Opinion
No. COA11–1312.
2012-06-5
April C. BUTLER, Petitioner–Appellant, v. CHARLOTTE–MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent–Appellee.
Van Kampen Law, PLLC, by Joshua R. Van Kampen, and John Gresham, for Petitioner-appellant. McGuireWoods, LLP, by H. Landis Wade, Jr. and Brittni G. Robinson, for Respondent-appellee.
Appeal by Petitioner from judgment entered 11 July 2011 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 2012. Van Kampen Law, PLLC, by Joshua R. Van Kampen, and John Gresham, for Petitioner-appellant. McGuireWoods, LLP, by H. Landis Wade, Jr. and Brittni G. Robinson, for Respondent-appellee.
HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., Judge.
April C. Butler (“Petitioner”) appeals from the trial court's judgment affirming the Charlotte–Mecklenburg Board of Education's (“the Board”) decision to dismiss her from her position as principal of First Ward Elementary School (“First Ward”) in Charlotte. We affirm.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
The evidence of record tends to show the following. Petitioner began her employment with the Charlotte–Mecklenburg School System (“CMS”) as an instructional assistant at Piedmont Middle School in 1992. Petitioner subsequently held several other positions with CMS, including a principalship at Walton Charter Academy. In October 2007, Joel Ritchie, Area Superintendent for the Central Learning Community Center at CMS, recruited Petitioner to serve as principal at First Ward and signed her to a two-year employment contract. When Petitioner accepted the position, “she understood the staff at First Ward to be more adult-centered than child-centered and that she faced challenges in improving the school's performance.”
In June 2008, at the end of Petitioner's first year at First Ward, Superintendent Ritchie noted in Petitioner's evaluation that Petitioner had “implemented many needed procedures and changes in the school.” The report also expressed certain concerns regarding Petitioner's performance in several areas, including student standardized test scores and Petitioner's relationship with her staff. Petitioner was placed on an “Action Plan” designed to improve her performance in her second year.
Petitioner's mid-year evaluation in January 2009 indicated that her performance was improving, and Superintendent Ritchie determined that Petitioner had successfully completed her Action Plan. A CMS audit of the school in April 2009 reported that the learning atmosphere at First Ward was “much improved” since CMS' previous assessment in October 2008.
In April 2009, prior to receiving First Ward's standardized test results and staff survey results for the 2008–09 academic year, CMS Superintendent Peter Gorman recommended that the Board renew Petitioner's contract. CMS issued a renewal contract to Petitioner on 29 July 2009, and Petitioner signed the contract on 3 August 2009. The renewal contract extended Petitioner's employment with CMS for four additional years through June 2013. The Board's chairperson, Molly Griffin, finalized Petitioner's new contract with her signature on 3 September 2009.
Between the time of Superintendent Gorman's recommendation to renew Petitioner's contract in April 2009, and finalization of Petitioner's new contract in September 2009, CMS received reports indicating that the situation at First Ward was not what it had believed it to be at the time it decided to renew Petitioner's contract. On 1 May 2009, Superintendent Gorman received staff surveys evaluating Petitioner's performance for the 2008–09 academic year. The surveys reflected scores lower than Petitioner's first-year evaluations, which had led to implementation of the Action Plan. The students' standardized test scores also dropped. The test score reports revealed that during Petitioner's two-year tenure as principal at First Ward, the students' math and reading test scores declined by more than fifteen percent and forty-six percent, respectively. In Petitioner's summative evaluation, completed on 17 June 2009, Petitioner received a rating of “not demonstrated,” the lowest rating possible, on five out of the seven performance criteria. Petitioner received a rating of “developing” on the two remaining criteria. CMS also received numerous staff complaints regarding Petitioner's conduct, “some [of] which were unsigned due to subjective fear of retaliation by [Petitioner].”
In light of these developments, Superintendent Gorman suspended Petitioner on 17 August 2009. By letter dated 3 December 2009, Superintendent Gorman notified Petitioner of his intent to recommend her dismissal to the Board based upon the following statutory grounds: (1) inadequate performance; (2) failure to fulfill the duties and responsibilities imposed upon school administrators by our General Statutes; and (3) failure to comply with other requirements prescribed by the Board. Petitioner exercised her statutory right to a hearing before a Case Manager under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(j1) (2011), and nine non-consecutive days of hearings on the matter were held between 29 March 2010 and 15 July 2010. On 23 August 2010, the Case Manager issued the following recommendation to the Board based upon the evidence presented:
I recommend that the findings of fact do not substantiate the Superintendent's grounds for dismissal of [Petitioner]. The decision is based upon the waiver by the Superintendent of offering [Petitioner] a contract; however, given the inability of [Petitioner] to manage the staff and act as an instructional leader at First Ward, I recommend that while the facts do not justify the Superintendent's decision that [Petitioner] be terminated, they do justify the decision that she not be returned to the position of principal at First Ward.
By letter dated 27 September 2010, Superintendent Gorman notified Petitioner that he was recommending her dismissal to the Board based on the Case Manager's report, and he informed Petitioner of her right to an administrative hearing before the Board. Petitioner requested a hearing before the Board on 28 September 2010, and Superintendent Gorman served the Board with his recommendation for Petitioner's dismissal by letter dated 1 October 2010.
The matter came on before the Board on 18 November 2010. By resolution dated 22 November 2010, the Board dismissed Petitioner, citing two statutory grounds as the basis for its decision: (1) Petitioner's failure to improve instruction and community spirit, seeN.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 115C–325(e)(1)(i) (2011) & 115C–288(c) (2011); and (2) Petitioner's “inadequate performance,” seeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 (e)(1)(a) (2011). Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review and notice of appeal from the Board's decision with the Mecklenburg County Superior Court on 22 December 2010.
The matter came on for hearing before the trial court on 10 June 2011, Judge Richard D. Boner presiding. By judgment entered 11 July 2011, the trial court determined there was substantial evidence in the record to support Petitioner's dismissal and affirmed the Board's decision. Petitioner filed notice of appeal with this Court on 5 August 2011.
II. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–27(b) (2011), as Petitioner appeals from a final judgment of the Superior Court as a matter of right.
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
In our review of the trial court's judgment affirming the Board's decision to dismiss Petitioner, we may
reverse or modify the [Board's] decision if the substantial rights of [Petitioner] may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency or administrative law judge;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence ... in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 150B–51(b) (2011). We review assignments of error alleged under subsections (1) through (4) de novo; assignments of error alleged under subsections (5) and (6) are reviewed under the whole record test. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 150B–51 (c) (2011). “When conducting de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and may freely substitute its own judgment for the board's.” Moore v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C.App. 566, 572, 649 S.E.2d 410, 415 (2007). “In determining whether the Board's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, we apply the ‘whole record’ test.” Cowan v. N.C. Private Protective Servs. Bd., 98 N.C.App. 498, 502, 391 S.E .2d 217, 219 (1990). Under the whole record test, we must examine all competent evidence, including evidence that detracts from the Board's conclusions, to determine if the Board's decision has a rational basis in the evidence. Beauchesne v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 125 N.C.App. 457, 465, 481 S.E.2d 685, 691 (1997). “ ‘The whole record test’ does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo.” Baxter v. Poe, 42 N.C.App. 404, 411, 257 S.E.2d 71, 76 (1979) (citation omitted).
B. Waiver
Petitioner first contends the trial court erred by failing to conclude that the Board waived its right to dismiss Petitioner based upon Petitioner's conduct under her initial employment contract when it renewed Petitioner's contract for a second term. We disagree.
Our General Statutes require the local board of education to employ school administrators, including principals, under a two to four-year contract initially, with the possibility of renewing the contract for four-year periods thereafter. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–287.1(b) (2011). The administrator's initial employment contract expires “on June 30 of the final 12 months of the contract .” Id. The local board of education possesses the ultimate authority in determining whether to terminate or renew the administrator's contract. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 (j1)(5) (2011). A school superintendent may recommend renewal or non-renewal of an administrator's contract, but he or she must submit the recommendation to the school board prior to May 1 of the final year of the contract. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–287.1(d) (2011).
If a superintendent decides not to recommend that the local board of education offer a new, renewed, or extended school administrator's contract to the school administrator, the superintendent shall give the school administrator written notice of his or her decision and the reasons for his or her decision no later than May 1 of the final year of the contract.
....
If the local board decides not to offer the school administrator a new, renewed, or extended school administrator's contract, the local board shall notify the school administrator of its decision by June 1 of the final year of the contract.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–287.1(d) (2011). Neither the superintendent's recommendation, nor the school board's decision may be “arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, personal, or political[,]” and any decision not to renew a school administrator's contract is subject to judicial review. Id.
In the instant case, Petitioner argues that the Board's renewal of her employment contract constituted a waiver of the Board's right to dismiss her based upon her conduct under her initial contract. The question whether the Board waived its right to dismiss Petitioner based upon her pre-contract-renewal conduct is a question of law reviewed by this Court de novo. See N.C. Dept. of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d 888, 894 (2004). “The essential elements of waiver are the existence at the time of the alleged waiver of a right, advantage or benefit, the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence thereof, and an intention to relinquish such right, advantage or benefit.” J.W. Cross Indus. v. Warner Hardware Co., 94 N.C.App. 184, 186, 379 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1989). “No one can be said to have waived that which he does not know, or where he has acted under a misapprehension of facts.” Danville Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Gallivan Bldg. Co., 177 N.C. 103, 107, 97 S.E. 718, 720 (1919). “The question of waiver is mainly one of intention, which lies at the foundation of the doctrine. Waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner[.]” Id.
Here, the Case Manager entered the following findings of fact:
A7. There is no evidence in the record that any Board member, including the Board Chair, was ever aware of the evidence that formed the basis for the dismissal of [Petitioner].
A8. There is no evidence in the record that the Board Chair signed the new contract with knowledge of the evidence that formed the basis of the suspension or recommended dismissal of [Petitioner].
The Board expressly accepted the Case Manager's findings of fact and declined to enter its own, alternative findings of fact. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 (j2)(7) (2011). These findings of fact indicate that the Board was unaware of Petitioner's conduct and the reports that served as grounds for Petitioner's dismissal at the time it decided to renew her contract. It would be illogical to conclude that the Board knowingly and voluntarily relinquished its right to dismiss Petitioner based upon evidence of which it had no knowledge. The Case Manager's legal conclusion that the Board waived this right is immaterial, as the Board rejected this conclusion, and we afford no deference to the Case Manager's conclusions of law on appeal. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 (i1)(2) (2011) (“The hearing officer shall not make a recommendation as to conclusions of law ....”). Moreover, we note that Petitioner's renewal contract contemplated that Petitioner “may procedures set forth in G.S. 115C–325 applicable to career teachers.” There is no requirement under Petitioner's contract or under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 that Petitioner's dismissal must be predicated upon her post-contract-renewal performance.
Petitioner argues the Board could have waited to issue her new contract until after it had received the information regarding First Ward's performance reports and staff evaluations. Petitioner points out that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–287.1(f) contemplates such a delay in providing that:
If the superintendent or the local board of education fails to notify a school administrator by June 1 of the final year of the contract that the school administrator will not be offered a new school administrator's contract, the school administrator shall be entitled to 30 days of additional employment or severance pay beyond the date the school administrator receives written notice that a new contract will not be offered.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–287.1(f) (2011). While it is true that the Board could have delayed its issuance of Petitioner's new contract, this does not alter the fact that the Board did not know about the evidence that ultimately served as grounds for Petitioner's dismissal at the time it renewed her contract. Administrative disconnect and “jumping the gun” in renewing Petitioner's contract do not demonstrate the knowledge required for a finding of waiver. Without knowledge, Petitioner's claim of waiver must fail. We hold the Board and the trial court properly concluded that the Board did not waive its right to dismiss Petitioner based on her pre-contract-renewal conduct.
C. Personnel Files
Petitioner next contends the Board should not have been permitted to consider staff complaints against Petitioner that were not maintained in Petitioner's personnel file in reaching its decision to dismiss her. We disagree.
Petitioner relies on N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 115C–325(b) and 115C–276(l) in support of her argument on this issue. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(b) provides:
Personnel Files.—The superintendent shall maintain in his office a personnel file for each teacher that contains any complaint, commendation, or suggestion for correction or improvement about the teacher's professional conduct, except that the superintendent may elect not to place in a teacher's file (i) a letter of complaint that contains invalid, irrelevant, outdated, or false information or (ii) a letter of complaint when there is no documentation of an attempt to resolve the issue.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(b) (2011). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–276(l) provides:
To Maintain Personnel Files and to Participate in Firing and Demoting of Staff.—The superintendent shall maintain in his office a personnel file for each teacher that contains complaints, commendations, or suggestions for correction or improvement about the teacher and shall participate in the firing and demoting of staff, as provided in G.S. 115C–325.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–276(l) (2011).
Petitioner argues that because the two statutory provisions, supra, vest a superintendent with the responsibility of (1) maintaining personnel files for school employees and (2) participating in firing these employees, that in order to “harmonize” these provisions, we must conclude that only complaints properly maintained in an employee's personnel file may serve as a basis for dismissal. We decline to adopt this bright-line rule.
At the outset, we agree with Petitioner that these statutory provisions apply to school administrators as well as teachers. See Warren v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 80 N.C.App. 656, 658, 343 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1986) (holding principals fall within the statutory definition of a “teacher” for purposes of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325). However, we cannot agree with Petitioner's contention that only complaints maintained in her personnel file could serve as the basis for her dismissal. Our General Assembly has enacted extensive legislation concerning the hiring and firing of school system employees. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 115C–325 & 115C–287.1; see alsoN.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(e)(4) (2011) (“Dismissal ... shall not be based on conduct or actions which occurred more than three years before the written notice of the superintendent's intention to recommend dismissal or demotion is mailed to the career employee.”); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(j)(4) (2011) (“Rules of evidence shall not apply to a hearing conducted by a hearing officer. The hearing officer may give probative effect to evidence that is of a kind commonly relied on by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of serious affairs.”). We infer from this extensive legislation that our General Assembly would have articulated the bright-line rule Petitioner requests—that complaints must be maintained in an employee's personnel file in order to serve as a basis for dismissal—if it so intended. We also note that Petitioner has failed to present any case law in support of her contention. Accordingly, we decline to draw this bright-line rule, and we hold the Board did not err in considering staff complaints against Petitioner not maintained in her personnel file.
Furthermore, even if the Board did err in considering the complaints, the error was not prejudicial. This is true because these complaints were merely cumulative and corroborative of testimony presented before the Case Manager, to which Petitioner offered no objection. See Wilson County Bd. of Educ. v. Lamm, 276 N.C. 487, 493, 173 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1970) (“The admission of incompetent testimony will not be held prejudicial when its import is abundantly established by other competent testimony, or the testimony is merely cumulative or corroborative.”). Additionally, the complaints in question were introduced only to demonstrate the sheer volume of complaints against Petitioner; they were not introduced as substantive evidence against her. Regardless, we discern no error in the Board's reliance, if any, on these staff complaints, notwithstanding the Superintendent's failure to maintain them in Petitioner's personnel file.
D. Substantial Evidence
Petitioner further contends the trial court erred in concluding under the whole record test that the Board's decision to dismiss Petitioner was supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and hold there was substantial evidence in the record supporting each alleged ground for dismissal.
We apply the whole record test, see Part III(A), supra, in determining whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(e) provides:
(e) Grounds for Dismissal or Demotion of a Career Employee.
(1) Grounds.—No career employee shall be dismissed or demoted or employed on a part-time basis except for one or more of the following:
a. Inadequate performance.
....
i. Failure to fulfill the duties and responsibilities imposed upon teachers or school administrators by the General Statutes of this State.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(e) (2011). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C288 describes the powers and duties of a public school system principal and provides, in pertinent part:
To Improve Instruction and Community Spirit.—The principal shall give suggestions to teachers for the improvement of instruction.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–288(c) (2011).
Here, the Board based its decision to dismiss Petitioner upon (1) Petitioner's “inadequate performance,” and (2) Petitioner's failure to improve instruction and community spirit at First Ward. We address each ground for dismissal in turn.
1. Inadequate Performance
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 authorizes the dismissal of a career employee for “inadequate performance.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 (e)(1) (2011).
In determining whether the professional performance of a career employee is adequate, consideration shall be given to regular and special evaluation reports prepared in accordance with the published policy of the employing local school administrative unit and to any published standards of performance which shall have been adopted by the board.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(e)(3) (2011). “ ‘[I]nadequate performance’ reflects a standard of skill expected in the performance of a teaching job [.]” Barringer v. Caldwell County Bd. of Educ., 123 N.C.App. 373, 379, 473 S.E.2d 435, 439 (1996). This Court has described “ ‘inadequate performance’ in regard to a job [as a term that] can be readily understood by any person of ordinary intelligence who knows what the job entails.” Crump v. Durham County Bd. of Educ., 74 N.C.App. 77, 80–81, 327 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1985). For example, this Court has held that a career teacher was properly dismissed for inadequate performance where “she was aware that her job as a schoolteacher entailed maintaining good order and discipline in the classroom ... and that her alleged failure to maintain good classroom order on numerous, specific occasions was the basis for the steps taken to dismiss her.” Id. at 81, 327 S.E.2d at 601.
Here, CMS provided Petitioner with a summative performance evaluation at the close of her first year at First Ward, as well as a mid-year evaluation in January 2009. These evaluations delineated Petitioner's responsibilities and performance criteria, and Petitioner personally reviewed and signed off on each of the evaluations. Petitioner was also placed on an Action Plan specifically geared to improve her performance in certain areas as she entered the second year of her two-year contract. This evidence indicates that Petitioner was well aware of her job performance requirements and expectations at First Ward. Nonetheless, Petitioner was unable to perform as expected, as evidenced in Petitioner's overall performance evaluation completed at the close of her second year: Petitioner received a rating of “not demonstrated” in five of the seven performance categories, which means that Petitioner “did not demonstrate competence on or adequate progress toward achieving” that particular standard of performance. Additionally, the First Ward students' math and reading standardized test scores declined by more than fifteen percent and forty-six percent, respectively, during Petitioner's two-year tenure at First Ward. Superintendent Gorman testified that “first and foremost [the District] is looking for increases in student achievement,” and we must conclude that Petitioner readily understood that her position entailed enhancing student performance and achievement.
There is some evidence in the record that detracts from the Board's conclusion that Petitioner's performance was inadequate. For example, the evidence indicates that First Ward was a “struggling school” when Petitioner assumed her position as principal in October 2007, and that despite “great adversity from the staff and parents ... she had implemented many needed procedures and changes in the school.” Moreover, the evidence showed that the drop in standardized test scores during Petitioner's tenure was due in part to a “re-norming of the reading test,” which had a detrimental impact on test scores across the school district. However, the significant decrease in reading test scores (a drop of forty-six percentage points) at First Ward was more than twice the decline in test scores experienced by other schools in the district. The evidence also showed that the standardized test scores were lower during Petitioner's second year as principal than they were during her first year. Thus, while there is evidence both in support of, and detracting from, a finding of “inadequate performance,” the Board concluded this ground for dismissal had been met, and this Court is precluded under our standard of review from “ ‘replac[ing] the Board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views.’ “ Baxter, 42 N.C.App. at 411, 257 S.E.2d at 76 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we hold there was a rational basis in the evidence for the Board's decision to terminate Petitioner's contract on grounds of inadequate performance.
2. Failure to improve instruction & community spirit
Having determined there was substantial evidence in the record to support Petitioner's dismissal for inadequate performance, supra, review of the Board's second asserted ground for dismissal is unnecessary to our holding. See id. at 416, 257 S.E .2d at 78 (holding dismissal is justified upon finding substantial evidence of any of the asserted statutory grounds for dismissal). We nonetheless address this issue, and we conclude there was also sufficient evidence in the record to support Petitioner's dismissal based upon her failure to improve instruction and community spirit.
As previously stated, the whole record test governs our review on this issue. When construed together, N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 115C–325 and 115C–288(c) authorize dismissal of a career principal for “failure to improve instruction and community spirit.” Neither party here presents case authority pertaining to this statutory ground for dismissal, nor are we aware of any case law on point. We therefore base our analysis upon the plain language set forth in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–288(c), which requires a career principal to “[i]mprove [i]nstruction and [c]ommunity [s]pirit” and to “give suggestions to teachers for the improvement of instruction.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–288(c) (2011). Our review of the record as a whole reveals substantial evidence demonstrating Petitioner's failure to perform in this respect.
Petitioner's 17 June 2009 evaluation reflects her poor performance in the area of “Instructional Leadership.” Petitioner received substandard marks of “Developing” and “Not Demonstrated” under the leadership-related categories labeled “Focus on Learning and Teaching Curriculum, Instruction and Assessment” and “Focus on Instructional Time,” respectively. Superintendent Ritchie noted that Petitioner had no “process in place to identify the professional development needs of the staff” and that staff members “felt they were not given clear directions on most occasions.” Testimony before the Case Manager indicated that Petitioner's meetings and discussions with her staff focused more upon what Petitioner perceived as an absenteeism problem than on improving classroom instruction. One teacher testified that when she requested guidance in dealing with her students, Petitioner replied, “[i]t is what it is.” Based on this and additional, substantial evidence concerning Petitioner's failure to perform adequately in her leadership role—for instance, the significant decline in standardized testing scores during her tenure, discussed supra ô the Case Manager entered the following findings of fact:
33. The evidence is clear that teacher morale was very low at First Ward and that [Petitioner] contributed to and in many instances directly caused the low teacher morale. While [Petitioner] professed unawareness of how low the morale was, as principal she should have been aware. Moreover, she should have been aware that improving instruction and community spirit was part of her job. Numerous teachers individually ... complained ... about [Petitioner] and her leadership at First Ward.... [T]eachers and staff were afraid to allow their names to be used in connection with complaints about [Petitioner].
....
78. Despite [Petitioner's] attempts to work on correcting performance problems, the evidence is overwhelming, however, that [Petitioner] could not serve as principal at First Ward because of her inability to lead the staff.
(Footnote omitted). The evidence presented prompted the Case Manager to devote nearly ten pages of her twenty-five page report detailing what she termed “Significant Issues with How [Petitioner] Related to Her Staff.” These issues included numerous reported incidents of First Ward staff members leaving Petitioner's office crying and complaints that Petitioner had depressed staff morale at First Ward, generally. The Case Manager reached the following conclusion based upon this evidence, which the Board later adopted in its resolution dismissing Petitioner:
[Petitioner] did not lead the staff at First Ward in a positive direction. She did not improve instruction and community spirit at First Ward. She had a difficult assignment, coming into a struggling school, but she did not succeed. While the school needed changes, she did not provide the leadership to move the school forward.
We recognize there is some evidence of probative value that detracts from the Board's conclusion that Petitioner failed to improve instruction and community spirit at First Ward. For example, one First Ward staff member testified that her working relationship with Petitioner was “wonderful.” Another staff member described Petitioner's staff meetings as “inspirational.” It appears that Petitioner was even considering hiring a consultant to help foster teamwork at First Ward. The evidence also tends to show that many of the staff complaints resulted from Petitioner's attempt to correct what she perceived as an absenteeism problem at First Ward, and that Petitioner was faced with an “adult-centered” staff from the outset. Nonetheless, this evidence does not negate the substantial evidence demonstrating Petitioner's inability to lead her staff as documented in the Case Manager's findings and as readily apparent from our review of the record before this Court. We hold this evidence provided a rational basis for the Board's decision to dismiss Petitioner based upon its second asserted ground for dismissal, namely, Petitioner's failure to improve instruction and community spirit at First Ward.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Affirmed. Judges BRYANT and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).