Opinion
No. 10-02-00315-CR
Opinion delivered and filed September 22, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Brazos County, Texas, Trial Court # 02-0511M. Affirmed.
Jim W. James, Bryan, TX, for Appellant. Amanda Matzke, Bryan, TX, for Appellee.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM Opinion
This appeal concerns a conviction for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003). We will affirm. Appellant raises four issues. In Appellant's first and second issues, she contends that the trial court erred in overruling Appellant's motion to suppress the arresting officer's "observations and opinions." In Appellant's third and fourth issues, she contends that the trial court erred in overruling Appellant's motion to suppress a video recording of Appellant. In Appellant's first and third issues, she argues that the officer did not have probable cause for arrest. In Appellant's second and fourth issues, she argues that her warrantless arrest did not fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. We will overrule Appellant's issues. Appellant does not contest that she was intoxicated. Appellant argues that there is no evidence of the time at which she drove her car into a parked pickup truck, and no evidence of the time at which the officer arrived on the scene; and thus no evidence that Appellant was intoxicated when she caused the collision. When the officer arrived in response to the collision, the ambulance and paramedics, firemen, and eyewitnesses were still present. Under the totality of the circumstances, under the undisputed facts, the officer had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that Appellant drove her car while intoxicated. See Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 536 (2003); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Thus, the officer had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving while intoxicated. See id. Accordingly, Appellant's first and third issues are overruled. Moreover, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant's apprehension at the scene of and near the time of the collision made that scene a "suspicious place." See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004); Dyar at 468. Thus, Appellant's arrest fell within Article 14.03's exception to the warrant requirement. See id. Accordingly, Appellant's second and fourth issues are overruled. Having overruled Appellant's issues, we affirm the judgment. (Justice Vance concurs with a note. It is hard to understand why the majority will not provide, even in a memorandum opinion, either the basic facts necessary to understand why the Appellant brought the issues or our reasons for rejecting them. Here, the majority simply says Appellant was apprehended "at the scene of and near the time of" the collision. It is undisputed that Appellant was found in a nearby apartment; it is the apartment that the State says was a "suspicious place." Left unstated is Appellant's contention that the State did not prove the time that elapsed between the collision and Appellant's arrest, and that the State says it could have been up to 42 minutes. Thus, in each instance the majority has not addressed the issues brought by Appellant in light of the facts revealed by the record.)