Opinion
No. 1 CA-SA 17-0113
08-31-2017
LOGAN RONEY BYERS, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. BLUFF, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of YAVAPAI, Respondent Judge, STATE OF ARIZONA, Real Party in Interest.
COUNSEL John Trebon PC, Flagstaff By John Trebon Counsel for Petitioner Yavapai County Attorney's Office, Camp Verde By Ethan A. Wolfinger Counsel for Real Party in Interest
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. V1300CR2017-80097
The Honorable Michael R. Bluff, Judge
JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED
COUNSEL
John Trebon PC, Flagstaff
By John Trebon
Counsel for Petitioner
Yavapai County Attorney's Office, Camp Verde
By Ethan A. Wolfinger
Counsel for Real Party in Interest
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
SWANN, Judge:
¶1 In obtaining a grand jury indictment in this sexual assault case, the state presented the inculpatory portion of DNA-testing results but omitted results that, based on the state's theory of the case, were clearly exculpatory. The state was obligated to present all clearly exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Its failure to do so requires that the indictment be remanded to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 A grand jury convened to consider evidence regarding the state's allegation that Logan Roney Byers committed sexual assault.
¶3 The state presented the testimony of Sergeant Steven Butler. Butler testified that according to Byers's 15-year-old niece, M.H., Byers entered M.H.'s bedroom when she was sleeping, removed her pants and underwear, penetrated her vagina with his penis, kissed her forehead, and left. After Byers left, M.H. urinated in a toilet and noticed a "white glob" in the toilet bowl. M.H. disclosed the incident to her grandmother in the morning, and she was taken to a hospital that evening. When confronted by family members, Byers denied any wrongdoing. Law enforcement then coordinated a confrontation call in which Byers told M.H. that he had not done anything to her, and that even if he had, he was incapable of causing her to become pregnant.
¶4 Butler informed the grand jury that DNA evidence was taken and tested:
Q. And shortly after this incident, Detective, did somebody obtain DNA from the alleged victim's genitalia area?
A. Yes. That was obtained during the SANE [Sexual Assault Nurse Exam] Exam.
. . . .
Q. And, Detective, as part of this investigation, did law enforcement obtain a DNA sample from Mr. Byers?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And was both the DNA sample that was obtained during the SANE Exam from the victim in this case, as well as Mr. Byers, sent off to the crime lab for analysis?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And was there a match of the DNA found in the genitalia area of the victim and a match to the DNA of Mr. Byers?
A. Yes, it was.
¶5 The description of a "match" in the "genitalia area" was true—the crime-lab reports show that Byers's DNA was found in swabs taken from M.H.'s external genitalia. But the reports also show that no spermatozoa were found in those swabs, that oral and vaginal samples showed no male DNA at all, and that M.H.'s underwear tested negative for a semen constituent. The state did not present any evidence of these additional results to the grand jury.
¶6 The grand jury indicted Byers. Byers thereafter moved for a remand to the grand jury based on the state's selective presentation of the DNA test results. The court denied Byers's motion, and he now seeks relief by way of special action.
DISCUSSION
¶7 We accept special-action jurisdiction because Byers has no remedy by appeal. See Francis v. Sanders, 222 Ariz. 423, 426, ¶ 9 (App. 2009); Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). We grant relief because the state failed to present evidence that, on the facts of this case, was clearly exculpatory.
¶8 The state must provide the grand jury with a fair and impartial presentation of the evidence. Maretick v. Jarrett, 204 Ariz. 194, 197, ¶ 8 (2003). What is required to meet that standard will vary from case to case. State v. Coconino Cty. Superior Court (Mauro), 139 Ariz. 422, 424 (1984). Though the state need not provide all exculpatory evidence, it must provide all "clearly exculpatory" evidence. Id. at 425. "Clearly exculpatory evidence is evidence of such weight that it would deter the grand jury from finding the existence of probable cause." Id.
¶9 Here, the state's theory of the case, as presented to the grand jury, was that Byers had vaginal intercourse with M.H. M.H.'s statement indicated that Byers ejaculated, and that ejaculate remained after the alleged assault. In support of that theory, the state asserted broadly that Byers's DNA "match[ed]" a sample taken from M.H.'s "genitalia area." But the state failed to mention the following details: the "DNA match" evidence was to non-spermatozoa from M.H.'s external genitalia, M.H.'s vaginal samples revealed no male DNA whatsoever, and M.H.'s underwear revealed no semen constituent. By omitting those details, the state created the misimpression that ironclad DNA evidence confirmed its theory of the assault. In reality, the import of the DNA evidence is much more limited—it establishes only that Byers's non-sex cells were found on M.H.'s external genitalia. The absence of spermatozoa, vaginal male DNA, and semen constituent on the underwear is clearly exculpatory evidence that should have been presented to the grand jury. Though negative forensic tests may not be clearly exculpatory in every case, the foregoing data is clearly exculpatory when measured against the state's theory of Byers's culpability. That is not to say that the grand jury may not indict Byers even after considering the clearly exculpatory evidence. But the grand jury must have access to that evidence to make an independent determination.
CONCLUSION
¶10 For the reasons set forth above, we remand the indictment to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause.