stalking plaintiffs' children); see also Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, 293 F.Supp.2d 845, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (a neighbor detonating a bomb and yelling racial epithets at a homeowner gave rise to a § 1982 claim); Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F.Supp. 60, 64-65 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's § 1982 claim where defendant threw a cocktail at plaintiff's home and used racial epithets and other violent language when referring to African-Americans).

  10. Brien Shelton Trucking, LLC v. United Fin. Cas. Co.

    Civil Action 4:22CV-00018-JHM (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2023)

    “In this context, ‘the trial court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Bailey, 2018 WL 6112972, *2 (quoting Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F.Supp. 60, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1996)). That being the law, the Court accepts as true United's factual allegations.