Opinion
16-P-743
02-17-2017
Deborah BUTLER v. TOWN OF FRAMINGHAM & others.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Deborah Butler, a resident of Framingham (town) and an elected town meeting member, filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that the town unfairly burdens residential property owners by using different valuation formulas for assessing residential and commercial properties. Acting on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, a judge dismissed Butler's complaint on the ground that Butler, who owns no real property in Framingham and has neither been assessed nor paid property taxes in at least ten years, did not have a sufficient interest to proceed. We agree, and affirm.
Courts generally do not pass on questions of only academic interest and will address the merits of a claim only if the plaintiff has "standing," that is, if she has a "definite interest in the matters in contention in the sense that [her] rights will be significantly affected by a resolution of the contested point." Bonan v. Boston , 398 Mass. 315, 320 (1986). Owning no town property, and having herself paid no property taxes, Butler would be unaffected by any judgment addressing her allegations; therefore, she has no standing. See Slama v. Attorney Gen ., 384 Mass. 620, 624 (1981) ("To have standing in any capacity, a litigant must show that the challenged action has caused the litigant injury"). See also Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs , 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000), and cases cited.
The facts that Butler resides in the town (in her parents' home) and is an elected town meeting member do not give her representative standing or otherwise change our conclusion. In certain instances, a person without a sufficient individual interest may stand in for others when those who otherwise would have standing are unable to seek available remedies for themselves. See Slama , supra ; Arbella Mut. Ins. Co . v. Commissioner of Ins ., 456 Mass. 66, 83-84 (2010). That is not the case here. As the judge observed, the "plaintiff's parents or other residents have avenues to challenge their tax assessments." See, e.g., Shoppers' World, Inc . v. Assessors of Framingham , 348 Mass. 366, 370 (1965) (taxpayers may challenge disproportionate assessments via application for abatement and appeal to Appellate Tax Board). To the extent the town conceded Butler's representative standing, the judge properly disregarded the concession. See Goddard v. Goucher , 89 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45 (2016), quoting from Swift & Co . v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co ., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917) ("[T]he court cannot be controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law"). Nor do the materials Butler submitted in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion, such as the town meeting membership orientation materials or Butler's rejected citizen's petition, support an inference that either the town or anyone else authorized Butler to act on its behalf in any litigation.
Because Butler lacks standing, the judge properly dismissed the complaint.
Based on the view we take of this case, we need not address Butler's arguments on the merits.
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Judgment affirmed .