Opinion
No. 01-2433-KHV
May 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse Magistrate (doc. 112), filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. In support of his motion, Plaintiff alleges Judge Waxse's refusal to grant Plaintiff's second Motion for Appointment of Counsel demonstrates the Judge Waxse's bias in favor of Defendant.
A judge must disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) ("[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."). "The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality." United States v. Stenzel, 49 F.3d 658, 661 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The standard for impartiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455 is an objective one, requiring recusal only if "a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Courts repeatedly have commented that the possibility for misuse of Section 455 is great. Metzger v. City of Leawood, No. 00-2015-KHV, 2000 WL 33314114, at *1-2 (D.Kan. Dec. 15, 2000) (citing Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 727 (D.Idaho 1981) (`[t]he potential for abuse is manifest and warned against by legal scholars")). Therefore a judge "should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation." Id. at *2 (citing Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
In this case, recusal is not appropriate. Based on the facts alleged in the motion for recusal, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the undersigned judge. Plaintiff does not allege actual partiality on the part of the undersigned judge nor has he shown an appearance of partiality. In fact, Plaintiff has not shown anything which calls into question the Court's willingness and ability to be fair to both parties. Plaintiff's entire argument centers around the Court's refusal to grant his second Motion for Appointment of Counsel, which he does not even allege stems from bias, but instead from the undersigned judge's "erroneous or distorted conception" of the facts presented. Id. (mere allegation of bias not sufficient to support motion for recusal) (citing Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226 (10th Cir. 1987)). Moreover, "adverse judicial rulings, standing alone, do not constitute a valid basis for recusal based on bias or partiality." Traylor v. Gibson, 202 F.3d 283, 2000 WL 16328, *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 11, 2000) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).
For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is denied.