Butler v. Superior Court

5 Citing cases

  1. People v. Trask

    191 Cal.App.4th 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 10 times
    In Trask, the defendant was found eligible, granted diversion under section 1000, and assigned to participate in an approved drug education program, but her only source of income was social security and she was frequently homeless.

    Defendant tried to "take it up," but we dismissed her appeal as being from a nonappealable order. ( People v. Trask (Mar. 11, 2010, C064336), citing Butler v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 64, 69 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 504].) The trial court then terminated defendant from diversion, reinstated criminal proceedings, and placed defendant on formal probation for three years, conditioned, among other things, on service of 60 days in county jail.

  2. People v. Rodriguez

    No. F080268 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2021)

    Perhaps the Legislature did not address appealability because “the Legislature is presumed to know about existing case law when it enacts … a statute [citation], …” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57.) In drug diversion cases, for example, the Legislature has expressly limited the defendant's ability to appeal, and states “[t]he sole remedy of a defendant who is found ineligible for pretrial diversion is a postconviction appeal” (§ 1000, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1996, c. 1132, § 2; Butler v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 64, 69), arguably a more serious limitation on a defendant's interests since he or she may not seek review until after there has been a resolution of the charged offenses. II.

  3. People v. Stec

    B262357 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 19, 2016)

    The statute governing deferred entry of judgment establishes appeal as the "sole remedy" for a defendant who is found to be ineligible. (§ 1000, subd. (b); Butler v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 64, 69.) Coram nobis is not a substitute for a failure to seek alternate forms of relief. (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1093-1094.)

  4. People v. Andreotti

    91 Cal.App.4th 1263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding a prosecutor's motion for deferral was akin to plea bargaining but acknowledging that "[o]nce the defendant pleads guilty and the prosecutor moves for deferral, the decision of how to dispose of the charges is in the hands of the judge, where it belongs" and that "[i]f the [prosecution] had some sort of veto over this decision by the trial court," then the statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine

    (Cf. Sledge, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 75 ["the decision of the district attorney that a defendant is ineligible on this ground is subject to judicial review at the proper time"]; People v. Sturiale (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 [drug deferral, section 1000, subd. (b) provides remedy of post-conviction appeal]; Butler v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 64.) Defendant cannot obtain review of the prosecution's refusal to move for deferred entry of judgment under the statute.

  5. People v. Davis

    79 Cal.App.4th 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 5 times
    In Davis, the court applied the standard rule of statutory construction that "[t]he Legislature is deemed to have been aware of statutes already in existence and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof.

    In this case of first impression, we are called upon to determine whether the deferred entry of judgment statutory scheme, effective three years after the enactment of the Three Strikes law, is prohibited for third strike offenders. Butler v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 64, failed to reach the issue on petition for writ of mandate only because "[t]he sole remedy of a defendant who is found ineligible for deferred entry of judgment is a postconviction appeal." (§ 1000, subd. (b))