Opinion
11-P-789
04-19-2012
JOSEPH P. BUTLER v. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Joseph P. Butler, who had his license revoked as a habitual traffic offender pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 22F, sought a new license due to hardship under that statute. The Registrar of Motor Vehicles denied him one, and the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board) upheld the decision. Whether to grant a hardship license is 'purely discretionary.' Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 44 n.6 (2002). Although the plaintiff sought review in Superior Court under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, he did not file a transcript of proceedings before the board as required by Superior Court Standing Order 1-96, precluding him from arguing that the board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was arbitrary and capricious. See Forman v. Director of the Office of Medicaid, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 218, 223 n.5 (2011), citing Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 782-783 (2003).
Although the plaintiff may have deserved some leniency because he was pro se before the Superior Court, he is represented by counsel before this court and still has not furnished a transcript. Providing a transcript is 'not some hypertechnical requirement,' but is necessary to evaluate the plaintiff's claim. Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 782 (2003). Ultimately, 'the rules bind pro se litigants as they bind other litigants.' Jones v. Gallagher, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 883, 888 n.5 (2002).
Even if we looked past this failure, the plaintiff's arguments on appeal are unsupported by authority and do not rise to the level of reasoned appellate argument. See Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975); DeLuca v. Jordan, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 136 n.11 (2003). The plaintiff, 'as appellant, has the burden of proof 'to demonstrate the invalidity of the administrative determination." Forman, supra at 221, quoting from Andrews v. Division of Med. Assistance, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 228, 231 (2007). He has provided neither a sufficient record nor appropriate arguments to meet this burden.
In addition, it is questionable whether the plaintiff's appeal of the board's decision was timely filed. See Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 189-190 (2007) (actions under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, must be filed within thirty days of receiving notice of final agency action). We do not rely on this defect, as the record does not demonstrate when the plaintiff received the notice from the board.
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Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Berry, Kafker & Meade, JJ.),