One court summarized: โA rule of court may go beyond the provisions of a related statuteโ only โ so long as it reasonably furthers the statutory purpose. ( Butterfield v. Butterfield (1934) 1 Cal.2d 227, 228, 34 P.2d 145 [rule requiring points and authorities in support of motion for change of venue]; Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 29[210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134] [rule limiting time to file opposition to summary judgment motion].) However, if a statute even implicitly or inferentially reflects a legislative choice to require a particular procedure, a rule of court may not deviate from that procedure.
One court summarized: โA rule of court may go beyond the provisions of a related statuteโ only โ so long as it reasonably furthers the statutory purpose. (Butterfield v. Butterfield (1934) 1 Cal.2d 227, 228, 34 P.2d 145 [rule requiring points and authorities in support of motion for change of venue]; Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 29[210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134] [rule limiting time to file opposition to summary judgment motion].) However, if a statute even implicitly or inferentially reflects a legislative choice to require a particular procedure, a rule of court may not deviate from that procedure.
A rule of court may go beyond the provisions of a related statute so long as it reasonably furthers the statutory purpose. ( Butterfield v. Butterfield (1934) 1 Cal.2d 227, 228 [ 34 P.2d 145] [rule requiring points and authorities in support of motion for change of venue]; Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 29 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134] [rule limiting time to file opposition to summary judgment motion].) However, if a statute even implicitly or inferentially reflects a legislative choice to require a particular procedure, a rule of court may not deviate from that procedure.
2]; Grady v. Easley, 45 Cal.App.2d 632 [ 114 P.2d 635]; Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715 [ 299 P.2d 257]; Southern Pacific Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal.App.2d 353 [ 333 P.2d 133].) [6b] Inasmuch as a measure of liberality has been shown in the application of the summary judgment procedure to the end that the opposing party may not be summarily deprived of the use of the full hearing available at the trial of an action and the rights incident thereto, and inasmuch as section 437c contains no limitation on the right of the party to counteraffidavits filed prior to the time of the hearing, we conclude strict adherence to the rule of practice limiting the time within which opposing affidavits must be filed on a motion for summary judgment to the day before the hearing thereon (rule (6)), to be inconsistent and in conflict with the procedural requirements established by statutory provisions (ยง 437c; Conae v. Conae, 109 Cal.App.2d 696 [ 241 P.2d 266]; Henry v. Willett, 60 Cal.App. 244 [ 212 P. 698]; Butterfield v. Butterfield, 1 Cal.2d 227 [ 34 P.2d 145]) and to deprive him of his statutory rights ( People v. McClellan, 31 Cal. 101; Dikkers v. Superior Court, 88 Cal.App.2d 816 [ 199 P.2d 709]); and to the extent that it applies to motions for summary judgment, rule (6) is void and unenforceable. Moreover, we note that rule (6) provides that affidavits not filed concurrently with a motion "should" be filed not later than noon of the day preceding the date of hearing, which seems only to import a duty or moral obligation of counsel, as an officer of the court, to conduct his affairs in the law and motion department according to the accepted practice of that court to the end that business therein may be properly expedited ( Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal.2d 83 [ 156 P.2d 441]), rather than to make such filing mandatory.
An order attempting to add requirements to those prescribed by a statute is to such an extent a nullity and void. ( Cf. Butterfield v. Butterfield, 1 Cal.2d 227, 228 [ 34 P.2d 145]; Henry v. Willett, 60 Cal.App. 244, 252 [ 212 P. 698].) Therefore since the provision in the court's order that it be served upon plaintiff personally was a nullity it was properly disregarded at the time of the hearing.
The respondent relies on the appellant's failure to comply with rule XIX of the Rules of the Superior Court, which provides that a memorandum of points and authorities relied on must be served and filed with the notice of motion. Under almost exactly similar circumstances the Supreme Court in Butterfield v. Butterfield, 1 Cal.2d 227 [ 34 P.2d 145], affirmed an order denying a motion for change of venue. It was there said: "Appellant had a statutory right to a change of venue upon a proper showing of grounds therefor; and the rule requiring points and authorities is a reasonable provision in furtherance of the statutory purpose.
But in any event the point is not sound. A failure to comply with the rule relating to points and authorities may justify a denial of the motion ( Butterfield v. Butterfield, 1 Cal.2d 227 [ 34 P.2d 145]), but we have found no case holding that it is error for the trial court to make an order, otherwise proper, merely because the moving party failed to comply with the rule. [2] The second point raised by appellant is that the trial court erred in striking out the proposed bill rather than giving leave to amend.
(See Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 762.) The rules of court are intended to refine and explain the procedure set forth in the statutory scheme ( Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1093-1094; Butterfield v. Butterfield (1934) 1 Cal.2d 227, 228), consistently with legislative and constitutional law ( In re Dorothy B. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 509, 516; Paul D. v. SuperiorCourt (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 838, 841). Rule 45(e) is among those appellate rules for the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal that have general application in both civil and criminal cases.
The rule though going beyond 7-705, I.C.A., does not conflict therewith. ( Butterfield v. Butterfield (Cal.), 34 P.2d 145.) The rule was therefore authorized and is valid, McAllister v. Erickson, 45 Idaho 211, 261 P. 242, and is necessary and salutary to avoid congestion on the calendar of derelict suits, and the learned trial court was completely justified in dismissing the case.
For this proposition, the But assuming a plaintiff might have actually relied on the general order's split-cause-of-action rationale in filing an action in the San Francisco Superior Court, the next question is whether that reliance was justified. A statute controls over any inconsistent local rule (Gov.Code, ยง 68070, subd. (a); Butterfield v. Butterfield (1934) 1 Cal.2d 227, 228, 34 P.2d 145; Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 28, 210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134) or policy (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children etc. Services v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1267, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 613; Wisniewski v. Clary (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 499, 504-505, 120 Cal.Rptr. 176), and a local general order is but a manifestation of a local rule or policy for this purpose (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 981(b)(2)).