Opinion
No. 04-21-00520-CV
07-27-2022
Christina Mitchell BUSBEE, in her capacity as District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District of Texas (Uvalde and Real Counties), Appellant v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, Texas, Appellee
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Gregory Sherwood, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 200613, Austin, TX 78720-0613, Christina Mitchell Busbee, 38th Judicial District Attorney, Courthouse Square, Box 5, Uvalde, TX 78801. APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Lauren A. Valkenaar, Greta S. McFarling, Chasnoff Mungia Valkenaar, Pepping & Stribling, LLP, 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150, San Antonio, TX 78209, Megan D. Sturm, Jackson Walker LLP, 100 Congress Ave., Suite 1100, Austin, TX 78701. Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Irene Rios, Justice, Beth Watkins, Justice
From the 454th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2021-03-26964-CV, Honorable Donna S. Rayes, Judge Presiding
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Gregory Sherwood, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 200613, Austin, TX 78720-0613, Christina Mitchell Busbee, 38th Judicial District Attorney, Courthouse Square, Box 5, Uvalde, TX 78801.
APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Lauren A. Valkenaar, Greta S. McFarling, Chasnoff Mungia Valkenaar, Pepping & Stribling, LLP, 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150, San Antonio, TX 78209, Megan D. Sturm, Jackson Walker LLP, 100 Congress Ave., Suite 1100, Austin, TX 78701.
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Irene Rios, Justice, Beth Watkins, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
In this accelerated appeal, appellant Christina Mitchell Busbee—District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District of Texas—seeks to reverse the trial court’s order dismissing her counter-petition against appellee County of Medina, Texas, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After considering the parties’ arguments, the record, and the law, we affirm the trial court’s order.
The underlying suit was brought by Medina County, seeking declaratory relief and to quiet title to real property located in Medina County. Busbee counterclaimed, asserting various causes of action against Medina County based on her claimed rights to the real property under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code Criminal Procedure.
B ackground
The parties do not dispute the events leading to this appeal. In 1998, Anton E. "Tony" Hackebeil—then the 38th Judicial District Attorney—authorized the distribution of funds from his office’s forfeiture account to purchase a building in Medina County, Texas ("the Building"). The Building would house the 38th Judicial District Attorney’s Office. At that time, the 38th Judicial District included Medina, Real, and Uvalde counties.
The Building’s deed named Medina County as grantee and specified the Building’s use as the 38th Judicial District Attorney’s Office "for so long as the property is owned by the county of Medina." The deed provided that Medina County could sell the Building with the 38th Judicial District Attorney’s consent.
Twenty years later, the Texas Legislature divided the 38th Judicial District into two judicial districts: Medina County became a new judicial district—the 454th Judicial District. Real County and Uvalde County remained in the 38th Judicial District. Act of May 27, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., S.B. 891, § 1.03 (amending Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 24.140, 24.598). The Legislature provided that the 38th Judicial District would retain jurisdiction over all three counties until January 1, 2021. Act of May 27, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., S.B. 891, ch. 54., § 6.03 (amending Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 43.123).
Anticipating the change, the Medina County Commissioner’s Court decided to obtain a new facility for the 454th Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Because the Building’s deed restricted use as the 38th Judicial District Attorney’s Office, Medina County decided to sell the Building. Mark Haby, who was then the 38th Judicial District Attorney—and who Busbee later named as a counter-defendant—agreed to the sale.
The county judges for Medina, Real, and Uvalde counties began discussing the distribution of sale proceeds. Under an interlocal agreement, the 38th Judicial District would receive 40% of sale proceeds, after reimbursement of Medina County’s maintenance costs. Medina County Appraisal District sought to purchase the Building. Busbee notified the Medina County Judge that she objected to the sale and asserted that all sale proceeds must be returned to the 38th Judicial District Attorney. At that time, Busbee worked as an assistant district attorney for the 38th Judicial District.
Busbee became the 38th Judicial District Attorney on January 1, 2021. Eleven days later, she again informed Medina County that all sale proceeds must be returned to the 38th Judicial District Attorney. On January 21, 2021, she filed a notice of lis pendens alerting potential buyers of her claim. Medina County responded by seeking a declaratory judgment that it owns the Building and can sell it, and by seeking removal of Busbee’s notice of lis pendens.
Busbee then filed a counter-petition asserting the Building’s deed was illegally and improperly granted to Medina County and that the deed violated Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. She asserted that Medina County must return all sale proceeds to the 38th Judicial District Attorney. In response, Medina County filed a plea to the jurisdiction and asserted that Busbee lacked standing to pursue her counterclaims. After considering the plea, the trial court found Busbee based her claims on Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Busbee lacked standing to pursue those claims. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed Busbee’s counter-petition. Busbee appealed.
Medina County filed other motions, but this appeal concerns only the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction.
[1] Busbee first asks us to abate the appeal for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We do not need additional findings of fact or conclusions of law because this appeal presents a legal question—whether Busbee has standing to pursue her counterclaims. See Dukatt v. Dukatt, 355 S.W.3d 231, 240 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) ("[A] trial court is not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with its order on a special appearance"). Abatement would serve no purpose except to delay the dispositions of this appeal and the underlying dispute. C hapter 59: T he B asis of B usbee’s C ounterclaims
According to Rule 28 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which concerns appeals of interlocutory orders such as this one, "[t]he trial court need not file findings of fact and conclusions of law but may do so within 30 days after the order is signed." Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(c).
Busbee based her counterclaims on Chapter 59. Chapter 59 governs the forfeiture of contraband used in the commission of certain offenses or acquired with the proceeds of certain offenses. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Ch. 59. Simply described, Chapter 59 allows a district attorney or a law enforcement agency to seize contraband. Id. art. 59.02–.03. After a seizure, Chapter 59 requires a hearing and a judgment to reassign title to seized property. Id. art. 59.04–.05. Upon a judgment, contraband becomes forfeiture property. See id. art. 59.06(f).
Chapter 59 tasks the attorney representing the state with administering forfeited property "in accordance with accepted accounting practices and with the provisions of any local agreement entered into between the attorney representing the state and law enforcement agencies." Id. art. 59.06(a). Chapter 59 defines the "[a]ttorney representing the state" as "the prosecutor with felony jurisdiction in the county in which a forfeiture proceeding is held under [Chapter 59]." Id. art. 59.01(1). For simplicity, this opinion refers to that attorney as a "district attorney." Upon a final judgment of forfeiture, Chapter 59 directs a district attorney to "dispose of the property in the manner required by Article 59.06 of this code." Id. art. 59.05(e).
Article 59.06 specifies authorized dispositions of forfeiture property. Id. art. 59.06. If the property would be useful to law enforcement—like a vehicle—the property can transfer to a law enforcement agency. Id. art. 59.06(b). But other property shall be sold at an auction with sale proceeds deposited into a district attorney’s forfeiture account for distribution for specified purposes. Id. art. 59.06(a). This appeal involves the latter option.
S tanding to E nforce C hapter 59
[2–5] Busbee contends the trial judge erred by determining she lacks standing to pursue her counterclaims. "Standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case." Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). Medina County properly challenged subject-matter jurisdiction with a plea to the jurisdiction. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554. Whether a party has standing to maintain a lawsuit is a question of law. Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). We review the trial court’s ruling on Medina County’s plea de novo. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020).
[6, 7] In this case, Chapter 59 provides the basis for standing. See Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851 ("When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis."). Article 59 authorizes the Texas Attorney General to bring a lawsuit to enforce Chapter 59’s requirements. The relevant language follows:
In the name of the state, the attorney general may institute in a district court … a suit for injunctive relief, to recover a civil penalty, or for both injunctive relief and a civil penalty if the results of an audit or investigation … indicate that the law enforcement agency or attorney representing the state has knowingly violated or is knowingly violating a provision of this chapter relating to the
disposition of proceeds or property received under this chapter.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.062(a) (emphasis added). No other Chapter 59 provision provides for a lawsuit. "When a statute explicitly provides certain rights of enforcement, but is silent as to the right sought to be enforced, we may presume that the Legislature intended for that right to not be included." Witkowski v. Brian, Fooshee & Yonge Props., 181 S.W.3d 824, 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). Because Chapter 59 explicitly confers a right of enforcement upon the Texas Attorney General, but is silent as to the right Busbee seeks to pursue, we presume the Legislature intended not to include that right.
Although Busbee frames her counterclaims and arguments in her duty to administer forfeited property, the essence of her counterclaims seeks to enforce Chapter 59. For example, the counter-petition seeks "to Quiet Title based on the illegality of the 1998 deed into Medina County," "to enforce the restriction within the 1998 deed and/or prevent the fraudulent sale of the Property," and "to require proceeds of the sale to be tendered to the 38th Judicial District Attorney." The counter-petition seeks judicial declarations that the Building is forfeiture property under Chapter 59, the 1998 deed naming Medina County as grantee is void, Medina County has no authority to convey the Building, and sale proceeds belong to the 38th Judicial District. Busbee asserted in a motion for summary judgment that "Medina [County] intends to usurp the legal authority of the District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District, sell the [building] and pocket the proceeds in direct violation of Chapter 59." These allegations and the relief sought sound in enforcement, not administration.
Busbee’s interpretation of Chapter 59 would extend a district attorney’s authority to administer forfeiture funds into perpetuity. But "[t]aken as a whole, [C]hapter 59 authorizes [a district attorney] to hold forfeited property only to administer it for ultimate disposition by sale or transfer." Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0122 (2003). The ultimate disposition of the forfeiture funds used to purchase the Building occurred in 1998 when Hackebeil used the funds to purchase the Building. No question exists that Hackebeil used the funds for an authorized purpose because Chapter 59 permits a district attorney to use forfeiture funds solely for the official purposes of his office. See Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.06(c)(1). Chapter 59 also identifies the purchase of a building as an official purpose of the office. Id. art. 59.06(d-4)(7).
C onclusion
The trial court correctly determined that Busbee based her claims on Chapter 59 and that Busbee lacked standing to pursue those claims. Without standing, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Busbee’s counterclaims. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Medina County’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Busbee’s counter-petition.