Opinion
Civil Action File No. 1:01-CV-3124-TWT.
March 18, 2004
ORDER
The Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and the Equal Pay Act. The Plaintiffs seek to recover benefits and equitable relief with respect to an employee benefit plan established and maintained by their employer, the Coca-Cola Company. In the motions before the Court, the Defendants move to dismiss in part the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [Docs. 59, 60 73].
I. BACKGROUND
The First Amended Complaint states that the named Plaintiffs, Lisa Ann Byars, Michelle Palmeri, and Felecia Weems, were participants in The Coca-Cola Company Long Term Disability Income Plan ("the LTD Plan"). They filed this consolidated action on behalf of themselves, as well as a class of similarly situated individuals. Defendant Coca-Cola Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Delaware. Coca-Cola is authorized to transact business in the state of Georgia, where it maintains its principal place of business. The Plaintiffs also named as defendants the LTD Plan and the LTD Plan Committee.
In addition to the Coca-Cola Defendants, the Plaintiffs named three other defendants in this action that were involved with the processing of claims on behalf of the LTD Plan. Defendant Reliastar Life Insurance Company ("Reliastar") is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Minnesota, and is authorized to transact business in the state of Georgia. Reliastar was the successor to an Administrative Services Agreement with Coca-Cola. That agreement gave Reliastar claim processing responsibilities, and made Reliastar a fiduciary for the LTD Plan. Defendant NATLSCO, Inc. ("NATLSCO") is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Delaware, and is authorized to transact business in the state of Georgia. NATLSCO processed claims and appeals for the LTD Plan, and is a fiduciary with respect to the LTD Plan. Finally, Defendant Kemper National Services, Inc. ("Kemper") is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Florida and is authorized to transact business in the state of Georgia. Kemper performed claims administration functions on behalf of Reliastar and the LTD Plan. Kemper is a wholly owned subsidiary of NATLSCO.
Coca-Cola provides long term disability benefits to its employees through the LTD Plan. Coca-Cola is both the LTD Plan sponsor and the named administrator. The LTD Plan expressly delegates Coca-Cola's powers and duties as Administrator to "the Committee," which is the LTD Plan's named fiduciary. Under the LTD Plan, the Committee is given broad powers. The Committee has the power to adopt rules and regulations necessary for the performance of its duties under the LTD Plan. Also, the Committee has the exclusive responsibility, and complete and final discretionary authority, to construe the LTD Plan, determine eligibility for benefits, and decide all questions arising thereunder.
Reliastar was the original administrative services provider for Coca-Cola's LTD Plan. In June of 1999 Reliastar outsourced its duties as administrative services provider to NATLSCO. Kemper, NATLSCO's subsidiary, provided administrative services to the LTD Plan from August 1999 through December 2002. During that time period, Byars and Palmeri both applied for benefits under the LTD Plan. Their applications were denied. Both Byars and Palmeri appealed the initial decision on their claims. Also during that time period, Weems applied for benefits under the LTD Plan and received them for a period of one month. Her benefits were then terminated. Weems filed an appeal, and the decision to terminate her benefits was upheld.
II. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(6)(6) only where it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts could support the plaintiff's claims for relief Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(6)(6); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Development Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir. 1983). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The Coca-Cola Defendants (collectively referred to as "Coca Cola") move to dismiss parts of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint on various arguments. First, Coca-Cola moves to dismiss all of the class-wide claims in the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this suit. Next, Coca-Cola seeks dismissal of Counts II and III, arguing that the relief sought in those Counts under section 502(a)(3) is not available since adequate relief is available under other provisions of section 502(a). Coca-Cola then argues for the dismissal of Count IV because the Plaintiffs cannot prove a set of facts showing a loss to the plan as required by section 502(a)(2) of ERISA. Finally, Coca-Cola moves to dismiss Count V, brought under ERISA section 510, because the Plaintiffs cannot show interference with their rights under the LTD Plan, or an adverse action taken against them for exercising their rights. The Reliastar Defendants (collectively referred to as "Reliastar") move to dismiss in part the First Amended Complaint on similar grounds.A. Exhaustion
Coca-Cola moves to dismiss the class-wide ERISA claims in Counts I-VI of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint because the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing this suit. As a general rule, the Eleventh Circuit requires ERISA plaintiffs to exhaust all available administrative remedies before they file an action in the district courts.Perrino v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 209 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). The exhaustion doctrine is strictly applied, with exceptions made only for cases when "resort to administrative remedies would be futile or the remedy inadequate, or where a claimant is denied meaningful access to the administrative review scheme in place."Id. at 1315-16. The exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine are narrow, and apply only when "requiring a plaintiff to exhaust an administrative scheme would be an empty exercise in legal formalism." Id. at 1318.
The purposes behind the exhaustion requirement are several. The requirement reduces the number of frivolous lawsuits brought under ERISA, minimizes dispute resolution costs, assists fiduciaries in carrying out their duties, prevents premature judicial intervention, and provides the courts with a more fully developed record if litigation is necessary. Perrino, 209 Fad at 1315. The Plaintiffs argue that appealing a denial of benefits under the terms of the plan suffices to exhaust the administrative review process for all purposes. The Plaintiffs' position is wholly inconsistent with the purposes of the exhaustion requirement. With such a minimalist exhaustion requirement, a litigant could appeal a denial of a benefits claim on an inadequate ground while holding back for federal court her more meritorious claims. Courts would be forced to hear claims wholly lacking in factual development; fiduciaries would be denied the ability to perform significant portions of their responsibilities; the costs of resolving ERISA disputes would increase; and most importantly, the courts would intervene in situations where, if administrative remedies been utilized, judicial involvement would not have been necessary. Moreover, depriving the fiduciary of the ability to review all bases of a litigant's claim before a lawsuit is filed would require this Court to abandon the applicable "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" review standards in favor of a de novo review. See Tones v. Pittston Co., 346 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003) (when discretionary authority is given to the plan administrator, the district court normally reviews benefit decisions under an "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standard). The Eleventh Circuit applies the exhaustion doctrine in strict fashion, and is disinclined to excuse its compliance. Penino, 209 F.3d at 1315-16. Thus, this Court holds the Plaintiffs may not evade the exhaustion doctrine by reserving for litigation issues which could have been presented in the administrative review process.
The Plaintiffs also contend that this Court should excuse compliance with the exhaustion doctrine because this case falls within the exceptions for futility and lack of meaningful access to administrative review. As for futility, the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint contends that further administrative review would be futile based on the widespread nature of "Defendants' practice in administering claims and paying benefits under the plan." (See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 163-64.) Then with respect to lack of meaningful access, the Plaintiffs contend that the failure of the Defendants to provide them adequate plan documents outlining the administrative process denied them meaningful access to that process. (See id. at ¶ 165-66.)
With respect to lack of meaningful access, it is simply not possible for the Plaintiffs to produce any facts indicating that they were denied meaningful access to the review procedures of the LTD Plan. All of the named Plaintiffs went through at least one level of review with respect to their benefits claims. The lack of meaningful access exception to the exhaustion doctrine is for situations where an administrator in control of the review procedures denies a claimant meaningful access to those procedures. Counts v. American General Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 111 Fad 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1997). The Plaintiffs have not been denied meaningful access, but rather, with respect to the issues for which they actually sought review, they were given meaningful access. Thus, the Plaintiffs' meaningful access arguments do not justify excusing compliance with the exhaustion doctrine.
With respect to the futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine, the Plaintiffs pled that the practices of the Defendants in administering claims and paying benefits under the plan makes further review futile. However, the Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth claims under the terms of the plan, fiduciary duty breaches, and statutory violations of ERISA which, as far as the pleadings in this case indicate, have never been presented to the administrative review process. As those issues have never been presented for review, there is no provable set of facts which could justify this Court in using its discretion to excuse administrative exhaustion based on futility. Because there is no indication that administrative review would be an "empty exercise in legal formalism," the Plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies before pursuing class claims in the district court. Perrino, 209 F.3d at 1318.
Having determined that the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and are not excused from doing so, this Court must determine whether the unexhausted claims should be remanded to the administrative review process or dismissed without prejudice. This is not a case where the Plaintiffs were unaware of the existence of the administrative review process. Additionally, this is not a case where the Defendants altered their arguments to present new matters before the district court.Cf. Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 1998). Where the Plaintiffs know of the existence of the administrative review process but decide not to use it, this Court sees no reason to delay resolution of the issues which are properly before the Court while the Plaintiffs go through the review process with respect to other claims. See also Counts v. American General Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 111 Fad 105, 108 (11th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice with the exception of the Plaintiffs' individual claims under ERISA sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(c), and Byars' claim under the Equal Pay Act.
B. Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
Coca-Cola and Reliastarcontend that ERISA section 502(a)(3) does not afford the Plaintiffs the relief they seek in Counts II and III of their First Amended Complaint. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA provides that:
A civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (I) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of his subchapter or the terms of the plan.29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The Supreme Court has held that this is a "catchall" provision, and relief is available under this section of ERISA only if adequate relief is not available elsewhere in section 502(a). Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,515 (1996) (where Congress provided for other adequate remedies, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief under section 502(a)(3)); Katz v. Comprehensive Plan of Group Ins., 197 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 1999) (where there is an adequate remedy under section 502(a)(1)(B), additional relief under section 502(a)(3) is not proper); In re Managed Care Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (where breach of fiduciary duty claims would be adequately addressed in an action under section 502(a)(1)(B), no claim was available under section 502(a)(3)). The question then, is whether the claims raised in Counts II and III of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint are provided adequate relief elsewhere in section 502(a). See Katz, 197 Fad at 1089 (holding that the availability of an adequate remedy does not mean or guarantee an adjudication in one's favor).
In Count II of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs contend several actions of Coca-Cola establish the grounds for relief, including: (1) the practice of requiring applicants to apply for Social Security benefits as a prerequisite to receiving LTD Plan benefits; (2) reducing benefits below an alleged 60% of average compensation floor; (3) denial of claims based on standards not present in the LTD Plan; (4) having someone other than a named fiduciary make final benefit determinations; (5) improper bonus incentives for denied claims; (6) misrepresentations in the LTD Plan's Summary Plan Description; (7) failure to include basic information in the Summary Plan Description; and (8) the improper incorporation of an inadequate booklet into the Summary Plan Description. As to their individual claims, these alleged ERISA statutory violations affect the Plaintiffs only to the extent that their claims for benefits were denied. Section 502(a) (1) (B) provides an adequate remedy for the denial of benefits. Therefore, there is no relief available under the catchall provision of section 502(a)(3).
Most of the actions about which the Plaintiffs complain in Count II concern the decision to award or deny benefits. Specifically, the Plaintiffs' complaints regarding the requirement that they apply for Social Security benefits, reduction of benefits below a sixty percent floor, improper delegation of decision making authority, improper incentives for denied applications, and the denial of claims based on criteria not present in the LTD Plan, all go directly to the decision to award or deny benefits. Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA provides a cause of action for these types of complaints. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (providing for action to recover benefits due under the Plan's terms, enforce rights under the plan's terms, and clarify rights to future benefits). To the extent the Plaintiffs were harmed by the actions of Coca-Cola in Count II, section 502(a)(1)(B) provides adequate relief.
The balance ofCount II concerns procedural violations of ERISA's writing and disclosure requirements in the Summary Plan Description for the LTD Plan. There is no remedy for a procedural violation per se, but rather, procedural violations of ERISA must work a substantive harm before relief is available. Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Managed Care Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1329-31 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Bush v. Humana Health Plan of Alabama, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1997). A substantive harm is required because if employers were subject to claims based on every procedural violation of ERISA, the Act would become a strict liability statute. See VaritX Corn v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (the goal is to protect employee benefit plans without making procedural requirement such a hurdle that employers are discouraged from offering benefits); Hein v. TecliAnierica Group, Inc., 17 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 1994) (declining to extend relief when benefit plan failed to comply with ERISA's writing and disclosure requirements for vesting).
The first avenue of relief for the Plaintiffs' claims in Count II of their First Amended Complaint is in section 502(a)(1)(B). To the extent that a summary plan description is inadequate to inform an employee of his rights, the employee may bring an action for resulting damages, if any, under section 502(a)(1)(B).LaYaou v. Xerox Corp., 238 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2001). Additionally, to the extent the Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the information provided by the Summary Plan Description, they may request such information and, if not adequately provided, may assert a claim under section 502(a)(1)(A) for the relief available in section 502(c). See In re Managed Care Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(A), (c) (providing for penalties and such other relief as the Court deems proper). Indeed, the Plaintiffs recognized relief was available in both sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2), and they pled separate Counts under those provisions. (See First Amended Complaint, Counts I, VI.) To the extent the Plaintiffs suffered harm or are otherwise entitled to relief, an adequate remedy is available without resort to the catchall of section 502(a)(3).
Although it may be true that the relief available under section 502(a)(1)(B) is not identical to the relief available under section 502(a)(3), identity is not the issue. Rather, as stated in Varity and its progeny, the issue is whether there isadequate relief available elsewhere. Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) ("where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief"); Hamilton v. Allen-Bradley Co., Inc., 244 Fad 819, 826 (11th Cir. 2001) (remedy available under section 502(a)(3) when "a violation has no appropriate remedy provided by ERISA"); Katz, 197 F.3d at 1088-89 (same);Tolson v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 141 Fad 604, 610 (5th Cir. 1998) (where plaintiff sued for wrongful denial of benefits and breach of fiduciary duty and relief was available under section 502(a)(1)(B), it is "inappropriate" to grant equitable relief under section 502(a)(3)). In this case, the Plaintiffs' claims under section 502(a)(1)(B) sufficiently address the harms the Plaintiffs complain about in Count II. Accordingly, relief is not available under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.
Count III of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges that Coca-Cola and Reliastar committed multiple breaches of their fiduciary duty, causing harm to the Plaintiffs. The alleged breaches include: (1) misrepresentation of the offset for the receipt of Social Security benefits; (2) miscalculation of the offset for the receipt of Social Security benefits; (3) failure to provide LTD Plan documents upon request; (4) application of standards without basis in the LTD Plan document; (5) delegation ofdecision making authority to someone otherthan anamed fiduciary; (6) misleading LTD Plan participants about the appeals process for the denial or termination of benefits; and (7) entering into a contractual agreement which awards bonuses based on the number of claims that are denied or placed on Social Security benefits. (See First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 178-187.)
As to the Plaintiffs' individual claims, the alleged ERISA violations in Count III are provided adequate relief elsewhere, making section 502(a)(3) an improper avenue for relief. The Plaintiffs' Count III allegations about the standards applied to benefits decisions, misrepresentations about the appeals process, improper delegation of decision making authority, improper incentives, and the harms caused by those breaches, all concern the decision to award or deny benefits under the LTD Plan. Similarly, the Plaintiffs' complaints about the misrepresentation and miscalculation of the Social Security offset go to the amount of benefits to which the Plaintiffs believe they are entitled. Both the decision to award or deny benefits and the amount of benefits to which the Plaintiffs are entitled are matters which have an adequate remedy in section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (providing an action to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan, enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan). As for the Plaintiffs' complaints about the failure to provide information about the plan, such claims are provided adequate relief under section 502(a)(1)(A) for the reliefavailable in section 502(c).See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(A), 1132(c) (providing relief for failure to disclose information regarding the plan). Because the harms complained of in Count III have an adequate remedy elsewhere in ERISA section 502(a), the Plaintiffs cannot seek relief under section 502(a)(3) in Count III of their First Amended Complaint.
C. Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(2)
Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA provides that "a civil action may be brought . . . by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under [section 409] . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Section 409 provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial reliefas the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). This section of ERISA was interpreted by the Supreme Court as providing "relief singularly to the plan" and "remedies that would protect the entire plan," rather than the rights of an individual beneficiary. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985). Accordingly, for relief to be available under section 409, the LTD Plan itself must have suffered a loss. Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 Fad 549, 566 (5th Cir. 1999) (section 409 of ERISA limits claims to those that inure to the benefit of the entire plan, and not to individual beneficiaries); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 Fad 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) (to seek relief under ERISA section 409, a plaintiff must make out a breach of fiduciary duty and a prima facie case of loss to the plan); see also Sinclair v. United Healthcare of Georgia. Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 23696, 5-6 (there is no private right of action for individuals in section 409 of ERISA; the only cognizable action must be brought to relieve a harm to the plan caused by a breach of fiduciary duty).
In Count IV of their First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs bring a claim under section 502(a)(2) of ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty. The Plaintiffs allege that Coca-Cola and Reliastar breached their fiduciary duties owed to the LTD Plan and its participants, and they seek the removal of the LTD Plan fiduciaries and the disgorgement of all compensation received by those fiduciaries. Coca-Cola and Reliastar seek to dismiss Count IV claiming that no relief is available under section 502(a)(2) because the Plaintiffs cannot prove a loss to the plan. The Plaintiffs cannot recover under that section because their First Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts that, if proven, would establish a loss to the plan, a prerequisite to relief under ERISA section 502(a)(2). Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140-42 (1985); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (1995). Accordingly, Count IV is subject to dismissal.
The sole allegation of a loss to the plan in this entire action is in Count IV of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. There, in an amendment to their original complaint, the Plaintiffs tacked on an allegation that fiduciary breaches by Coca-Cola relating to its decisions on benefits claims "caused a loss to the Plan as a whole." (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 189.) The allegation is devoid of any support upon which this Court can determine that the Plaintiffs can prove a set of facts entitling them to relief under section 502(a)(2). In fact, if anything, the denial of claims actually strengthens the LTD Plan, by making more assets available which are required for the plan to function.
The impetus behind section 502(a)(2) of ERISA was the potential for a plan fiduciary to misuse or mismanage plan assets.Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 473 U.S. at 140-42. In contrast, the Plaintiffs' complaint implies that any potential breach of fiduciary duty creates a loss to the plan, presumably because the fiduciaries never should have been compensated for their services. Such a broad use of section 502(a)(2) was not envisioned by Congress, and is not consistent with well reasoned precedent interpreting that section of ERISA. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 473 U.S. at 140-42; Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 566 (5th Cir. 1999); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995). This Court will not stretch that provision of ERISA to provide relief which was never intended. Because Count IV sets forth no facts which, if proven, would entitle the Plaintiffs to relief under section 502(a)(2), it is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
D. Relief Under ERISA Section 510
Count V of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges that the denial or termination of their benefits under the LTD Plan was for the purpose of preventing them from attaining rights they had under other employee benefit plans maintained by Coca-Cola. Section 510 of ERISA is designed to prevent interference with protected rights, and it provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled. . . .29 U.S.C. § 1140. The Plaintiffs allege that in order to save money which would be spent to provide benefits to the Plaintiffs under several employee benefit plans, Coca-Cola denied the Plaintiffs' LTD Plan claims which thereby ended their eligibility for benefits under other plans. This is not really a retaliation claim. See Byrd v. MacPapers. Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 161 (11th Cir. 1992) (employer accused of retaliatory discharge for plaintiff's exercising or rights); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 399 (11th Cir. 1993) (employer accused of modifying its plan to prevent employee from realizing benefit); Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 797 (6th Cir. 1997) (estate allegedly stopped payments it owed to plaintiff because plaintiff exercised rights under an ERISA plan);Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F. Supp. 735, 740-41 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (employer accused of discriminating against and intimidating the employee into accepting benefits inferior to those to which the employee was entitled). If the Plaintiffs' theory were adopted, any denial of benefits under the LTD Plan would lead to a claim under section 510 of ERISA. Any loss of other benefits may be addressed in the individual section 502(a)(1)(B) claims. Unless they are entitled to benefits under the LTD Plan, the loss of other collateral benefits is irrelevant.
E. Failure to Provide Plan Documents
Section 502(c) of ERISA addresses an administrator's failure to comply with requests for information from plan participants. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). It provides that a plan administrator may be subject to fines of up to one hundred dollars per day for failure to comply with such requests for information. The Reliastar Defendants assert that dismissal of this Count is proper because they were not the administrators of the LTD Plan at issue. An administrator is statutorily defined as the person specifically designated as administrator by the terms of the plan, or, if no one is designated, the plan sponsor. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). There is no dispute in this case that Coca-Cola is both the designated plan administrator and the plan sponsor. The Plaintiffs, however, contend that the Reliastar Defendants acted as the de facto administrator of the LTD Plan, and that they therefore should be subject to the requirements and fines of ERISA section 502(c).
The Eleventh Circuit case of Hunt v. Hawthorne Associates. Inc., 119 F.3d 888 (11th Cir. 1997), dealing with a pension plan for Eastern Airlines' pilots, is instructive on this issue. In that case, the Court of Appeals addressed, on an appeal from summary judgment, the issue of whether an entity given responsibility for administrative functions of an ERISA plan could be considered the de facto plan administrator under section 502(c). The court first reaffirmed the Circuit's previous holding that in some cases, an entity which is not named as the plan administrator nor the plan sponsor, must be treated as the de facto plan administrator for ERISA purposes. Id. at 914-15 (reaffirming Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191 (11th Cir. 1992)). The court then went on to examine the facts of the case and ultimately determined that there was no de facto plan administrator present. Id. at 915. In declining to find there was a de facto plan administrator in Hunt, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the putative de facto administrator assumed any of the responsibilities for disseminating information addressed by section 502(c). The court stated that "the record is devoid of evidence that the TAC had assumed any of Eastern's duties regarding the provision of information to participants. We therefore hold that Hunt has failed to support his contention that the TAC functioned as de facto Plan Administrator." Hunt, 119 Fad at 915. The implication of such a holding is that if there had been evidence that the Trust Administrative Committee assumed some ofEastern's duties regarding dissemination of information, the court would have found it appropriate to let that issue proceed to trial. That holding is pertinent to the instant case because the Plaintiffs alleged in their First Amended Complaint that the Moving Defendants assumed responsibility for providing information about the plan and plan documents to participants. (First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 195-196.) If these facts are proven, the Plaintiffs may be able to show that the Reliastar Defendants were de facto plan administrators for the LTD Plan. Assuming all the facts pleaded in the complaint are true, it is improper to dismiss Count VI as to Reliastar at this juncture before there has been any discovery on this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Reliastar Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 59 73] are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Coca-Cola Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 60-1] is GRANTED. The First Amended Complaint is dismissed except for the named Plaintiffs' claims for benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) in Count I, the named Plaintiffs' claims under section 502(c) as detailed in Count VI, and Byars' Equal Pay Act Claim in Count VII. The class action claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Motion to Remand [Doc. 60-2] is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.