¶ 7 In the trial court and in his brief in chief Ayala argued, correctly, that the law of bailment applies to this case. He relied on Bush v. Middleton, 1959 OK 116, 340 P.2d 474, 477-78 for the proposition that the owner of a vehicle who permits another to use the vehicle may be held liable to the bailee or a third party for death or damage caused by a defect in the vehicle. Ayala admitted that liability depends on the fact that the defect "was not known to the bailee."

In this state, the owner of a vehicle must use ordinary care to see that the vehicle is not in such a condition as to become dangerous for use on the highways of the state, failure in such duty of care constituting negligence. Bush v. Middleton, 340 P.2d 474, 478 (Okla. 1959). In cases involving the use of vehicles with defective brakes, the courts of Oklahoma have held that the failure to maintain a vehicle in a safe operating condition in violation of Oklahoma statute may constitute negligence.

Uncontroverted testimony of another repairman was that the break in the copper air line was an old break, caused by vibration over a long period of time preceding the accident. In view of Bush v. Middleton, Okla., 340 P.2d 474, we think the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on the question of whether the defendant, through his agent, Thompson, knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that the braking system was defective and as to whether the defective brakes, together with the non-using of the emergency brake, was the proximate cause of the collision. Neither is the theory of unavoidable accident availing to the defendant under the facts.

The motor vehicle statutes impose certain external and mechanical requirements upon a motor vehicle that will be operated upon the public roads. For instance, 47 O.S. 2001 § 12-301[ 47-12-301] requires a motor vehicle be equipped with brakes and § 12-303 requires that the brakes by "maintained in good working order". This Court has held that the owner may be liable for injury caused by faulty maintenance of brakes or failure to maintain the brakes, Bush v. Middleton, 1959 OK 116, 340 P.2d 474 and 47 O.S.Supp. 1957 § 148[ 47-148]; that the owner and the operator may be liable for failure to exercise ordinary care regarding faulty brakes that have been previously repaired, Gowins v. Merrell, 1975 OK 135, 541 P.2d 857; but that neither the owner nor operator will be liable for unexpected brake failure where the owner properly maintains the brakes and the operator acts with ordinary care after a brake failure occurs, Weaver v. Hoster, 1969 OK 128, 459 P.2d 614. ¶ 20 Statutory words are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears.

47 O.S. 1971 § 12-301[ 47-12-301] (a) requires every motor vehicle operated upon a highway to be equipped with brakes adequate to control movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, including two separate means of applying brakes. We have held owner of automobile must exercise ordinary care to insure it is not in such condition as to become dangerous for use upon public highways, and his failure to use such care, and permitting vehicle to be used upon public highways is negligence. Bush v. Middleton, Okla., 340 P.2d 474. If owner properly maintains brakes, he will not be liable for damages resulting from unexpected brake failure if he acts as a prudent person after failure occurs.

The demurrer admits every fact which the evidence in the slightest degree tends to prove, and all inferences and conclusions that may be reasonably and logically drawn from the same, and, where there is any conflict in the plaintiff's evidence that would make any part of it unfavorable to plaintiff, or sustains the defense, the court, in passing upon such demurrer, should consider such evidence withdrawn. Bush v. Middleton, Okla., 340 P.2d 474. With that rule in mind we now examine plaintiff's evidence in this case.

Neither is it proper to consider the evidence in the light of defendant's theory of the case, as was done by the trial court in resolving the question, since this amounts to nothing more than an attempt to weigh the evidence. Bush v. Middleton, Okla., 340 P.2d 474. The evidence disclosed the amount of drainage to the subject tract, the cost of an additional well, as well as cost of operations, and the expert testimony showing that had this location been timely drilled it would have been a commercial well, and demand upon defendant to protect plaintiff's tract from drainage. The evidence was uncontradicted that the Privett lease drained plaintiff's tract from Skinner production, although not clear as to which direction Red Fork production was drained.

"On a demurrer to the evidence, all evidence that is favorable to the demurring party is withdrawn from the consideration of the court, and the remaining testimony, with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, should be considered by the court in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the demurrer." In the case of Bush v. Middleton, Okla., 340 P.2d 474, in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus we held: "In passing upon a demurrer to the evidence, the court does not weigh the evidence.

He gave no other testimony, as an expert or otherwise, having a bearing on any of the allegations of negligence contained in plaintiff's petition. On appeal, plaintiff argues generally that a demurrer to the evidence admits every fact which the evidence, in the slightest degree, tends to prove citing Bush v. Middleton, Okla., 340 P.2d 474, and this may be conceded to be a correct general statement of the rule. It is obvious that the portion of the testimony of plaintiff's witness Fletcher above noted is unfavorable to plaintiff, and that under the rule stated in the fourth paragraph of the court's syllabus in Bush v. Middleton, supra, it is to be considered withdrawn for purposes of the demurrer to the evidence.

See Smith v. Crotts, Okla., 336 P.2d 1102 and Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Jones, Okla., 354 P.2d 415. Clearly 47 O.S.Supp. 1957 § 148[ 47-148](x), now section 12-301, 47 O.S. 1961, with certain changes, was violated by defendants in this case and we think that Bush v. Middleton, Okla., 340 P.2d 474, controls this case. As to defendants' second point we see no merit. There is nothing about the question which connected Mrs. Lollar's death with the accident out of which this case arose.