Stroud v. State. 272 Ga. 76, 77 (3) ( 526 S.E.2d 344) (2000). Compare Busbee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 17 ( 435 S.E.2d 60) (1993). 4.

Appellant cannot show how he was harmed by Roberts' passing comments which indicated that Fleming and Shawn Brown had prior criminal arrests. Compare Busbee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 17 ( 435 S.E.2d 60) (1993); Hill v. State, 176 Ga. App. 509 (3) ( 336 S.E.2d 276) (1985). The admission of testimony by Special Agent Ingram regarding his efforts in Florida to locate appellant and the second pistol used in the crime, even if error, does not require reversal; contrary to appellant's position, Georgia does not recognize the cumulative error rule.

After the trial court overruled Forehand's relevancy objection, counsel for the State inquired as to whether the defense witness was a "drug dealer." The court then sustained Forehand's objection and he sought no further relief. Compare Fields v. State, 260 Ga. 331, 333 (6) ( 393 S.E.2d 252) (1990) (meritorious hearsay objection erroneously overruled); Busbee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 17 ( 435 S.E.2d 60) (1993) (meritorious relevancy objection erroneously overruled). Since the transcript shows that the only objection to the characterization of the defense witness as a "drug dealer" was sustained below, we need not consider any possible prejudicial effect upon Forehand's own character.

Hill at 510 (3); Johnson at 591 (1). See also Busbee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 17, 18 ( 435 S.E.2d 60) (1993) (what is forbidden is for the state to introduce in the first instance evidence whose sole probative value is that it shows a defendant's bad character). After Taylor put on evidence of his good character and denied involvement with the drugs found in his apartment, the prosecutor cross-examined him about receipts that officers had found in the apartment which show that he had given money to two men who were incarcerated for cocaine distribution convictions.