Opinion
C083314
08-20-2018
In re R.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. BUTTE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.B., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. J37559)
The primary adults in the subject minor's life include her birth mother (A.P.) (mother), her biological father (C.B.), her presumed father (J.P.), and mother's wife (M.B.). C.B., J.P., and M.B. each requested the juvenile court declare him/her to be the minor's presumed parent. The juvenile court granted J.P.'s request and declared him the minor's presumed parent, and denied C.B.'s and M.B.'s requests. In this appeal, M.B. contends the juvenile court's order denying her presumed parent status was not supported by the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
M.B.'s motion for calendar preference, filed July 25, 2018, is denied as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2015, the Tehama County Department of Social Services filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of the minor based on the minor's mother's failure to adequately supervise the minor, failure to seek appropriate and adequate medical care for the minor, and substance abuse issues. The petition further alleged that the minor's alleged father, C.B., had a significant criminal history involving sexual crimes against children. The minor was detained and the juvenile court subsequently sustained the allegations of the petition.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Prior to the disposition hearing, mother informed the social worker that she and her girlfriend, M.B., were getting back together and getting married. Mother had previously moved from Butte County to Tehama County after her relationship with M.B. had ended. On February 18, 2015, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent and ordered that reunification services be provided to mother. After her marriage, mother moved back to Butte County. The minor was returned to her custody under a plan of family maintenance and, in April 2015, the case was transferred to the Butte County Superior Court. The minor lived with mother, M.B., and M.B.'s daughter.
The Butte County Department of Employment and Social Services (the Department) filed a 12-month review report dated March 24, 2016, recommending termination of jurisdiction and dismissal of the dependency, stating that the minor's needs were being met and that mother would not benefit from further services. By the time of the May 4, 2016 hearing, however, circumstances had changed. Mother had not been engaging in her program, had failed to maintain stable housing, and wanted to "get away" from M.B. because she "was controlling and emotionally abusive." On April 28, 2016, the minor was taken into protective custody and the Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387 that same day.
On June 23, 2016, M.B. filed a Statement Regarding Parentage on Form JV-505, asking the juvenile court to find her to be a presumed parent of the minor. On August 11, 2016, M.B. also filed a motion, pursuant to Family Code sections 7611 and 7612, subdivision (c), seeking presumed parent status and placement as the minor's "noncustodial parent." C.B. and J.P. had also filed JV-505 forms seeking to be declared the minor's presumed parent.
The juvenile court first heard testimony and argument regarding C.B.'s request for presumed parent status. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ruled that C.B. was merely a biological father and had failed to establish that he qualified as a presumed father. Testimony was then received from M.B. and mother as to M.B.'s request. Thereafter, the juvenile court denied M.B.'s request to be found the minor's presumed parent. Additional testimony was then received from J.P. and mother, after which the juvenile court found J.P. to be the minor's presumed father.
Additional facts are found in the discussion.
DISCUSSION
M.B. contends the juvenile court's order denying her presumed parent status was not supported by the evidence.
"Designation as a presumed parent is critical in dependency proceedings because it entitles the presumed parent to appointed counsel, custody absent a finding of detriment and a reunification plan (§§ 317, subd. (a); 361.2, subd. (a); 361.5, subd. (a))." (In re Salvador M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1357.) A person may be presumed to be the natural parent of a child if he or she receives the child into his or her home and openly holds the child out as his or her natural child. (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d) [presumed father]; In re Karen C. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 932, 938 [presumed mother].) Once the presumption of parentage arises, it may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence. (Fam. Code, § 7612.)
Presumptive parent-child relationships, regardless of their lack of foundation in biology, are protected because society has an interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child relationships that give children social and emotional strength and stability. (Steven W. v. Matthew S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1116.) The presumptions are driven by the state's interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family. (In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 65.) The familial relationship resulting from years of living together in a purported parent/child relationship " ' " ' "should not be lightly dissolved." ' " ' " (Ibid.)
We review the lower court's determination of presumed parentage status, including its findings whether M.B. accepted the minor into her home and openly held her out as her natural child, under the substantial evidence standard. (Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 368, disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532, fn. 7; In re A.A. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 771, 782.) " 'Under that standard, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citations.] [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.' " (Charisma R., at p. 369.)
Here, M.B. testified she met mother in June 2014, when the minor was almost one year old. At that time, mother and the minor were living with J.P. M.B. and mother entered into a committed relationship and began living together in August 2014, after mother and J.P. ended their relationship. Except for a period of time before she and mother married on February 7, 2015, she and mother lived together (with M.B.'s father) until they separated on April 19, 2016. M.B. testified she considered the minor to be her daughter and held her out as her own child—although she does not recall exactly when she began doing that. The minor began referring to her as "Mom," "Mom M[.]," or "Mommy M[.]" in November 2015. It was recognized within their circle of friends that J.P. was the minor's father, and M.B. was the minor's "other mom." The minor has always referred to, and considered J.P., as her father and their relationship was consistent with that of a father-daughter relationship.
M.B.'s supporting statement which was included in her motion was accepted by the juvenile court as testimony subject to cross-examination. M.B. also testified at the hearing on her motion.
M.B. testified that, during the time the minor lived with her, she and mother shared the responsibilities in caring for the minor, including feeding her, bathing her, changing her, reading to her, and comforting her. M.B. also provided financial support to the household. M.B. believed the minor was bonded to her. M.B. was willing to engage in services and do anything that was asked of her in order to obtain custody or placement. She had not sought placement earlier because the minor was placed in her home when the minor was returned to mother's custody.
At the juvenile court's request, mother also testified at the hearing on M.B.'s motion. Mother testified M.B. did not hold herself out to others as the minor's mother, but instead identified herself to friends as the minor's stepmother. The minor did not start calling M.B. "Mom" until November 2015. During the majority of her relationship with M.B., M.B. told the minor to stop calling her "Mom"—M.B. only started allowing it near the end of their relationship. M.B. told mother on more than one occasion that she did not want to develop a connection with the minor because she had had previous relationships fail and the children taken away, and she did not want that to happen again. Mother and M.B. told M.B.'s daughter and the minor that the girls were "sisters."
The juvenile court denied M.B.'s request for presumed parent status. In doing so, the juvenile court indicated it believed mother's testimony that M.B. had not held the minor out as her own, and had not done so to protect herself and the minor should the minor be taken away. She had, quite reasonably, maintained a distant relationship with the minor because she "didn't want to get too close to the child" in order to "protect the child and protect her own heart." The juvenile court did find M.B. played an important role in the minor's life, however, and declared her a de facto parent.
M.B. argues the evidence showed she considered the minor to be her daughter, considered herself to be the minor's "other mom," and never viewed herself as the minor's stepmother. But mother testified M.B. intentionally kept her relationship with the minor at a distance, did not hold the minor out as her own, resisted the minor referring to her as "Mom," and identified herself to friends as the minor's stepmother. M.B. argues that the evidence, nonetheless, establishes that she eventually did permit the minor to call her "Mom" and that she only initially resisted forming a close relationship with the minor. But mother's testimony was that M.B. resisted creating a parental bond with the minor throughout almost the entirety of their relationship and that, although M.B. eventually allowed the minor to call her "Mom," she identified herself to others as the minor's stepmother.
We do not reweigh evidence or disturb the juvenile court's credibility determinations. Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving conflicts in favor of the juvenile court's finding, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's ruling. (See R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 780.)
M.B. fares no better under her proposed standard that when a person has the burden of establishing presumed parent status and is challenging the finding that turns on a failure to satisfy the burden of proof at trial, the question becomes whether the evidence was (1) "uncontradicted and unimpeached" and (2) "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding," so as to compel a finding in her favor as a matter of law. (See Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) M.B.'s evidence that she held the minor out as her own was not "uncontradicted and unimpeached," nor was it "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding" to the contrary.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
RAYE, P. J. We concur: ROBIE, J. MURRAY, J.