Opinion
24A-AD-252
09-19-2024
In the Matter of the Adoption of B.Y.N., J.C., Appellant-Petitioner v. C.K. and D.K., Appellees-Respondents
APPELLANT PRO SE J.C. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Charles P. Rice, Murphy Rice, LLP.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable Michael A. Casati, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D01-2112-AD-1891
APPELLANT PRO SE J.C.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Charles P. Rice, Murphy Rice, LLP.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[¶1] J.C., whose consent to adoption was irrevocably implied, brings this pro se appeal challenging the denial of his motion to set aside a December 2022 order related to the adoption of B.Y.N. ("Child"). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Child was born in February 2020. In mid-to-late 2021, J.C. learned that he might be Child's biological father. J.C. did not register with the Putative Father Registry at that time. Instead, on October 28, 2021, J.C. filed only a petition to establish his paternity of Child. On December 28, 2021, C.K. and D.K. (collectively, "Adoptive Parents") filed a petition to adopt Child. A few months later, on April 12, 2022, Adoptive Parents filed a motion for a determination that, by statute, J.C.'s consent to the adoption petition was irrevocably implied due to his failure to register with the Putative Father Registry before they filed their petition to adopt Child. On April 26, 2022, the trial court issued an order declaring that J.C.'s consent to Child's adoption was irrevocably implied.
[¶3] On July 5, 2022, J.C. filed a motion to dismiss the adoption petition. The next day, the trial court entered an order denying the motion. Referring to its prior finding that J.C.'s consent was irrevocably implied, the trial court determined that J.C. was "prohibit[ed] . . . from contesting the adoption or pursuing an action to establish paternity" and "d[id] not have standing to contest the validity of the adoption via motion to dismiss." Appellees' App. Vol. 2 p. 9. The trial court later held a hearing on the merits of the adoption petition as well as a different party's motion to contest the adoption. On December 22, 2022, the trial court issued an order titled "Order Denying Motion to Contest and Granting Adoption." Id. at 10. Therein, the court denied the other motion to contest. Id. at 17. The court also incorporated prior orders regarding J.C. and stated that, "[p]ursuant to Trial Rule 54(B), . . . there [was] no just reason for delay" and it was "direct[ing] entry of final judgment against . . . [J.C.] and in favor of [Adoptive Parents] such that th[e] order [was] a final appealable order." Id. at 18. Although the title of the order-"Order Denying Motion to Contest and Granting Adoption"-indicated that the court was granting the petition to adopt, toward the end of the order, the court indicated that it was not yet granting the petition in part due to pending issues with adoption subsidies for Adoptive Parents. See id. at 17-18. It said: "To protect the privacy of . . . Child, the [c]ourt will issue a separate Decree of Adoption once subsidies are approved by [the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS")] showing the effective date of . . . Child's adoption to be December 19, 2022." Id.
[¶4] In January 2023, J.C. filed his Notice of Appeal. In that prior appeal, he challenged the determination that his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied. In June 2023, we issued an opinion affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss the adoption petition. The opinion was certified in August 2023. See In re Adoption of B.Y.N., No. 23A-AD-130 (Ind.Ct.App. June 27, 2023) (mem.); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 12.
[¶5] On December 18, 2023, J.C. filed an appearance on his own behalf, along with a pro se motion titled "Motion to Set Aside Adoption Decree." Appellant's App. Vol. 3 p. 2. In the motion, J.C. indicated that he was seeking to set aside the December 2022 decision that "t[ook] away his parental rights[.]" Id. The motion was based on Trial Rule 60(B)(8) and Indiana Code section 31-19-14-2 ("the Best Interests Statute"), a statute contemplating that, in some cases, the trial court may set aside an adoption decree within a strict timeframe if doing so is in the best interests of the child. J.C. asserted that "it [was] in the best interest of [Child] to be in a permanent placement" with J.C. Id. In support of his motion, J.C. provided a list of reasons purportedly related to why it was in Child's best interests to be placed with J.C., among them, allegations of paternity fraud and poor performance of counsel, and the rights the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution confers to both parent and child. Id. On January 3, 2024, Adoptive Parents filed a response to J.C.'s motion and asserted that J.C. "mistakenly" sought "to have the [trial court] withdraw an Adoption Decree that ha[d] never been entered." Appellees' App. Vol. 2 p. 33. Adoptive Parents also argued that J.C. was estopped from seeking to set aside the adoption decree due to the outcome of the prior proceedings.
[¶6] In addition to challenging the motion to set aside, Adoptive Parents filed a motion asking the trial court to declare that it "ha[d] not entered an adoption decree" pursuant to statute. Id. at 36. Adoptive Parents explained that DCS had "taken the position" that the December 2022 order titled "Order Denying Motion to Contest and Granting Adoption" had the effect of "finaliz[ing] the adoption" and, as a result, DCS had concluded that Adoptive Parents were "no longer eligible for subsidies." Id. Adoptive Parents referred to that portion of the order where the trial court indicated that, once the subsidies were approved, the trial court would "issue a separate Decree of Adoption . . . showing the effective date of . . . Child's adoption to be December 19, 2022." Id. at 36-37.
[¶7] On January 4, 2024, the trial court summarily denied J.C.'s motion to set aside the adoption decree. On January 30, 2024, J.C. filed his Notice of Appeal. The Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record was noted on the CCS on February 1, 2024. Meanwhile, on February 14, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Adoptive Parents' request to declare that the trial court had not yet entered an adoption decree. The next day, the court entered an order "declar[ing] that it ha[d] not entered an adoption decree." Id. at 43. Therein, the court directed DCS to "process [Adoptive Parents'] application for subsidies and make a determination of eligibility[.]" Id. On February 29, 2024, J.C. filed his Amended Notice of Appeal. The Notice of Completion of Amended Clerk's Record was noted on the CCS on March 13, 2024. This appeal ensued.
We accessed the trial court's CCS through the Odyssey case management system.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] J.C. appeals the denial of his motion to set aside the adoption decree. In his motion, J.C. cited Trial Rule 60(B)(8) and the Best Interests Statute, with references to caselaw and the United States Constitution. See Appellant's App. Vol 3 pp. 2-3. Trial Rule 60(B) allows the trial court to set aside a judgment for "any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" other than those specified elsewhere in the rule. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8). In seeking relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), a party "must allege a meritorious claim or defense[.]"
[¶9] In general, when a party seeks relief from a judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B), the judgment at issue need not be a final judgment. See Mitchell v. 10th and The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 973-74 (Ind. 2014) (noting that the word "final" had been removed from Trial Rule 60(B)). Moreover, a trial court's ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion is "deemed a final judgment, and an appeal may be taken therefrom as in the case of a judgment." T.R. 60(C). We review the trial court's ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. E.g., State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016). However, to the extent our review involves a question of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, our review is de novo. B.K. v. State, 235 N.E.3d 142, 145 (Ind. 2024).
[¶10] Here, J.C. moved to set aside the December 2022 order, wherein the court (1) issued a final order determining that J.C.'s consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied and (2) stated that it was not yet issuing an adoption decree.
[¶11] Although J.C. framed his motion with reference to the Best Interests Statute, he at times seemed to challenge the prior determination that his consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied due to his failure to timely register with the Putative Father Registry. Critically, however, J.C. already challenged this aspect of the December 2022 order in his prior appeal. That challenge was unsuccessful, with this Court concluding that the trial court correctly applied the law in determining that J.C.'s consent was irrevocably applied. See In re Adoption of B.Y.N., No. 23A-AD-130 (Ind.Ct.App. June 27, 2023) (mem.).
[¶12] Where-as here-an appellate court conclusively addressed a legal issue in a prior appeal "involving the same case and substantially the same facts," the "appellate court's determination of [the] legal issue . . . binds . . . the trial court[.]" Bousum v. Bousum, 173 N.E.3d 289, 294 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). "This doctrine is based upon the sound policy that once an issue is litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter." Id. We note that, unlike the trial court, this Court retains the discretionary power to revisit an issue resolved in the prior appeal. See id. Yet, we are generally "loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances." In re Adoption of Baby W., 796 N.E.2d 364, 373 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (quoting Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 347, 361 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996)). Here, J.C. has not addressed the law of the case doctrine, let alone explained why extraordinary circumstances exist to revisit the prior decision. Under the circumstances, we decline to exercise our discretion to revisit the decision. Thus, to the extent J.C. was again challenging whether his consent was implied, the court did not err in declining to grant the motion to set aside the judgment.
[¶13] In seeking to set aside the December 2022 order, J.C. seemed to focus on whether he was entitled to relief under the Best Interests Statute, which states: Except as provided in section 3 of this chapter, if a person whose parental rights are terminated by the entry of an adoption decree challenges the adoption decree not more than the later of:
(1) six (6) months after the entry of an adoption decree; or (2) one (1) year after the adoptive parents obtain custody of the child; the court shall sustain the adoption decree unless the person challenging the adoption decree establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that modifying or setting aside the adoption decree is in the child's best interests.Ind. Code § 31-19-14-2(2).
[¶14] On appeal, J.C. maintains that the Best Interests Statute applied, and so the trial court should have set aside the December 2022 order in light of Child's best interests. Adoptive Parents point out that, because the trial court has not yet issued an adoption decree, the Best Interests Statute does not apply. We agree with Adoptive Parents. Whereas the Best Interests Statute provides limited grounds for setting aside an adoption decree, here, the trial court explained in its December 2022 order that it was not yet issuing an adoption decree and would wait to issue an adoption decree until the resolution of ancillary issues related to subsidies. Thus, because the court had not yet issued an adoption decree, J.C. did not identify grounds for relief under the Best Interests Statute.
The trial court later issued an order explaining that, just as the December 2022 order stated, that order did not result in an adoption decree. Therein, the court directed resolution of issues pertaining to subsidies, which would spur the issuance of a nunc pro tunc decree. The order was issued after this Court acquired jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 8. See Ind. Appellate Rule 8 (specifying that "[t]he Court on Appeal acquires jurisdiction on the date the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary"). We note that, in general, "Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial court of 'jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the appeal has been terminated.'" Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners Assoc., Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1005 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Schumacher v. Radiomaha, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 1993)). However, because we resolve this issue based on the plain language in the December 2022 order, rather than the subsequent order, we need not further address Appellate Rule 8.
[¶15] Moreover, even assuming that the December 2022 order could be read to constitute an adoption decree, there is an exception to the Best Interests Statute outlined in Indiana Code section 31-19-14-3. See I.C. § 31-19-14-2. This section states that "[a] person who consents to an adoption may not withdraw the consent to adoption after the entry of the adoption decree under IC 31-19-10-4." I.C. § 31-19-14-3(a). As discussed, it has been conclusively determined that J.C. impliedly consented to Child's adoption. Because J.C. impliedly consented to Child's adoption, J.C. is statutorily precluded from withdrawing that consent. 31-19-14-3(a); cf. I.C. § 31-19-9-13 (specifying that a person "whose consent to adoption is implied . . . is not entitled to challenge . . . the adoption[.]").
[¶16] Furthermore, to the extent J.C. argues on appeal that, independent of the Best Interests Statute, there were other grounds for setting aside the December 2022 order-such as alleged paternity fraud, the poor performance of counsel, or the 14th Amendment-J.C. did not present these matters as independent grounds for relief in his motion to set aside the December 2022 order. Rather, J.C. indicated that he was seeking relief "pursuant to" the Best Interests Statute, and he listed examples of why setting aside the order was in Child's best interests. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 pp. 2-3. It is well-settled that a party generally waives issues presented for the first time on appeal. Cf. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 907 (Ind. 2024). Thus, to the extent J.C. presents arguments that do not rely on the Best Interests Statute, which was the focus of his motion below, we decline to address those new arguments. See id.
[¶17] Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to set aside any aspect of the December 2022 order regarding Child.
[¶18] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.