A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed by the appellate courts unless it clearly appears that the judge abused his discretion in this regard. Moore v. State, 202 Ga. 357 (2) ( 43 S.E.2d 251); Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 (1) ( 83 S.E.2d 610); Harris v. State, 211 Ga. 327, 328 ( 85 S.E.2d 770); Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231 (1) ( 91 S.E.2d 764); Hall v. State, 213 Ga. 557 (1) ( 100 S.E.2d 176). The motion for a continuance in this case is based on the ground of inflammatory newspaper publicity concerning the crime and stands on substantially the same footing as a motion for a change of venue on that ground. While there was a general showing that the newspaper in which the alleged inflammatory articles had been carried was widely read in Gainesville and in Hall County, Georgia, where the trial was to be held, there was no showing that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in Hall County or that the jurors who had been summoned to try the case had read the articles and formed fixed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the accused from reading them, or that the right of the accused to have a fair and impartial jury could not be adequately protected by his right of challenge to the poll, to have v
"The granting of a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and this court will not interfere unless it is clearly shown that he has abused his discretion." Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 (1) ( 83 S.E.2d 610). 2.
The record contains none of the evidence adduced upon the hearing of the motion on January 25, 1959, and this court has no way of determining whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion in overruling these grounds of the motion for new trial. Hall v. State, 141 Ga. 7 ( 80 S.E. 307); Tolie v. State, 184 Ga. 518 ( 192 S.E. 35); Kennedy v. State, 191 Ga. 22 (6) ( 11 S.E.2d 179); Verdery v. Campbell, 203 Ga. 211 ( 46 S.E.2d 66); Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 ( 83 S.E.2d 610). 6. It was not error for any reason assigned to deny the motion for a new trial as amended.
Code § 81-1419 provides that all applications for continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and nothing is shown in the record, bill of exceptions, or the briefs from which it can be said that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the continuance. See Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 ( 83 S.E.2d 610); Harris v. State, 211 Ga. 327 ( 85 S.E.2d 770); Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231 ( 91 S.E.2d 764); Hall v. State, 213 Ga. 557 ( 100 S.E.2d 176). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
1. Where, on motion for continuance, it appeared that counsel were appointed on Monday to represent this defendant as well as two others, all indicted for the murder of the same man while in the commission of a robbery, and they tried the other defendants on Wednesday and Thursday, and the present case was called for trial on Friday, and the motion indicated no information or investigation which the movant desired, but the merely sought more time, we can not hold that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion. McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55 (2) ( 52 S.E.2d 294); Blackston v. State, 209 Ga. 160 (2) ( 71 S.E.2d 221); Starr v. State, 209 Ga. 258 (1) ( 71 S.E.2d 654); Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 (1a) ( 83 S.E.2d 610); Harris v. State, 211 Ga. 327 (1) ( 85 S.E.2d 770); Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231 (1) ( 91 S.E.2d 764). 2.
However when the office is created by special statute under which he is named by the county board of education and is not elected by the voters, he is held to be an officer of the board and not of the county. Richter v. Board of Education, 149 Ga. 32 ( 99 S.E. 28). On the other hand, members of the board of tax assessors ( Barnes v. Watson, 148 Ga. 822 (4), 98 S.E. 500), a county registrar ( Andrews v. Butts County, 29 Ga. App. 302, 114 S.E. 912), a justice of the peace ( Davis v. Mercer, 48 Ga. App. 191, 192, 172 S.E. 669), a notary public and ex-officio justice of the peace ( Overton v. Gandy, 170 Ga. 562, 153 S.E. 520), the Solicitor of the City Court of Dublin ( Graham v. Merritt, 165 Ga. 489, 141 S.E. 298), the Marshal of the Municipal Court of Atlanta ( Strickland v. Houston, 173 Ga. 615 (2), 161 S.E. 262), and a grand juror ( Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 (2), 83 S.E.2d 610) have been held not to be county officers. Is a deputy sheriff a "county officer"?
In view of these facts this court cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion. See Harris v. State, 119 Ga. 114 (1) ( 45 S.E. 973); Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 (1) ( 83 S.E.2d 610); Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227 ( 9 S.E.2d 241). Special ground 1 is without merit. 3. Special ground 2 of the amended motion is an amplification of the general grounds which complains that there is no evidence in the record that the defendant cut and beat the prosecutor, Flanders, with a sharp instrument as charged in the indictment.
Where, as here, the defendant on the morning of the trial announced ready as to an indictment charging him with molesting a minor child, and where, during the morning, this indictment was quashed and another returned identical in all respects with the first, except that certain portions of the anatomy were described by their technical rather than their colloquial terminology, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a continuance based on the sole ground that sufficient time had not been granted counsel to examine the new indictment and prepare his defense thereunder. See, in this connection, Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16 (1) ( 83 S.E.2d 610). 2.