Opinion
No. 99-1304
December 6, 1999
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on two motions filed by Defendants: (1) motion for a more definite statement and (2) motion to strike.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Patricia Renee Burwell (Burwell) filed her complaint in this case on September 14, 1999. She alleges therein that during the 1997-1998 school year at Pekin High School (School) a group of male students, referred to as "M.O.B.," (MOB) harassed and intimidated Burwell and other students and faculty members. This harassment allegedly included physical touching, death threats, and verbal insults. Burwell further alleges that she reported this behavior to School administrators and officials, who took no disciplinary action against any M.O.B. members other than to bar them from the faculty parking lot. The complaint contains allegations that after Burwell's father protested officials' inadequate reaction to the complaints, he was arrested when he came onto school property to pick up Burwell. The complaint additionally contains allegations that Burwell's mother and brother were threatened or intimidated by members of MOB.
Burwell brings her claims under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., alleging that Defendants' were deliberately indifferent to the conduct of MOB members. In addition, Burwell claims that Defendants retaliated against her for complaining about MOB members' conduct by preventing her attendance at some sports events, barring her from the student parking lot and requiring her to take certain routes to and from the School. Burwell requests compensatory damages, punitive damages, an injunction, and fees and costs.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendants make several arguments in support of their motion for a more definite statement. First, they argue that the complaint fails to name the individuals who harassed Burwell and that Burwell should thus be required to identify or name specifically each of the students who harassed her. Also, Defendants argue that Burwell neglected to name or identify the officials to whom she reported the harassing behavior and that this defect requires a more definite statement in the complaint in order to allow Defendants to frame a response.
Defendants' target in their motions to strike is Plaintiffs request for punitive damages in addition to several paragraphs that refer to incidents with MOB involving Burwell's mother and her brother. Specifically, Defendants argue that punitive damages are not allowed in Title IX suits and that the allegations regarding Burwell's mother and brother are irrelevant and should be stricken.
A. Motion for a More Definite Statement
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a party may move for a more definite statement if the pleading to which he is permitted to respond "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." But, in light of the liberal discovery permitted under the Federal Rules, motions for a more definite statement are not favored. See Moore v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 557, 559-560 (N.D. Ill 1994).
Defendants' motion is premised on the idea that they cannot respond to Plaintiffs complaint because Plaintiffs have not named the group of students who allegedly harassed Burwell specifically by name and because Burwell has not identified the officials to whom she complained about the harassment.
The complaint, however, does contain more than sufficient information to allow Defendants to respond to Burwell's claims. Burwell has identified that the alleged harassers were a group of about 20-25 male students at Pekin High School all of whom were between 15-18 years of age and identified themselves as members of a group or gang referred to as "M.O.B." during the 1997-1998 school year.
But Burwell adds even more detail in the complaint. Burwell alleges that at least some of the MOB students were disciplined by being forbidden from the faculty parking lot and, in paragraph 22 of the complaint, that three members of MOB. were arrested at the school for an incident involving Burwell. Surely Defendants know or have reasonable means to find out which students the School has disciplined and which students have been arrested on school property. Therefore, Defendants argument that they are at a loss as to how to investigate the incidents and find out who allegedly harassed Burwell is simply not plausible. The motion for a more definite statement on this ground will therefore be denied.
In addition, Defendants argue that Burwell should provide more definite statements about those person or persons to whom she complained about the harassment and threats. This argument is even less plausible than the previous one. In paragraph 19(c), Burwell identifies the School Principal, Tim Ruwe, as one official involved in one of Burwell's complaints. In paragraph 20, Burwell identifies Vice-Principal Joseph Schwalb as an official who responded to Burwell's complaints. In addition, in paragraph 21, Burwell alleges that her parents complained to Superintendent Paula Davis, Officer Smallwood, and the School Board itself about the harassing conduct. In paragraph 35, Burwell alleges that during another meeting between Burwell's parents and Schwalb and Davis on March 27, 1998, a solution to Burwell's problems was discussed and proposed. Thus, it is very clear that Defendants can easily begin to investigate Burwell's claims. Speaking to the officials named in this paragraph, for instance, might be one obvious way to start an investigation. The Court will deny Defendants' motion on this point.
B. Motion to Strike
Motions to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) may be used to "strike from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material." These motions are often considered to be dilatory and wastes of time. SeeUnited States v. 416.81 Acres of Land, 514 F.2d 627, 629-32 (7th Cir. 1975); C. Wright, A. Miller, M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1381 (1990).
Defendants move to strike the punitive damages request in the complaint, stating that punitive damages are not available against municipalities under Title IX. Very little argument is offered in support. Defendants include a citation to the case ofCollier v. William Penn School Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (E.D. Pa. 1997). This case was overruled in an unpublished per curium opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on August 31, 1999. See Collier v. William Penn School Dist, 191 F.3d 444 (3rd Cir. 1999). Since the motion was filed on November 3, 1999, Defendants had a clear duty to call the Court's attention to this reversal of the Collier case. It would be even better to refrain from citing to cases that have been reversed.
Plaintiff argues that punitive damages are available against municipalities under Title IX. Her argument on this point is almost as meager as Defendants' contentions.
Nonetheless, the Court need not do an extensive analysis of this issue at this time. It is sufficient to note that the availability of punitive damages has not been resolved by the Supreme Court or addressed by the Seventh Circuit. Although the Supreme Court has held that an implied right of action exists under Title IX, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-89, (1979), and that a money damages remedy is available under Title IX, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66-73 (1992), the Court has not specifically held that punitive damages are available in Title IX cases. The courts that have addressed the issue are not in accord. See Canty v. Old Rochester Reg'l. Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp.2d 66, 69 (D. Mass., 1999) (noting the divergent approaches). Thus, it cannot be said at this stage of the case that Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is "immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous."
Municipalities, however, have been considered exempt from punitive damages in the context of § 1983 suits. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, (1981).
Defendants have also moved to strike the allegations in the complaint regarding the threats and harassment allegedly visited upon Burwell's brother and mother because such allegations are irrelevant to Burwell's claims. Defendants also seek to strike allegations regarding an incident between members of MOB and Burwell that occurred at a shopping mall.
Defendants specifically seek to have allegations in the following paragraphs stricken from the complaint: 29, 35, 43, 51, 53 and 56. But paragraph 29 alleges that MOB members harassed Burwell in the presence of her brother and paragraph 35 merely refers to a solution to the harassment of Burwell and her brother. Paragraph 43 refers to comments about Burwell made by an MOB member to Burwell's brother, while paragraphs 51, 53, and 61 refer to threats made to Burwell and her brother.
The Court will not strike these allegations. It is not necessarily true that threats and harassment of Burwell's brother in the context here has nothing at all to do with Burwell's claim. The threats allegedly concerned the attempt by Burwell's brother to intervene on her behalf to stop the offending conduct against Burwell. When the threats against Burwell's brother concerned her, as they apparently always did, the threats may be relevant to the pervasiveness of the harassment and Defendant's knowledge of the harassment. For instance, if MOB members threatened Burwell's brother by saying loudly in class "we'll get you for protecting your sister from our threats to rape her" and this threat was overheard by School officials, it clearly would seem to be relevant to Burwell's claims.
Defendants also argue that paragraphs 34, 46, 47, 50, 54 and 57 should be stricken because they concern Burwell's mother (herein "Mrs. Burwell") and are thus irrelevant to Burwell's claims. But paragraph 34 alleges that Mrs. Burwell found a vulgar and profane statement written on a desk that referred to females in insulting terms. Paragraph 46 refers to a sexist comment by some MOB members to Mrs. Burwell which she reported to officials at the School. Paragraph 47 refers to various conduct by MOB members that occurred in or around Mrs. Burwell's classroom. Paragraph 50, last sentence, refers to Mrs. Burwell's lack of authority to control or address MOB members' behavior, while paragraph 54 contains a vulgar statement regarding the Burwells collectively. Finally, paragraph 57 states that some MOB members stated `she's a slut" in Mrs. Burwell's presence, a comment that was allegedly directed at her.
These allegations, like the ones involving Burwell's brother, may be relevant to Burwell's claims. None of the allegations involve conduct by MOB members that appears to be unrelated to their treatment of Burwell herself. For instance, it is unclear whether the alleged retaliatory conduct by MOB members was directed at Burwell or her mother or perhaps both. This conduct by MOB members may also be relevant to Defendants' knowledge about, or deliberate indifference to, MOB members' harassment of Burwell. At the very least, it is certainly not clear that the allegations of concern to Defendants are immaterial, redundant or scandalous. The motion to strike on this ground will also be denied.
Finally, the Court will not strike the allegations in paragraphs 41, 44 or 62. Defendants argue, rather unconvincingly, that paragraph 41 should be stricken because it does not specifically allege that MOB members unlatched Burwell's hood, which eventually crashed into the windshield of her vehicle while she was driving it. Similarly, Defendants argue that paragraph 44 should be stricken because it too does not allege specifically that an MOB member unlatched Burwell's hood. Defendants fail to note that Burwell does allege that MOB members were allowed into the student parking area after being told to stay out of it, thus being allowed access to her vehicle. The clear inference is that an MOB member unlatched the hood. The motion to strike on this ground will be denied.
Paragraph 62 alleges that an MOB member harassed Burwell and impliedly threatened to rape her at a shopping mall on or around June 2, 1998. While this incident did not occur on school grounds, it may be relevant to Burwell's damages. Thus, the motion to strike paragraph 62 will be denied.
For the reasons given above, Defendants' motion for a more definite statement and Defendants' motion to strike (d/e 10) are both DENIED. Defendants directed to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint on or before December 22, 1999.