Therefore, the legislature presumably was aware—and absent any clear indication to the contrary in the statutory language, the legislature must have intended (see Butler v. Harris , 2014 IL App (5th) 130163, ¶ 28, 382 Ill.Dec. 967, 13 N.E.3d 380 )—that an offense would be the same substantive offense regardless of whether it were committed as a principal or as an accomplice (see Ceja , 204 Ill. 2d at 361, 273 Ill.Dec. 796, 789 N.E.2d 1228 ). ¶ 148 Second, section 2-702(g) "must be afforded its plain, ordinary[,] and popularly understood meaning" ( People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns , 203 Ill. 2d 264, 279, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003) ), and common speech differentiates between the offense and the specific factual means of committing the offense.

Id. "A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is apparent or where findings appear to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based upon the evidence." Butler v. Harris, 2014 IL App (5th) 130163, ¶ 36, 13 N.E.3d 380.¶ 45 The trial court found defendant was aware of a defect in the basement shower, and that defect amounted to "a leaky basement shower that could be fixed by changing a washer in the handle of the shower faucet.

On appeal, Webb asserts that the district court misidentified the fraudulent conduct; the conduct included not only Frawley’s direction to work on a cancelled product, but also Frawley’s refusal to tell Webb that Jefferies cancelled the product, which Webb says was information he was entitled to know. Webb asserts that his claim survives dismissal if he shows: (1) Frawley failed to disclose a material fact; (2) Webb had a right to rely on Frawley’s false statement or omission; (3) the false statement or omission was made for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon; (4) Webb relied on the false statement or omission; and (5) Webb suffered injury as a direct result. See Butler v. Harris , 382 Ill.Dec. 967, 13 N.E.3d 380, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). As such, Webb argues that the district court erred when it dismissed Webb’s claim for lacking a specific false statement.

Under Illinois law, fraud claims must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Association Ben. Services, Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 852 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Illinois law and stating, "[m]ost importantly, fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence") (citation omitted); Butler v. Harris, 13 N.E.3d 380, 387 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2014) ("Common law fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence."). That "clear and convincing evidence" standard is properly taken into account in the summary judgment analysis.

Fraud consists of a false statement of material fact, known by the party making the statement to be false, and accompanied by detrimental reliance by the other party. Bangaly v. Baggiani, 2014 IL App (1st) 123760, ¶ 206; Butler v. Harris, 2014 IL App (5th) 130163, ¶ 28.

Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. App. 3d 446, 487 (2009). The false-statement element is also satisfied if the defendant fails to disclose or omits a material fact. Butler v. Harris, 2014 IL App (5th) 130163, ¶ 31. The defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statement or deliberate concealment with the intent to deceive is key.

¶ 20 Here, the trial court did not award attorney fees, finding that plaintiff's claims were not brought in bad faith and that plaintiff had simply failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to meet her burden of proof. See Butler v. Harris, 2014 IL App (5th) 130163, ¶¶ 28, 31 (fraud and a violation of the Disclosure Act must be proven by clear and convincing evidence); State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Welbourne, 2017 IL App (3d) 160231, ¶ 15 (to sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must plead and prove his or her by a preponderance of the evidence). After reviewing the record in this case, we cannot say that plaintiff's claims were meritless or brought in bad faith.

An omission of material fact is equivalent to a false statement of material fact for purposes of a fraud claim. Butler v. Harris, 2014 IL App (5th) 130163, ¶ 31 ("To prove common law fraud, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants intentionally made a false statement of material fact or failed to disclose a material fact"). Plaintiff also alleges facts from which we may reasonably infer that defendants knew that the scope of the settlement agreement and defendants' intent in entering the agreement were material and that defendants remained silent to induce plaintiff to enter the agreement without questioning defendants' intent.

¶10 When considering a judgment entered after a bench trial, a reviewing court will not disturb the circuit court's findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Butler v. Harris, 2014 IL App (5th) 130163, ¶ 36. A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is apparent or where the findings appear to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence. Id. The trier of fact is in the superior position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given to their testimony.