Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Ct. No. BS109684, James C. Chalfant, Judge.
J. Scott Cramer for Petitioner and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
CROSKEY, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (§ 1094.5) petition for administrative mandamus. The petitioner is Janel Buycks (petitioner). By her petition she sought relief from the denial, by the respondent California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Appeals Board), of her claim for unemployment insurance benefits.
In denying her section 1094.5 petition, the trial court determined that under the independent judgment test applied by the court, the weight of the evidence in the administrative record supported the denial of unemployment insurance benefits. We have examined the record and find no cause to reverse the trial court’s judgment, and therefore it will be affirmed.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
1. Procedural Events
In her operative section 1094.5 petition for mandamus relief, petitioner alleged she was employed by the American Cancer Society beginning in April 2005 as a full time staff assistant and quit the job in March 2006. She alleged that she quit because her safety was at risk there and because “discrimination was used as a basis for her treatment at the place of her employment.”
Petitioner proceeded in propria persona in the administrative proceedings as well as in the trial court. However, she is represented by counsel in her appeal to this court. Neither the respondent Appeals Board nor real party in interest American Cancer Society filed opposition points and authorities or appeared at the hearing on the section 1094.5 petition. Nor have they filed briefs in this appeal.
Petitioner filed a claim for unemployment compensation which was denied pursuant to California Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256 (§ 1256) when an examiner in the California Employment Development Department determined petitioner was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she voluntarily quit her job without good cause. Petitioner appealed the Department’s decision and her appeal was heard by an appeals board administrative law judge (ALJ) who issued a decision which affirmed the examiner’s determination. Petitioner then filed an appeal of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Board which affirmed the decision of the ALJ. Thereafter she filed her section 1094.5 petition for administrative mandamus which was denied by the superior court. This timely appeal followed.
Section 1256 provides in relevant part that “[a]n individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she left his or her most recent work voluntarily without good cause.... ”
2. Evidence Produced at the Administrative Hearing
Petitioner produced both oral and documentary evidence at the administrative hearing. During her testimony, petitioner described conditions in her work environment, in her position of staff assistant with the American Cancer Society, that she asserted produced stress sufficient to cause her to take sick leave days off from work. She stated these stressful conditions commenced with a work related incident in November 2005 and resulted in her having a stress produced medical condition. After she filed a harassment charge related to the incident, “some things [came] up in my medical history that I wasn’t used to.” Weeks later she resigned because of her medical condition.
Petitioner stated she became ill in the beginning of December 2005. When the ALJ asked her what her medical condition is, petitioner declined to say. Instead, she produced a letter from her doctor, dated May 9, 2006. The letter only states petitioner “was seen on a monthly basis in clinic as well as having periodic blood testing from December 2005 through April 2006.” Petitioner stated the stress producing incident at work concerned a new employee, Laura Smith. Petitioner stated Smith made statements about petitioner’s “character as an individual in the... company” but not about petitioner’s work. Smith worked in another department as a manager and was not petitioner’s supervisor, but the two departments worked closely together. Because petitioner’s department was understaffed due to people leaving, she and the other remaining workers were given more responsibilities to take up the slack.
Asked whether her medical condition was the only thing that caused her to resign, petitioner stated that even if there were no medical condition she would have resigned anyway for another reason, namely that she was subjected to retaliation because she filed a claim of harassment against Smith. Her harassment claim was filed in November 2005.
Petitioner stated that Smith felt that petitioner was uncooperative and it was difficult to communicate with petitioner. However, petitioner acknowledged that their employer was satisfied with petitioner’s work and she was never written up or disciplined. Petitioner stated that because Smith was making work difficult, petitioner tried talking to Smith and that resulted in Smith complaining to one of petitioner’s supervisors. The supervisor spoke with the operations manager, and then with petitioner and others, and the latter conversation was memorialized in an e-mail from the supervisor to petitioner.
In the e-mail, the supervisor stated that during a meeting between herself, petitioner, Smith and two other employees, Smith’s perception of petitioner’s attitude was discussed, including petitioner’s eye contact, body language, gesturing and tone. The supervisor acknowledged that petitioner believed that if someone has a negative reaction to her it is their problem and petitioner should not have to change herself. The supervisor also stated that petitioner is a capable employee but should be aware of how her body language and tone communicate to others because a work environment involves give and take. The e-mail is dated November 29, 2005.
The supervisor’s e-mail ends with this sentence: “We agreed that in order to maintain decorum and a code of conduct that is necessary to a conducive work environment, you will be aware of how your body language and tone communicates to others.” However, petitioner stated at the administrative hearing that she made no such agreement and after receiving the supervisor’s e-mail she filed a complaint with the employer’s human resources director, Lou Johnstone, alleging harassment by Smith. Asked if Smith did anything to her in between the day the supervisor sent the e-mail to petitioner and the day petitioner filed a complaint of harassment against Smith, petitioner answered: “Not that I know of.” Petitioner stated an investigation on her claim of harassment was conducted with the result that no fault on the part of Smith was found.
The administrative record contains a letter from the human resources director Johnstone to petitioner dated December 21, 2005. According to that letter, the alleged harassment by Smith of which petitioner complained occurred at a meeting called by Smith that was attended by petitioner and two of petitioners co-workers. The director stated in the letter that “none of the other participants” in that meeting (apparently meaning the two co-workers) “perceived [Smith’s] behavior toward you as inappropriate. They did note that you were unresponsive to [Smith’s] questions and concluded that it was an uncomfortable situation and that there was some sort of communication issue between you and [Smith].” The director added that there was no evidence of inappropriate behavior by Smith towards petitioner, and the director stated: “I cannot conclude that [Smith’s] behavior was intended to do anything other than solicit a response from you after a question was asked.”
In the letter, the director also stated she interviewed two of petitioner’s supervisors, and the operations manager, and those three people all stated they had observed body language from petitioner which can be considered to reflect petitioner being disengaged or even disrespectful (petitioner putting her head down, folding her arms, and not looking at the speaker). The director advised petitioner such body language is likely to be perceived by most people in the same way, whether petitioner intends that or not. The director suggested that petitioner take the feedback given to her by the supervisor and director in a positive way and practice other types of body language “so that your intentions will not be misinterpreted in the future.” The letter adds that petitioner’s ability to perform her duties at work was not in question and the members of the management team with whom the director spoke were satisfied with petitioner’s overall performance.
Additionally, the letter stated that petitioner’s supervisor assured the director that the November 29, 2005 e-mail sent to petitioner was intended only to be a confirmation of the meeting between petitioner and the supervisor, and not intended as a disciplinary measure. The letter stated that the employer “does not condone harassment in any form nor does it tolerate retaliation against employees who file complaints or participate in investigations of those complaints.” However, petitioner stated at the administrative hearing that retaliation did occur when she was assigned, by the operations manager, to a new supervisor. Petitioner stated her new supervisor was Germaine Cameros and her original supervisor was Gail Nakasaki.
The November 29, 2005 e-mail was sent to petitioner by Ms. Nakasaki, who signed it as “interim supervisor.” There is another e-mail from Nakasaki to petitioner, also dated November 29, 2005, in which Nakasaki referred to herself as having been petitioner’s “direct supervisor earlier this year.” The December 21, 2005 letter to petitioner from human resources director Johnstone identifies Ms. Cameros as petitioner’s supervisor.
Petitioner told the ALJ she was also retaliated against in January 2006 when her request for flex time was denied. She stated she asked for the change in schedule because she felt her immune system was negatively impacted by what occurred at work. She was weak and sick all the time, she had migraine headaches and her eye hurt, and she was “taking off more days than what [she] had taken off before.” She stated the doctor told her to take a couple of days off work. Asked why she did not have the doctor provide her employer with a written request for flex time, she stated she did not think of it. She stated her schedule was Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. She stated that when she asked her employer for flex time she did not say that she needed it for medical reasons because “they didn’t need to know that. I didn’t want them to know what’s going on with me.” So, she gave “other reasons” for why she was requesting flex time, specifically, that she wanted to participate in a volunteer program at a hospital that “was tied with [her employer].” Petitioner stated she believed not allowing her to have the flex time was retaliation because the supervisor who denied the request, Ms. Cameros, had “something personal against me because of this investigation that I had asked for because she was part of the party being investigated and things like that.”
Petitioner stated that she was also retaliated against because she was given additional work to do. The additional duties came about because the department in which Ms. Smith worked was understaffed and so petitioner and others were given work from that department to do. She mentioned to her supervisor that she was concerned she would not be able to accomplish all the duties that her own job entailed but her supervisor opined that petitioner would be able to “get it all done.” Other employees had the same concern. Petitioner stated she did everything that was asked of her.
Petitioner stated she resigned after she had been off work a week due to laryngitis. She resigned because she “was getting sick too often” and she did not think her body could “handle it anymore.” She stated that for the months of January and February 2006 she was off work for medical reasons for a total of 15 days. She did not have doctor’s notes for those days. Her employer did not write her up for the absences and did not complain about them, and she had accumulated sufficient sick days to cover the absences.
The ALJ noted that petitioner did not explain to her employer that she had medical conditions stemming from the stressful matter relating to Smith, and petitioner did not ask for a medical leave of absence for her medical condition. The ALJ stated that a medical leave of absence would have guaranteed petitioner her job when she returned, and the ALJ asked petitioner why she did not seek the leave of absence. Petitioner replied that since her employer had already denied her request for flex time work in January 2006, she assumed the employer would not grant her a medical leave of absence in early March of that same year, and so she resigned.
In Lewis v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 729, 741-742, the court stated that during the period of a voluntary leave of absence, the employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he or she left the job without good cause.
The employer’s operations manager, Valerie Meyer, testified at the administrative hearing that she was not aware petitioner was taking sick days but petitioner’s supervisor would know. The employees were required to give their supervisor a doctor’s note if absent more than three days. Meyer stated she could not recall why petitioner had a change in supervisors but it was not due to petitioner’s claim of harassment.
Regarding petitioner’s description of being given extra work, Meyer stated that all of the people who work as staff assistants, including petitioner, have “major responsibilities,” and they also have “minor responsibilities” which are “assisting other Departments when we have events going on.” Petitioner’s request for flex time was not approved because her regular time “best suited the employer with the responsibilities that she had.” The employer used flex time to accommodate those employees who have to attend an event in the evening, thus allowing them to come to work later than usual so that no overtime would be paid, or take off a Friday if they have to work on a Saturday.
Regarding petitioner’s conflict with Ms. Smith, Meyer stated that the employer took the situation seriously and had its human relations person from Oakland, California, Ms. Johnstone, come to address the matter. Asked if petitioner would have been given a leave of absence if she asked for one, Meyer stated that the employer granted a leave of absence whenever a doctor recommended that an employee take such a leave, and for privacy reasons the exact diagnosis of the employee’s medical situation would not have to be revealed. Meyer stated the employer had no plans to discharge petitioner, petitioner had never been reprimanded or written up, and she was relatively satisfied with petitioner’s work. She added that in her opinion petitioner resigned voluntarily and there was no indication that it was because of a medical condition.
3. The Trial Court’s Determination
Hearing on the section 1094.5 petition was held on May 27, 2008. The trial court issued a tentative ruling, which it adopted as its final ruling. Citing the holding in Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 774 et seq., the court stated that in considering the merits of the petition for administrative mandamus, the court applied the independent judgment test because decisions granting or denying unemployment insurance benefits involve a fundamental right.
The court set out the facts of this case that occurred prior to petitioner leaving her employment, and analyzed those facts with respect to whether they would support petitioner’s unemployment compensation claim, finding that such support could not reasonably be found from the facts. Petitioner’s requested mandamus relief was denied and a judgment of denial was signed and filed on June 24, 2008.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Petitioner contends there was prejudicial error and abuse of discretion when the ALJ declined to develop a full record of events concerning petitioner’s employment with the American Cancer Society. Specifically, petitioner asserts the ALJ refused to accept into evidence (1) all of petitioner’s time cards from her employment with the American Cancer Society; (2) certain e-mails; (3) a list of people who retired or resigned from work at the American Cancer Society in the time between when petitioner began working there and when she resigned; and (4) the above mentioned December 2005 letter to petitioner from human resources director Johnstone, which is identified in petitioner’s appellate brief as a human resources investigative report.
Petitioner also contends the ALJ’s conclusion that petitioner did not have good cause to quit her job was an abuse of discretion that prejudiced petitioner’s right to unemployment benefits.
DISCUSSION
1. The Record Does Not Support the Claim of Prejudicial Exclusion of Evidence
a. Time Cards and E-Mails
At the administrative hearing, petitioner sought to introduce all of her time cards from her employment at the American Cancer Society. The ALJ declined to admit all of them, saying she only wanted the ones that would “show me what we’re talking about.” The ALJ added: “I want to see how many times you were out ill.” Petitioner’s theory of her case, as presented to this court in her appellate brief, is that she was “an employee who only in her last few months prior to leaving [the American Cancer Society] substantially increased her sick leave time,” and had she been permitted to introduce all of her time cards at the administrative hearing, the entirety of those cards “would have shown an employee progressively using more and more of her sick time leave hours as she dealt with her increasing stressful office work environment.” Petitioner also asserts prejudice because the ALJ declined to accept into evidence e mails petitioner sent to human resources or the operations manager which state petitioner was not at work because she was ill.
The record shows the ALJ questioned both petitioner and the representative from the American Cancer Society who attended the administrative hearing about petitioner’s absences during petitioner’s last few months of employment, which is the period of time that petitioner asserted she was ill from conditions at work. Petitioner points to nothing in the record that indicates that the ALJ did not believe her presentation about her pattern of sick leave absences from work, that is, did not believe that the bulk of petitioner’s sick leave days occurred in the few months before she left her job. Rather, just the opposite is true. The ALJ stated she did believe petitioner’s representations. The ALJ indicated she did not need to see the e-mails offered by petitioner because (1) petitioner had already told the ALJ about her sick leave absences and (2) the ALJ believed her. Thus, petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice from the time cards and the e-mails not being admitted into evidence.
b. Employment List
Petitioner also sought to introduce into evidence a list of people whom she told the ALJ were working for the American Cancer Society when she first began working there but whose retirement or resignation by the time petitioner left her job had increased the amount of work those left at the office had to do. The ALJ stated she would not accept the list into evidence. However, the ALJ did question the employer’s operations manager about the list. The ALJ noted, from looking at the list, that “it looks like seven or eight people left. Does that necessarily mean [petitioner] was given more assignments?” The operations manager answered that petitioner “would have been given some assignments to pick up the slack absolutely.” In her appellate brief, petitioner states this staff shortage “created and contributed to Petitioner’s harsh stress-related office working environment and was a source of Petitioner’s stress [and] contributed to the unhealthy office turbulence.” Given that the ALJ did examine the list and did question the employer’s witness about it, there was no prejudice when the ALJ did not admit the physical list into evidence.
c. The December 2005 Letter to Petitioner from Human Resources
Petitioner asserts the ALJ declined to accept into evidence “a copy of the Petitioner’s Human Resources investigation report.” This was the December 2005 letter/report sent to petitioner by the employer’s human resources department in response to the complaint filed by petitioner about employee Smith’s allegedly harassing petitioner and making accusations against her. We observe that page 46 of the reporter’s transcript of the administrative hearing shows that the letter/investigation report was actually received into evidence. The letter is found in the “exhibits” portion of the administrative record.
2. The Record Does Not Support Petitioner’s Claim of Good Cause to Resign
a. Meaning of the Term “Good Cause”
As noted in footnote 2, ante, section 1256 provides that an individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she left his or her most recent work voluntarily without good cause. Petitioner admits she left her job with the American Cancer Society voluntarily, however, she asserts she had good cause to do so.
“The term ‘good cause’ is not susceptible of precise definition. In fact, its definition varies with the context in which it is used. Very broadly, it means a legally sufficient ground or reason for a certain action.” (Zorrero v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 434, 439.) Whether there is “good cause” within the context of section 1256 is a question of law and the answer is found in the facts of each case, not in the abstract. (Ibid; MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 205, 209.) Good cause “requires that voluntary termination of employment be based on serious and exigent circumstances.” (Zorrero, at p. 439.) “[T]he quitting must be for such a cause as would, in a similar situation, reasonably motivate the average able-bodied and qualified worker to give up his or her employment with its certain wage rewards in order to enter the ranks of the unemployed. [Citation.]” (Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1016.)
b. Appellate Standard of Review of the Trial Court’s Determination Regarding Good Cause
“On appeal, after the superior court has applied its independent judgment to the evidence, all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all reasonable inferences made to uphold the court’s finding [citation].” (Cerberonics, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 172, 176.) Nevertheless, the Cerberonics court observed that this substantial evidence standard of appellate review is not applicable when the facts are not in dispute and the inferences from the facts all point one way. Then, the issue for the reviewing court is one of law.
Here, petitioner asserts “the critical facts are not in dispute” and therefore we may use our independent judgment to determine whether she was properly denied unemployment benefits. However, it matters not which standard of review we apply. The facts of this case point to only one reasonable conclusion of law—there was no good cause for petitioner to quit her employment with the American Cancer Society.
c. Analysis of the Good Cause Issue
Petitioner testified at the administrative hearing that she quit her job both because of her medical condition and because she believed the employer had retaliated against her for making a claim of harassment against Smith. She stated that because of the retaliation she would have quit even if she did not have a medical condition. Conversely, she stated she would have quit because of her medical condition even if she had not been retaliated against. The latter statement was given to the following question by the ALJ: “Let’s assume you had no problems with your coworkers or with retaliation or any of that, would you have left because of your medical problems?” Petitioner answered: “Correct.” The record shows that besides her problems with coworkers and retaliation, petitioner attributed her medical condition to the extra work given to her.
As noted above, petitioner claimed retaliation in being assigned a new supervisor, being denied flex time, and being given additional work to do.
We find no merit in petitioner’s contention that her “medical condition” constituted a good cause reason for leaving her job. Petitioner declined to indicate to the ALJ the nature of her medical condition except to say that it that was related to her immune system. Her evidence of a medical condition was essentially (1) her testimony that conditions in her work environment produced stress sufficient to cause her to take sick leave days off from work and (2) her production of a letter from her doctor, written after petitioner quit her job, which only states she “was seen on a monthly basis in clinic as well as having periodic blood testing from December 2005 through April 2006.” This did not constitute evidence of a medical condition sufficiently serious to warrant a good faith and reasonable conclusion on petitioner’s part that she needed to quit her job because of her health.
Further, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the employer did not give petitioner good cause to quit because of a medical condition. We find no merit in petitioner’s contention that her employer was on notice that she had “stress induced health issues” or a medical condition. The mere fact that petitioner used sick leave more often in the few months prior to her quitting than she had used it before does not constitute notice on the part of the employer. For all the employer knew, petitioner’s increased absences could have been due to a variety of matters unrelated to each other and to her employment, such as, for example, the flu, a cold, a sprain, a sinus headache, and a dental problem. There is no evidence the employer denied petitioner a sick leave or some other medical accommodation. Indeed, there is no evidence petitioner requested such accommodations. She only asked for flex time to be able to do volunteer work.
Moreover, good cause to quit cannot be based on petitioner’s difficulties with (1) Ms. Smith, (2) the human resources director’s finding of no inappropriate behavior on the part of Smith, and (3) the retaliation petitioner perceived in (a) being denied flex time, (b) being given new responsibilities and (c) being given a new supervisor. These “stressors” call to mind the observation made by various courts regarding what constitutes an adverse employment action with respect to claims brought by an employee under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, to wit, that workplaces are not usually “ ‘idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is displeased by an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially adverse employment action.’ ” (Thomas v. Department of Corrections (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 507, 511; accord McRae v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 386. Petitioner’s work environment, even if it was truly as she perceived it to be, did not rise to the serious and exigent circumstances necessary to constitute good cause for quitting her job. It was not so onerous that it would reasonably motivate the average worker to give up his or her job. This case is not similar to McCrocklin v. Employment Development Dept. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1067, where the reviewing court found good cause to leave employment from the facts that the claimant employee was forced to work in an inadequately ventilated space filled with tobacco smoke, he had a reasonable fear of the harmful effects of second hand smoke, and one of his co-employees smoked a brand of cigarettes that made the claimant’s throat raw and his eyes water.
DISPOSITION
The judgment from which petitioner has appealed is affirmed. The respondent Appeals Board shall recover its costs on appeal.
We Concur: KLEIN, P. J., ALDRICH, J.