Inasmuch as Investigator Richards substantially complied with OCGA § 15-11-19 (a) (3) by promptly contacting the juvenile court intake officer (when the most serious charge was aggravated assault), the contention that defendant's spontaneous statements were obtained during the violation of applicable juvenile code procedures is without merit. Compare Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875 (1) ( 243 S.E.2d 99). (c) As we have held in Division 2, supra, once the victim died and the charge was upgraded from aggravated assault to murder, the superior court was vested with exclusive jurisdiction under the express provisions of OCGA § 15-11-5 (b) (2) (A) (i).
"A confession from a juvenile is scanned with more care and is received with greater caution than an adult." Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875 ( 243 S.E.2d 99); see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 ( 87 SC 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527). The posture of the evidence at the hearing on the voluntariness of the juvenile's statement did not fully address the nine factors of Riley, supra. Compare the factors known to exist in this case with the facts in Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321 ( 240 S.E.2d 824). However, at this time, we need not reverse this juvenile adjudication solely on account of this deficiency.
In the case of a juvenile, a confession is scanned with more care and is received with greater caution than the confession of an adult. Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875 ( 243 S.E.2d 99) (1978). Failure to comply with the statutory safeguards contained in Code Ann. § 24A-1402 renders the confession of a juvenile inadmissible.
In Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 325 ( 240 S.E.2d 824), the court cited J. J. v. State of Ga., and pointed out: "Although those were juvenile court proceedings as opposed to criminal cases, the rule as to confessions of juveniles should be the same because law enforcement officers cannot be certain when they question a juvenile what kind of case may develop, and the statutory safeguards (Code Ann. § 24A-1402) are applicable to both criminal and juvenile cases." See Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875 ( 243 S.E.2d 99); Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298 ( 232 S.E.2d 535). Here the defendant was under 17 years of age. The evidence shows and the state virtually concedes that no effort was made to comply with the provisions of Code Ann. § 24A-1402, supra; the defendant's parents were not notified and were not present. The crime and the events relative thereto including the trial occurred in 1975 prior to the Crawford decision.
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on ground one. Petitioner cites West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968); Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321 (1977); Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298 (1977); and Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875 (1978). (Pet'r's Obj. [8] at 2.)
1. In the companion appeal, Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875, we reversed and remanded with direction to the trial court to vacate the sentence and to hold a post-trial hearing limited to the issue of whether there was compliance with Code § 24A-1402 (a). The identical disposition is required in the instant case, as there is the same evidentiary deficiency present.