Opinion
Civ. No. JFM-98-2066.
November 5, 1998.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs Elvis Butler and his wife Pamela Butler have sued defendants Howard County, Maryland, the Howard County Police Department, Major William J. Spaulding, Sergeant Merritt Bender, Corporal Brook Donovan, Corporal Robert Wagner, PFC Mark Thomey, PFC Patrick Arnone, PFC Robert Dell'Erba, and PFC Jeffrey Giroux under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law causes of action. In their § 1983 claims, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their constitutional rights to be protected from false arrest and from use of excessive force. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on the federal claims on the basis of qualified immunity, and to dismiss the remaining state law claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. Defendants' motion will be granted.
I.
In June 1997 the U.S. Marshal's Task Force ("Task Force") was attempting to locate Nelson Reid, who was wanted in Baltimore City for homicide in the death of his girlfriend on June 16. On June 26, 1997, Reid fired shots at a police officer assigned to the Task Force who had been following Reid in his vehicle in Baltimore City. That same day, as part of the attempt to locate Reid, the Task Force obtained information that connected Reid to plaintiffs' apartment in Howard County. Members of the Task Force had paged Reid to a telephone number. When Reid returned the calls to that telephone number, Bell Atlantic could identify the telephone number from which Reid's call was being made. As a result of paging Reid several times, the Task Force obtained two telephone numbers from Bell Atlantic for Reid: one in Randallstown, Baltimore County, Maryland, and one in Elkridge, Howard County, Maryland. Given the distance between the two locations and the timing between the calls, it was impossible for Reid to have called from both locations.
The Task Force attempted to locate Reid at the Elkridge location. That telephone number had been linked to 7064 Duckett's Lane, Apartment 102 ("the apartment"), the residence of plaintiffs Elvis and Pamela Butler and their two children. On their way to the apartment, officers assigned to the Task Force were pulled over by a Howard County patrol officer, who radioed their request for Howard County Police Department assistance. Howard County police commanders were notified of the request and learned of the paging operation from the Task Force. The Task Force members communicated their confusion over the distant locations of the phone numbers from which pages had been returned.
The Howard County police commanders set up a command post less than a mile from the apartment. According to defendants, Howard County police officers were not involved in surveillance of the apartment until approximately 8:30 p.m.; rather, only the Task Force performed surveillance of the apartment until that time. Except for one "ride by" performed by Howard County tactical officers, none of the named defendants was in a position to see the apartment until 8:30 p.m.
At 8:40 p.m., two Howard County tactical officers were deployed as snipers in the townhouse development located behind the apartment. At 8:57 p.m., one of the snipers reported that he had seen a man in the apartment and was 70-80% sure that the man he had seen was the suspect, based on his view of the man's face through a scope and the color photograph shown to him earlier by the Task Force. Other Howard County tactical officers then moved into position, with six officers in the entrance of the building in which the apartment was located, and other officers covering the rear of the building.
The Howard County police commanders at the command post did not believe that the sniper's 70-80% confidence in his identification and the identification of the telephone number associated with the apartment gave them a sufficient connection between the apartment and Reid to enter the apartment. Therefore, they made plans to contact the person inside the apartment by telephone. Before that telephone call was made, however, Task Force members intercepted Mrs. Butler and her children as they attempted to enter the building at 7064 Duckett's Lane at approximately 9:30 p.m.
Mrs. Butler was interviewed by a Task Force member. During the interview, Mrs. Butler and the Task Force member sat in the front seat of an unmarked police car, and the children and a Howard County police detective sat in the back seat. Mrs. Butler was shown a picture of the suspect, and she said that the man in the picture was not her husband. When she gave the officers a picture of her husband, the Task Force member indicated that the man in Mrs. Butler's picture was not the suspect. Mrs. Butler was unable to explain why the telephone calls from Reid had come from her apartment; however, she did note that the telephone company had recently installed a new line for their computer. She did not know the number for the computer line, but she gave the officers the telephone number she did know for her apartment.
The parties dispute whether Mrs. Butler said that the man in the picture resembled her husband. For the purposes of this motion, this factual dispute must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. Therefore, it is deemed that Mrs. Butler made no comment about the similarity between the appearances of her husband and the suspect.
The Howard County police commanders then decided to attempt to contact Mr. Butler by telephone and ask him to come out of the apartment. In order to be able to search the apartment after Mr. Butler had left it, the Howard County detective present in the car obtained Mrs. Butler's written consent to search the apartment.
Telephone contact was established with Mr. Butler, who agreed to come out of the apartment. According to plaintiffs, Mr. Butler was thrown to the ground, held there by the knee of one officer, and handcuffed while other officers had their weapons pointing at him. Mr. Butler was kept in that position for five to eight minutes while other officers searched his apartment. Mr. Butler was then taken to the vestibule of the apartment building, where he was held by the same officers for another five to seven minutes. At that point, Mr. Butler was taken outside and delivered to the federal Task Force members, where he was held in handcuffs for approximately twenty to thirty-five minutes.
The Task Force members questioned Mr. Butler to determine his possible association with the suspect. While the Task Force conducted its investigation, Howard County police officers tried to explain to the Butlers why their apartment had been approached by tactical officers. After talking with Mr. Butler and other family members, the Task Force concluded that he should no longer be detained.
When the Task Force left that night, they had not determined how and why the telephone calls attributed to Reid had come from the telephone number assigned to the Butlers. According to information obtained later, Bell Atlantic had provided incomplete information to the Task Force. The telephone number assigned to the Butlers had also been assigned to a cellular telephone tower. When Reid made calls from his cell phone, the number assigned to the tower, rather than his cell phone number, was intercepted by the Task Force. The Butlers had no connection with Nelson Reid.
II.
Qualified immunity protects police officers from civil liability "unless the officer reasonably should have known that his actions violated clearly established constitutional rights."Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 1994) (quotingHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The policy underlying the doctrine of qualified immunity is the "desire to avoid over-deterrence of energetic law enforcement by subjecting governmental actors to a high risk of liability." Id. "Because qualified immunity is designed to shield officers not only from liability but from the burdens of litigation," the resolution of claims against officers through summary judgment has been encouraged. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992).
When ruling on a defense of qualified immunity, the Court engages in a three-step inquiry: "(1) identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determining whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have known that doing what he did would violate that right." Id. at 312.
Plaintiffs allege that two constitutional rights were violated by defendants: (1) the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and (2) the Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop. Defendants do not challenge the fact that both of these rights were clearly well established at the time of the alleged violation. Thus, the inquiry narrows to whether the police officers' actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances before them at the time.
From plaintiffs' perspective, the evening of June 26, 1997 was undoubtedly very frightening and embarrassing. The Butlers' lives were interrupted by a federal manhunt, and Mr. Butler was handcuffed and held in front of his neighbors and family. In hindsight, it was all a big mistake. The suspect was not hiding at the Butlers' apartment, nor had he ever made phone calls from there. The suspect had no connection whatsoever to plaintiffs. Defendants admit that "Mr. Butler was unquestionably `mistakenly apprehended at gun point' by police, including Howard County police."
Despite their mistake, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this case, because that mistake was reasonable in light of the circumstances as they were known at the time. Howard County police officers knew that there was evidence that Reid had placed phone calls from the telephone number assigned to the Butlers' apartment. Defendants admit that the Task Force members informed them that the telephone number information was confusing because it was impossible for Reid to have placed calls from both locations. However, it was still reasonable for them to rely on the information from Bell Atlantic. Plaintiffs argue that, were they given the opportunity for discovery, they could prove that the U.S. Marshals had information linking Reid with the other source of the phone calls in Randallstown. Even if that could be proved, it does not follow that the Marshals' knowledge should be imputed to the Howard County police officers.
Moreover, the Howard County police officers had evidence from a sniper that the occupant of the Butlers' apartment was 70-80% likely to be the suspect. Defendants acted reasonably on this knowledge. They did not believe that they had probable cause based only upon the telephone and sniper information to enter the apartment without permission, so they set about obtaining permission to search the apartment for the suspect. Defendants obtained valid consent from Mrs. Butler to search the apartment, and Mr. Butler willingly agreed to leave the apartment.
Once Mr. Butler opened the door of the apartment, it was reasonable for these police officers, involved in a search for an armed fugitive who had shot at federal marshals, to have their weapons drawn at any person exiting the apartment. In order to effectuate the search, the police officers handcuffed and detained Mr. Butler, as is their standard procedure during a search for an armed fugitive. As soon as the search was completed, defendants delivered Mr. Butler to the Task Force; therefore, they cannot be held accountable for his detention after that point.
The Fourth Circuit has explained "that the mistaken seizure of an individual is not pertinent to a proper qualified immunity analysis. Indeed, it is precisely in such a case of genuinely mistaken identity that the doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to protect police officers from civil liability." Taft v. Vines, 70 F.3d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part en banc, 83 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 1996). In Taft, police officers had pulled over a car thought to contain a suspected murderer. Id. at 308. The police were acting in response to a command by their dispatcher to stop the car. Id. As it turned out, the suspect was not in the car. Id. at 309. However, the police did not discover that until they had ordered a woman and four children out of the car. Id. Significantly, the police officers in Taft admitted that they knew as soon as the child who resembled the suspect exited the car that he was not, in fact, the suspect. Id. at 308.
The woman explained that she was the mother of two of the children, and that she was driving all of the children home from a basketball game. Id. at 309. Nonetheless, the police did pat-down searches of all of the car's occupants, handcuffed the mother and fifteen-year-old child, and left the two handcuffed while they searched the car. Id. The mother was placed in the back of a police cruiser, while the oldest child was placed handcuffed on his knees on the road, facing the headlights of a police car. Id. Plaintiffs in that case alleged that the police had pointed their guns at the younger children, and that the pat-down searches of the woman and girls amounted to sexual abuse.Id.
In Taft, the Fourth Circuit held that the police were entitled to qualified immunity on the wrongful arrest claims, but not on the excessive force claims. Id. at 312, 315-16. One judge dissented from the panel opinion and argued that the police were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claims as well. Id. at 317-21. On rehearing en banc, the Court adopted the dissent and held that the police were entitled to qualified immunity on both claims. Taft v. Vines, 83 F.3d 681, 683-84 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The dissent noted that the experience must have been terrifying for the persons in the car, and that they certainly deserve our empathy and sympathy. Taft, 70 F.3d at 320-21. "However, in other circumstances," the dissent continued, "for example if the murderer had commandeered their car, they might well have been grateful for the safeguards taken by the police." Id. at 321.
In the instant case, although perhaps unlikely under the circumstances, plaintiffs also could have been hostages of the suspect. The police had hostage negotiators at the ready to talk with the suspect were he to be found in the apartment. In any event, the actions taken by the police officers and the amount of force they used were reasonable in light of the threat posed by the suspect, who had already shot at U.S. Marshals in order to flee their pursuit. Qualified immunity "is to be applied with due respect for the perspective of police officers on the scene and not with the greater leisure and acquired wisdom of judicial hindsight." Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1992).
III.
Plaintiffs' claims against the Howard County Police Department ("HCPD") and Howard County ("County") must fail because the actions in this case were taken by individual police officers, not by the HCPD or the County as entities. Plaintiffs have made no allegation that the actions of the police officers were the result of an official policy of the HCPD or the County. Thus, the claims against the HCPD and the County are based solely on a theory of vicarious liability. It is well established that a municipality may not be held vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of its employees. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The common law doctrine of respondeat superior has no application in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jones v. Dennis, 894 F. Supp. 880, 889 (D. Md. 1995) (citing Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987)).
IV.
Counts III through XVIII of plaintiffs' complaint set forth state law claims against defendants. Because defendants have successfully asserted the defense of qualified immunity against the federal law claims, it is within the Court's discretion to dismiss the state law claims. See Ridenour v. Andrews Fed. Credit Union, 897 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). The justification for exercising supplemental jurisdiction "lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims so that they may be consolidated with the claims that will be filed against the U.S. Marshals arising out of the same incident. Plaintiffs represented to this Court on August 7, 1998 that they would be filing a case against the Marshals in mid-August; however, as of November 4, 1998, no such case has been filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. I am granting summary judgment on the federal claims in this case at an early stage, before the answer was filed. Therefore, it would benefit neither judicial economy nor fairness to litigants to keep the state law claims here.
Defendants have filed a separate motion to dismiss Counts III through XVIII of the complaint on other grounds. As I am dismissing those counts in this opinion, I need not rule on that motion.
For these reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and Counts III through XVIII of the complaint are dismissed. A separate order to that effect is being entered herewith.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the memorandum entered herewith, it is, this 5th day of November, 1998
ORDERED that
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Counts I and II is GRANTED; and
2. Counts III-XVIII are dismissed.