Opinion
No. 05-14-01405-CV
01-20-2016
GWENDOLYN (DILWORTH) BYARS, Appellant v. OTHO D. DILWORTH III, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-04374-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Myers, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Myers
Gwendolyn (Dilworth) Byars appeals the trial court's judgment awarding possession of property to Otho D. Dilworth in this suit for eviction. Byars contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding possession of the property to Dilworth without hearing Byars's argument and allowing her due process of law.
Byars is pro se before this Court. We liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs. Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). However, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Washington, 362 S.W.3d at 854. To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
In his petition for eviction, Dilworth alleged Byars was his tenant pursuant to an oral agreement and that she had failed to pay rent. The justice court awarded possession of the property to Dilworth. Byars appealed this decision to the county court at law. The judgment of the county court at law states the case "[c]ame on for trial" but that Byars did not appear at trial. "After considering all the evidence," the trial court found in Dilworth's favor and awarded him possession of the property.
A suit for eviction or forcible detainer is a procedure to determine the right to immediate possession of real property where there was no unlawful entry. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(2) (West 2014); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.1; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). It is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain possession without resort to an action on the title. Scott v. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818-19 (Tex. 1936); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. The trial court must adjudicate the right to actual possession of the property. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e). Except for a claim for rent, all other claims, including questions of title, validity of a foreclosure, counterclaims, and suits against third parties are not permitted. Id.; Scott, 90 S.W.2d at 818; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710 (quoting Scott). Those claims must be brought in separate suits. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Accordingly, the only issue in a forcible detainer action is which party has the right to immediate possession of the property. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709.
Although rule of civil procedure 510 is titled "Eviction Cases," it states that it applies to suits "to recover possession of real property under Chapter 24, of the Texas Property Code," that is, forcible detainer and forcible entry and detainer lawsuits. Also, the property code states, "Eviction suits include forcible entry and detainer and forcible detainer suits." See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a) (West 2014). --------
On appeal, Byars contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Dilworth possession of the property without hearing Byars's argument and allowing her due process of law. The trial court's judgment states the case was called for trial but that Byars did not appear at trial. Therefore, the record demonstrates that Byars had an opportunity to present her case to the trial court but did not avail herself of that opportunity. The record does not show that she was deprived of the ability to present her argument.
Byars did not request the preparation of the reporter's record from the trial before the county court at law, and no reporter's record was filed. When the parties do not bring forward a reporter's record, we must presume the evidence admitted at trial supports the trial court's judgment. See Favaloro v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 994 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. struck). With no reporter's record of the evidentiary hearing, we must presume the evidence submitted at the trial supports the trial court's determination that Dilworth is entitled to possession of the property.
Byars does not explain how she was deprived of due process of law. She states in her brief that Dilworth "only has sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession . . . ." Byars asserts that the determination of possession of the property required resolution of a title dispute, but the record contains no evidence of a title dispute. Byars also states that Dilworth did not comply with the requirements for foreclosing on property. However, the record contains no evidence or allegation of a foreclosure or of a deed of trust. Also, the validity of a foreclosure cannot be litigated in a suit for forcible detainer but must be brought in a separate suit. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709.
We conclude Byars has not shown the trial court deprived Byars of due process of law or that the court abused its discretion by awarding possession of the property to Dilworth. We overrule Byars's issue on appeal.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE 141405F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-04374-D.
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers. Justices Fillmore and Whitehill participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee OTHO D. DILWORTH III recover his costs of this appeal from appellant GWENDOLYN (DILWORTH) BYARS. Judgment entered this 20th day of January, 2016.